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ABSTRACT 
The Liberty to Take Fish 
Cod Fisheries, American Diplomacy, and Atlantic Environments, 1783–1877 
 
by 
 
Thomas Blake Earle 
 
The Anglo-American relationship across the long nineteenth century was one that was 
marked by the periodic oscillations between confrontation and cooperation. While the discourse 
between the leaders of either nation was marked by a kind of gentlemanly civility any sort of 
linear approach to the emergence of the “Special Relationship” of the mid-twentieth century 
obscures the significant transformations in transatlantic diplomacy during the nineteenth century. 
North Atlantic fisheries played a key role as transatlantic relations tacked between agreement 
and discord during the nineteenth century. This single issue allowed for and created the 
conditions necessary for addressing myriad other concerns and in the process continually 
redefined the relationship.  
The significant pivots in Anglo-Americans relations were in one manner or other 
intimately tied to the fisheries. Introducing the fisheries issues will demonstrate how, for 
instance, the Convention of 1818, the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854, and the Halifax Commission 
were the most vital junctures in transatlantic relations. This narrative of Anglo-American 
relations would remain obscured without an appreciation for the fisheries and the role of the 
environment more generally. While environmental history has long appreciated how proceedings 
in the human world were influenced by the natural, or nonhuman, world, diplomatic historians 
have been slow to consider that nexus. The transformations that are the focus of this dissertation 
would be invisible without the environmental lens. Fishermen, in addition to the fish they sought, 
are likewise important actors in this story as the on the ground, or perhaps water, decisions they 
made influenced the course of diplomacy at every level. 
This dissertation brings fish, fishermen, and statesmen together to tell the story of 
American foreign relations during the nation’s turbulent first century, and in doing so shows that 
elite politicians and diplomats were never isolated from the worlds they supposedly controlled. 
By integrating topics and characters often left to environmental and maritime histories into the 
narrative of foreign relations this dissertation offers a more complete understanding of American 
statecraft. At what seems to be a particularly dire moment in the environmental history of Earth, 
lessons about the interdependence between the human and nonhuman worlds should not, indeed 
cannot, be so lightly dismissed.   
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INTRODUCTION 
FISHERIES AND FOREIGN RELATIONS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 
 
The 1783 Treaty of Paris recognized the independence of the United States. Part of that 
independence was that this new state would have the “liberty to take fish” along the shores and 
in the seas adjacent to Britain’s remaining North American colonies. From its inception, the 
United States would define itself and its independence in terms of accessing and exploiting this 
maritime resource. When John Adams, member of the American peace delegation and the Bay 
State’s favorite son, demanded that the settlement address the North Atlantic fisheries, he entered 
the United States into a much older process of fisheries diplomacy. European fishermen were 
among the first to cross the Atlantic, and since the fifteenth century, the fishing grounds of the 
Northwest Atlantic were part of European imperialism and international politics. With American 
independence, the United States would cast its lot in with the European powers who had long 
used the fisheries as a makeweight in their diplomatic proceedings. In some respects the 
inclusion of the fisheries article in the Treaty of Paris was in no way novel. But the way that the 
fisheries would become so enmeshed in the workings of American politics—indeed become 
equated with independence itself—demonstrated that the American brand of fisheries politics 
would at least be unique.  
This dissertation argues that cod fishing in places like the Bay of Fundy, the Gulf of St. 
Lawrence, and the Grand Banks operated as a central facet of American statecraft and 
nationalism for much of the nineteenth century. The fisheries stood at the nexus of multiple 
forces—economic, social, and cultural—making the question the fodder of politics at multiple 
levels—local, regional, and national. The phrase fisheries issue will serve as shorthand for the 
series of questions that surrounded American commercial fishing in the North Atlantic. 
Internationally, the question was one of who could fish where, while domestically, the central 
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question concerned the degree to which the American state would support the fishing industry 
both politically and economically. While such fishing was a subject of foreign diplomacy, it was 
enmeshed in both domestic and international commerce, and implicated in concerns ranging 
from the nature of American federalism and the relations between the sections, to the military 
and national security, and even to competing definitions of nationhood. The fisheries issue 
encompasses how these various dynamics intersected at the fishing grounds. Commercial fishing 
occupied such an important place in the operations of the federal government because it 
represented so much more than just fish. The fisheries became an environment upon which the 
American political community ascribed various meanings. Fundamental beliefs like 
independence and national security were tied to the daily operations of fishing to make this 
maritime environment an important element of American state making.1    
While seemingly a parochial concern of the few fishing towns along New England’s and 
Canada’s Atlantic coast, fishing resonated at the highest level of government. This maritime 
industry provided the tissue connecting the wharves of Gloucester, the halls of Congress, and the 
cabinet rooms of Washington and London. The federal government had a sustained investment in 
the productive capacity of the fisheries. From the Second Congress the federal government 
directly supported the cod fishing industry through the payment of bounties to fishermen. For 
more than six decades federal coffers fed the industry—at times providing necessary capital to 
sustain fishermen during particularly lean years—under the assumption these maritime laborers 
were of singular importance to the American polity. But perhaps the strongest evidence of the 
                                                
1 The projection of political ideas onto environments resonates with Paul S. Sutter’s notion that landscapes are 
hybrid assemblages of human and non-human elements, bridging the nature-culture divide within the environmental 
history literature, see Sutter, “The World with Us: The State of American Environmental History,” Journal of 
American History 100 (June 2013): 94–119.  
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federal defense of the fisheries was found in the series of treaties the United States and Great 
Britain concluded across the nineteenth century. As a subject of diplomacy, an important 
industrial sector, and an element of American nationalism, the North Atlantic fisheries did not 
escape the attention of the federal government. The way fishing concerns resonated with political 
concerns, however, was not unique to the cod fisheries.   
Ocean fisheries inhabit an interesting niche within the historiography of both the 
environment and of diplomacy. This aquatic resource is most often tied to the problems of 
regulating an elusive, but ubiquitous, mobile resource with little concern for humanity’s political 
and regulatory regimes. Often times these kinds of resources demanded the attention of political 
establishments not only because of their value as commodities but because of their mobile 
nature, making them fundamentally different than other resources. Active political regimes have 
been necessary to facilitate the extraction of this resource because of its peculiar nature. 
Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Anglo-American commentators often 
compared the value of the fisheries to the wealth of silver and gold mines, and the labor of 
fishermen to that of farmers. These overwrought metaphors hint at just how difficult states found 
regulating such a fickle resource. Histories of fisheries are often tied to how governments at 
various levels worked to claim, manage, and defend the right of their citizens to exploit a 
maritime resource. In that way, then, the histories of fisheries become the history of statecraft.2        
                                                
2 The best recent example of the intermingling of political history and fisheries is Lissa K. Wadewitz, The Nature of 
Borders: Salmon, Boundaries, and Bandits on the Salish Sea (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2012); also 
see Harold Adams Innis, The Cod Fisheries: The History of an International Economy (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1940); Arthur F. McEvoy, The Fisherman’s Problem: Ecology and Law in the California 
Fisheries, 1850-1980 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Barbara J. Garrity-Blake, The Fish Factory: 
Work and Meaning for Black and White Fishermen of the American Menhaden Industry (Knoxville: University of 
Tennessee Press, 1994); Wayne M. O’Leary, Maine Sea Fisheries: The Rise and Fall of a Native Industry, 1830-
1890 (Boston: Northwestern University Press, 1996); Mark Kurlansky, Cod: A Biography of the Fish that Changes 
the World (New York: Walker and Co., 1997); Kurkpatrick Dorsey, The Dawn of Conservation Diplomacy: U.S.-
Canadian Wildlife Protection Treaties in the Progressive Era (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1998); 
Joseph E. Taylor, Making Salmon: An Environmental History of the Northwest Fisheries Crisis (Seattle: University 
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While the fisheries issue would become part of the larger workings of the American state, 
the fisheries would become most consequential in the realm of diplomacy. In 2000, historian 
Kinley Brauer called the study of foreign relations during the nineteenth century the “great 
American desert” of diplomatic history.3 One would be hard pressed to claim to have seen the 
desert bloom in the intervening decade and a half at the yearly meeting of the Society for 
Historians of American Foreign Relations—topics dealing with the first century of American 
diplomatic history make up a paltry number of panels in any given year. But the subfield of 
nineteenth-century American foreign relations has grown significantly during that period. If the 
desert remains, the monographic literature is at least a steadily growing oasis.  
This dissertation is firmly rooted in the history of nineteenth-century American foreign 
relations. Americans consistently looked beyond their borders—both maritime and terrestrial—
and in the process foreign relations became an often-contested field focused on national self-
definition. The earliest generations of historians approached this broad topic with great care and 
did much to meticulously explicate the inner workings of American power. But these studies 
were premised on narrow terms and concerned only with the elite cadre of policy makers in 
Washington.4 These studies also overlooked serious engagement with the multivalent 
                                                
of Washington Press, 1999); H. Bruce Franklin, The Most Important Fish in the Sea: Menhaden and America 
(Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 2007); Christopher P. Magra, The Fisherman’s Cause: Atlantic Commerce and 
Maritime Dimensions of the American Revolution (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Christine Keiner, 
The Oyster Question: Scientists, Watermen, and the Maryland Chesapeake Bay since 1880 (Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 2009); Brian J. Payne, Fishing a Borderless Sea: Environmental Territorialism in the North Atlantic, 
1818-1910 (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2010); and Carmel Finley, All the Fish in the Sea: 
Maximum Sustainable Yield and the Failure of Fisheries Management (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2011). 
 
3 Kinley Brauer, “The Great American Desert Revisited: Recent Literature and Prospects for the Study of American 
Foreign Relations, 1815-1861,” in Paths to Power: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations to 1941, ed. 
Michael J. Hogan, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 44–78. 
 
4 For a sampling of these early studies see Dexter Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine, 1823–1826 (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1927); Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine, 1826–1867 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1933); Samuel Flagg Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Foundation of American Foreign Policy (New 
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connections between the exterior processes that define foreign relations and the ostensibly 
international workings of domestic politics. Jay Sexton’s work on the Monroe Doctrine is 
instructive as he is mindful of “the potential overlap between internal divisions and foreign 
threats,” making clear that effective scholarship is attuned to “both the external relations of the 
United States and its internal dynamics and politics.”5 A more recent cohort of historians 
representing a range of methodological orientations have approached early republic and 
antebellum foreign relations with this connection in mind, showing that the foreign and the 
domestic were always tied together in the creation of American identities.    
Expansion has been the watchword for much of this literature. Unsurprisingly, the 
continental West, a region stretching from the Appalachians to the Pacific, has factored 
prominently into studies of early America’s interaction with foreign entities from European 
empires to Native American polities.6 The process of violence and dispossession that has defined 
American continental expansion has been subsumed under the tidy rubric of Manifest Destiny. 
Despite its association with an amateurish, inchoate, and reactionary approach to foreign policy, 
Manifest Destiny represented a clear, if not always consistent approach to foreign relations that 
                                                
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949); and Norman A. Graebner, Empire on the Pacific: A Study in American Continental 
Expansion (New York: Ronald Press Company, 1955). Brauer observes that these works “have not served as models 
for fresh investigations. Nearly all of them are narrowly conceived diplomatic histories that rely on traditional 
methodology,” “The Great American Desert Revisited,” 47.  
 
5 Jay Sexton, The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century America (New York: Hill and Wang, 
2011), 10, 13. 
 
6 The West was the first proving ground for the expansionism that would come to define American foreign relations 
during this period, see William Earl Weeks, John Quincy Adams and American Global Empire (Lexington: 
University Press of Kentucky, 1992); Anders Stephanson, Manifest Destiny: American Expansionism and the 
Empire of Right (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995); Peter S. Onuf, Jefferson’s Empire: The Language of American 
Nationhood (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2000); Steven Stoll, Larding the Lean Earth: Soil and 
Society in Nineteenth-Century America (New York: Hill and Wang, 2002); Adam Rothman, Slave Country: 
American Expansion and the Origins of the Deep South (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007); Bethel 
Saler, The Settlers’ Empire: Colonialism and State Formation in America’s Old Northwest (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 2015); and Honor Sachs, Home Rule: Households, Manhood, and National Expansion on the 
Eighteenth-Century Kentucky Frontier (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015). 
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approached the status of grand strategy with territorial acquisition and commercial expansion as 
the overriding goals. Thomas R. Hietala dispels the notion that foreign relations were of little 
concern for the denizens of nineteenth-century Washington, more the preoccupation of those 
agents actually on the frontier. Instead, Hietala notes that while “[p]ioneers played a role in 
expansion…the historical record points to politicians…as the primary agents of empire.”7 
Obviously the invasion of and ensuing war with Mexico in the 1840s have been the linchpins of 
this body of scholarship and are oftentimes taken as the major turning point in histories of 
antebellum foreign engagement.8 By defining gender roles, class relations, and racial attitudes, 
the continental expansion that was so much a part of Manifest Destiny proved to present the 
rhetorical and geographic space to explore and bound American nationalism.  
Study of American foreign relations during the nineteenth century does not, indeed 
cannot, assume the eventual boundaries the states would take. While the manifestly destined 
coveted continental territory, expansionists looked south in a similarly greedy fashion. Latin 
America and the Caribbean have also proven to be an area of rich inquiry for recent scholarship. 
Tied to a pivotal period in the history of defining American identity, relations between the 
United States and the nations of the Caribbean Basin and South America were shot through with 
sectional tensions. The circum-Caribbean was never just a static backdrop on which southern 
slaveholders projected their idle imperial fancies. This region proved to be a vital front upon 
                                                
7 Thomas R. Hietala, Manifest Design: American Exceptionalism and Empire (1985; Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 2003), x. 
 
8 For works addressing the U.S.-Mexican War and the context of American expansion see Reginald Horsman, Race 
and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1981); Paul Foos, A Short, Offhand, Killing Affair: Soldiers and Social Conflict During the Mexican-
American War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002); Amy S. Greenberg, Manifest Manhood and 
the Antebellum American Empire (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Brian DeLay, War of a Thousand 
Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.-Mexican War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); and Greenberg, A 
Wicked War: Polk, Clay, Lincoln, and the 1846 U.S. Invasion of Mexico (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012).  
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which the ostensibly domestic contest of North and South was waged. While the impulses of 
expansion were an important motivating factor, just as it was in continental North America, 
actual territorial acquisition was minimal, but no less important in how the region factored into 
the co-constitutive processes of foreign relations and nationalism.9  
An emerging literature removes the study of foreign relations from the Americas, if not 
the hemisphere. Still concerned with expansion, though commercial not territorial, this 
historiographical vein turns its attention to the Pacific world—the South Seas, as nineteenth-
century Americans would have understood it. In the ports of the vast Pacific, American nationals 
were forced to defend and define themselves in opposition to competing European merchants to 
ensure the success of their commercial ventures, and by doing so Americans crafted certain 
national identities as they interacted with foreign peoples.10 
                                                
9 Studies addressing American relations with Latin America include Robert E. May, The Southern Dream of a 
Caribbean Empire, 1854-1861 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973); James E. Lewis, The 
American Union and the Problem of Neighborhood: The United States and the Collapse of the Spanish Empire, 
1783-1829 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998);  May, Manifest Destiny’s Underworld: 
Filibustering in Antebellum America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002); Gerald Horne, The 
Deepest South: The United States, Brazil, and the African Slave Trade (New York: New York University Press, 
2007); Matthew Pratt Guterl, American Mediterranean: Southern Slaveholders in the Age of Emancipation 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008); Edward Bartlett Rugemer, The Problem of Emancipation: The 
Caribbean Roots of the American Civil War (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2008); Walter 
Johnson, River of Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton Kingdom (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 2013); David Head, Privateers of the Americas: Spanish American Privateering from the United States and 
the Influence of Geopolitics in the Early Republic (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2015); Caitlin Fitz, Our 
Sister Republics: The United States in an Age of American Revolutions (New York: Liveright Publishing, 2016); and 
Matthew Karp, This Vast Southern Empire: Slaveholders at the Helm of American Foreign Policy (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2016).   
 
10 Mirroring the rise of Atlantic world scholarship a historiography is developing around the Pacific, for related 
works see Matt K. Matsuda, Pacific Worlds: A History of Seas, Peoples, and Cultures (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012); David Igler, The Great Ocean: Pacific Worlds from Captain Cook to the Gold Rush (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Gregory T. Cushman, Guano and the Opening of the Pacific World: A 
Global Ecological History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Dane A. Morrison, True Yankees: The 
South Seas and the Discovery of American Identity (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014); and Brian 
Rouleau, With Sails Whitening Every Sea: Mariners and the Making of an American Maritime Empire (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2014). 
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Although the expansionist impulse guided and shaped much early American foreign 
relations, perhaps the most important geographic field did not entail any expansion. How the 
United States interacted with European states did much to influence the development of 
American identities. The transatlantic intellectual networks of the nineteenth century brought 
Europe and the United States into direct contact to address nationalism and abolition as 
paramount political problems of the era. The creation of American national identities did not 
happen in isolation but was part of a transatlantic discourse, just as abolition became entwined in 
the process.11 But of course European-American relations were not confined to these kinds of 
intellectual problems, but were based in the more material politics of economics and migration. 
As a point of commercial exchange and a source of migrants, Europe loomed large in how 
Americans at home, including the recently arrived, thought about themselves and their place in 
the world.12  
Historians have been hard pressed to define American foreign relations during the 
nineteenth century in any singularly coherent way.13 The expansionist impulse that characterized 
                                                
11 For transatlantic connections see Timothy Morton Roberts, Distant Revolutions: 1848 and the Challenge to 
American Exceptionalism (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2009); Paul Quigley, Shifting Grounds: 
Nationalism and the American South, 1848-1865 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Jenny S. Martinez, 
The Slave Trade and the Origins of International Human Rights Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); 
Andre M. Fleche, The Revolution of 1861: The American Civil War in the Age of Nationalist Conflict (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2012); and W. Caleb McDaniel, The Problem of Democracy in the Age of 
Slavery: Garrisonian Abolitionists and Transatlantic Reform (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
2013).  
 
12 The Irish proved to be the most important immigrant group with regard to American foreign relations, see Angela 
F. Murphy, American Slavery, Irish Freedom: Abolition, Immigrant Citizenship, and the Transatlantic Movement 
for Irish Repeal (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2010) and David Sim, A Union Forever: The Irish 
Question and U.S. Foreign Relations in the Victorian Age (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2013). 
 
13 In one of the rare overviews of American foreign policy during the middle decades of the nineteenth century, 
historian Paul A. Varg remarks that there is “no overarching theory to explain what took place. The chief 
characteristic of both policy formation and the conduct of foreign affairs was the multiplicity of factors entering 
decision making.” United States Foreign Relations, 1820-1860 (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 
1979). 
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the United States’ disposition towards the Americas, while an important optic in understanding 
the nation’s transatlantic relations, fails to appreciate the full complexity of the United States’ 
most important transatlantic relationship, that with Great Britain. The fisheries issue may, 
however, present a way out of this impasse by bringing questions of commercial and territorial 
expansion into direct conversation with transatlantic relations. While claims to maritime 
environments were obviously more tenuous than land-based claims, the fisheries issue was 
fundamentally concerned with claiming, controlling, expanding, and bounding geographic space 
along an ever-changing maritime frontier.14 The effort of politicians to impose order on the 
fisheries was often frustrated because of the fluidity of this environment, and thus led to 
confrontation over the inability to mold the environment to human demands. While American 
fishing interests sought to expand the footprint of fishing operations, it also sought great 
opportunities to sell American fish in the foreign markets of the Caribbean and Mediterranean in 
a way that mirrored the larger goals of other commercial enterprises. All the while this 
geographic and commercial expansion brought the United States, through both its fishermen and 
diplomats, into direct contact with European competitors, primarily Great Britain. In this sense, 
the fisheries issue brings together the primary elements of American foreign relations during the 
early republic and antebellum years.          
*** 
            
Conceptions of American identity were triangulated—created by the United States’ 
relationship with other international actors. Great Britain proved to be the nation that was most 
                                                
14 The idea of a frontier, though not in a Turnerian sense, may prove to be an appropriate analytic for understanding 
maritime spaces as a way to tie continental expansion and maritime expansion, see Brian Rouleau, “Maritime 
Destiny as Manifest Destiny: American Commercial Expansionism and the Idea of the Indian,” Journal of the Early 
Republic 30 (Fall 2010): 377–411. 
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often and most forcefully implicated in American statecraft, and that relationship informs this 
work. This dissertation fills a gap in the historical literature on Anglo-American relations, which 
almost entirely ignores the North Atlantic fisheries in this diplomatic story. But it is not merely 
that the fisheries contend for space among the “important” topics of Anglo-American relations. 
Adding fish to a list including topics like impressment, finance, slavery, and expansion yields 
few analytical insights. Considering the role of the North Atlantic fisheries in the calculus of 
transatlantic relations forces us to reconsider how those disparate elements work together and has 
the power to yield an understanding of American foreign relations with greater nuance and 
texture.  
The fisheries issue was the center around which various elements of Anglo-American 
relations would accrete and offers a reconceptualization of the chronology of transatlantic 
relations. While not a ubiquitous problem for the United States and Great Britain across the 
nineteenth century, the fisheries would, on multiple occasions, provide the context for 
fundamental revaluations of Anglo-American relations. The fisheries issue offers coherency to 
the first century of British-American diplomacy. In so doing the fisheries issue provides a 
narrative that is attuned to shifting contexts without assuming the amelioration of the so-called 
grand rapprochement. Much of the historiography assumes the approach of the “Special 
Relationship” like a tidal wave that would, in an instant, remake the nature of transatlantic ties by 
washing away the discord of the past. Fisheries diplomacy, however, shows that Anglo-
American relations were marked by the constant lapping of waves oscillating between 
confrontation and cooperation.   
The historiography of Anglo-American relations has remained tethered to the 
contemporary politics of transatlantic ties. Amid the victorious afterglow of World War II, 
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transatlantic commentators were not bashful in rhapsodizing about the flowering of Anglo-
American relations. Even though war threatened to rive the relationship a mere generation 
earlier, the postwar period witnessed comment from scholars and politicians alike concerning the 
maturation of the “Special Relationship” and the deep historical and cultural ties that bound these 
nations.15 Indicative of such sentiment were the observations of historian H. C. Allen. In his 
1955 work, Great Britain and the United States: A History of Anglo-American Relations, Allen, 
with an eye towards the future, confidently declared that “of all historical subjects, it is possibly 
true that the history of Anglo-American relations is the most important, as well as the most 
relevant, to the future of Western civilization.” With stakes set so high, Allen crafted a narrative 
of Anglo-American relations in which the “powerful but sometimes fickle bonds of emotion,” 
and “manifold links embedded deep in the lives of both peoples,” incessantly tilt towards 
conciliation and amity. Allen even went so far as to dismiss the American Revolution, the War of 
1812, and the subsequent decades of mutual distrust and suspicion that marked the nineteenth 
century as merely the American son chaffing under the unfair, but well intentioned, tutelage of 
the British father. Soon enough “filial soreness” and “aggrieved parental authority” were 
replaced with mutual affection. In Allen’s retelling, the story of Anglo-American relations was 
one dominated by cooperation, not confrontation.16  
While such a narrative obviously reflects the tenor of mid-twentieth century international 
politics, that narrative has cast a long shadow on subsequent interpretations of Anglo-American 
relations. For many historians of Anglo-American relations during the nineteenth century the 
                                                
15 Winston Churchill is credited with coining the phrase “special relationship” in his March, 1946 speech, “The 
Sinews of Peace,” perhaps more famous for coining another term, “the Iron Curtain.” 
 
16 H. C. Allen, Great Britain and the United States: A History of Anglo-American Relations (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1955), 19, 17–18, 27. 
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comity of the twentieth century is a given and thus the job of historians becomes finding the 
point at which revolution turned to rapprochement and ultimately—if not inevitably—the 
“Special Relationship.”17 Although more contemporary scholarship is not quite so cavalier as 
Allen in writing off the friction of the nineteenth century entirely, finding that turning point has 
become the primary concern of this body of work. The most popular answer to this 
historiographical question has been the decade of the 1840s.  
Historians have often looked to the 1840s for evidence of the decisive turning point in 
Anglo-American relations in which the frictions of the early republic were replaced by the 
fraternity of the Gilded Age. There is much about this decade that would suggest a fundamental 
set of changes. The conclusion of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty (1842) finally settled the border 
between Maine and New Brunswick, assuaging tensions that had simmered since the Revolution. 
Settlement of the Oregon Question showed that Anglo-American statesmen at last embraced the 
utility of cooperation over confrontation. Even the U.S.-Mexican War, an event ostensibly 
removed from the workings of Anglo-American relations, could not, in the words of Sam W. 
Haynes, “fail to transform the nation’s formal relations with Great Britain,” as the United States 
“had forged an empire by conquest,” and was, at long last, the equal of Britain.18 On this 
account, the end of the 1840s the United States and Great Britain were no longer enemies, but 
were certainly rivals, if not headed for friendship.19         
                                                
17 The most obvious example of this tendency is Duncan Andrew Campbell, Unlikely Allies: Britain, America, and 
the Victorian Origins of the Special Relationship (London: Hambledon Continuum, 2007).  
 
18 Sam W. Haynes, Unfinished Revolution: The Early American Republic in a British World (Charlottesville: 
University of Virginia Press, 2010), 279. 
 
19 For literature that focuses on the 1840s and the pacification of Anglo-American relations see Charles Campbell, 
From Revolution to Rapprochement: The United States and Great Britain, 1783-1900 (New York: Wiley, 1974); 
Howard Jones, To the Webster-Ashburton Treaty: A Study in Anglo-American Relations, 1783-1843 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1977); Kenneth R. Stevens, Border Diplomacy: The Caroline and McLeod 
Affairs in Anglo-American-Canadian Relations, 1837-1842 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1989); 
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These histories may succeed in retelling the gritty details of ongoing boundary disputes 
and trade disagreements, not to mention the palpable tensions that existed among statesmen on 
both sides of the Atlantic. Yet these works are all premised upon the notion that Anglo-American 
relations would eventually be turned to more constructive ends and only needed irritants like the 
Maine-Canadian border removed so that father and son could reunite in transatlantic harmony. In 
doing so this literature overlooks such significant tension as that of the Civil War era or the near-
war between the two in the 1890s over the disputed Venezuela border. But perhaps more 
egregiously, it overlooks nuance in constructing an overly simplistic and all-too-linear narrative. 
It is in this regard that the fisheries issue alters accepted narrative through rigorous attention to 
context.   
The work of Jay Sexton provides a model for navigating through the morass. Through a 
study of the complex relationship between international finance and American foreign relations 
during the middle decades of the nineteenth century, Sexton shows how the United States’ need 
for foreign capital moves the historiography of American diplomacy beyond a narrow focus on 
territorial and commercial expansion while providing a degree of coherency that is intensely 
attuned to shifting contexts. Although Sexton tends to see the financial needs of the United States 
as operating as “a powerful incentive for American statesmen to pursue a conciliatory foreign 
policy, particularly in relations with Britain, the nation’s chief creditor,” he does recognize that 
foreign indebtedness “did not always pave the way to harmonious foreign relations,” but, in fact, 
“had the potential to incite controversy.” By acknowledging this complexity Sexton eschews any 
                                                
Donald Rakestraw, For Honor or Destiny: The Anglo-American Crisis over the Oregon Territory (New York: P. 
Lang, 1995); Howard Jones and Donald Rakestraw, Prologue to Manifest Destiny: Anglo-American Relations in the 
1840s  (Wilmington, Del.: SR Books, 1997); and Francis M. Carroll, A Good and Wise Measure: The Search for the 
Canadian-American Boundary, 1783–1842 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001). 
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attempt to impose a linear narrative on the story of Anglo-American relations during the 
nineteenth century. Sexton’s work is also instructive in that his focus on the financial history of 
the United States provides an issue that brings together, in his words, “matters as diverse as state 
politics in Mississippi, evangelicals’ discussions of morality in Pennsylvania, the fate of the 
Confederacy, and the severity of stock market panics on Wall Street….foreign 
investment…needs to be considered not only in relations to foreign policy decisions, but also as 
a component of the nation’s larger relationship with the wider world, and with Britain in 
particular.”20     
This dissertation uses Sexton as a model. The fisheries issue operated in much the same 
way as Sexton’s financial networks. Both serve as neglected aspects of American foreign 
relations history that bring together a host of questions and actors that are frequently estranged to 
render new interpretations of Anglo-American diplomacy while offering a more coherent 
understanding of American foreign relations. But the fisheries issue pushes beyond the more 
constrained parameters of Sexton’s work. Sexton’s world of Anglo-American diplomacy is one 
populated exclusively by national politicians and elite financiers, two groups that were, at times, 
difficult to distinguish. While these actors are incredibly important in any analysis of Anglo-
American relations, the fisheries issue broadens the scope. Secretaries of State and high-level 
diplomats, of course, populate this narrative, but the fisheries issue also incorporates actors 
including consuls, merchants, ship owners, fishermen and other maritime laborers, politically 
engaged citizens at every level, and even the fish themselves. While this study gives little 
attention to the women in shore-side maritime communities and the enslaved African Americans 
who consumed much of this fish, to name but two groups intimately tied to the operation of the 
                                                
20 Jay Sexton, Debtor Diplomacy: Finance and American Foreign Relations in the Civil War Era (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), 7–8. 
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fishing industry, it does significantly broaden the cast of characters often found in studies of 
American foreign relations during this, or any, period.       
This history of American fisheries diplomacy between the Treaty of Paris (1783) and the 
Halifax Fisheries Commission (1877) reinterprets Anglo-American relations by offering a series 
of turning points often overlooked by other historians. At no point does this narrative imply 
rapprochement. Instead the fisheries issue shows the degree to which Anglo-American relations 
were subjected to constant oscillations between cooperation and confrontation, accommodation 
and acrimony. As this dissertation argues, the Convention of 1818, the Reciprocity Treaty of 
1854, and the Treaty of Washington of 1871 were the most important turning points in Anglo-
American relations across the nineteenth century. These were pivotal dates in which Anglo-
American statesmen reconsidered the nature of transatlantic ties as they touched on questions as 
diverse as the placement of the U.S.-Canadian border, commercial interactions, and Great 
Britain’s tacit support of the Confederacy during the Civil War. But threaded through these 
discussions was the fisheries issue. In each instance the United States and Great Britain were 
brought to the bargaining table to address immediate questions relating to the fisheries and in the 
process addressed a host of outstanding disputes. The fisheries issue often provided the 
circumstances for Anglo-American relations to pivot from friction to fidelity and back.      
*** 
 
This narrative of American foreign relations during the nineteenth century would, 
however, remain obscured without an environmental perspective. American foreign relations and 
environmental history are two fields that have remained largely estranged from each other. On 
the face of it, this divide in the literature is puzzling. Both fields follow processes that are 
international in scope. Environments, like diplomats, necessarily cross borders. But each of these 
  
 
16 
fields have traditionally been interested in far different questions, showing the mutual 
indifference these literatures have shared. Despite nearly two decades of calls to meld these two 
approaches, enviro-diplomatic history remains a small—though growing—subfield.  
In the first substantive call for an environmental-diplomatic history Mark H. Lytle 
exhorts his audience of foreign relations historians to embrace the subject, if not perspective, of 
environmental history in order to remain relevant. Explaining to readers of Diplomatic History in 
1996, Lytle bluntly remarks that “if we do not make an environmental perspective central to our 
study of foreign policy, we may consign ourselves to increasing irrelevance.”21 The mid-1990s 
seemed to be a pivotal time for diplomatic history as the conclusion of the Cold War left the field 
without its gravitational center. Without a communist specter in a bipolar world, American 
foreign policy and its study were free to focus attention on new questions, perhaps even 
environmental ones. Environmental diplomacy evangelist extraordinaire Kurk Dorsey has gone 
so far as to say that for the field of American foreign relations history, including environmental 
perspectives presents an opportunity “as great as the opportunity presented by the opening of 
East European archives for Cold War studies.”22 But barriers to cross-pollination seemed high. 
Lytle observed that there was a geographic, if not cultural, divide as environmental history grew 
out of the study of the American West while diplomatic history was, as always, focused on the 
pinstriped cookie pushers in Foggy Bottom. Driving the point home, Lytle continues, “Where on 
the diplomacy side we imagine the tea-and-crumpet set gathering in business suits and tweeds at 
the Council on Foreign Relations’ upper-east-side quarters…on the other we have the Levi-clad, 
                                                
21 Mark H. Lytle, “An Environmental Approach to American Diplomatic History,” Diplomatic History 20 (April 
1996): 281. 
 
22 Kurkpatrick Dorsey, “Dealing with the Dinosaur (and Its Swamp): Putting the Environment in Diplomatic 
History,” Diplomatic History 29 (September 2005): 575.  
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granola-munching sons and daughters of the West tromping the fields and forests.”23 But Lytle’s 
cheek aside, perhaps the most important point of departure between environmental and 
diplomatic history is the latter’s overwhelming preoccupation with human actors. The study of 
foreign relations is almost necessarily human centered, while much of environmental history’s 
innovation and dynamism come from its focus on the non-human world and its agency.24     
But this contrast in subject—human versus nature—has not completely retarded the 
subfield’s development. Environmental history spent most of its first generation of existence 
sorting through the divergent pulls of nature and culture, while diplomatic history, or whatever 
en vogue appellation it has adopted, has expanded its preoccupation to include a cast of 
characters beyond the narrow world of elite policy makers. Such work is certainly possible, 
indeed desirable and even necessary, but despite Dorsey’s almost singlehanded attempts to coax 
this field into fuller form—even calling the environment “the great untapped vein of American 
diplomatic history”—few self-consciously styled environmental-diplomatic histories exist.25 As 
recently as 2013 Dorsey speculated that, given the dearth of scholarship in the decade since his 
first call to arms, perhaps he was “mistaken” to think that environmental and diplomatic history 
had much to say to each other. He concluded that such pessimism may be unwarranted, but 
plenty of rocks remain unturned.26    
                                                
23 Lytle, “An Environmental Approach to American Diplomatic History,” 282. As a regular attendee of SHAFR and 
ASEH, I can attest that Lytle’s sartorial stereotyping is not that far off.  
 
24 The extreme of environmental history posits the environment as the central entity shaping human agency; see 
Linda Nash, “The Agency of Nature or the Nature of Agency?” Environmental History 10 (January 2005): 67–69.  
 
25 Dorsey, “International Environmental Issues,” in A Companion to American Foreign Relations, ed., Robert D. 
Schulzinger, (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 31. Despite other works falling into this category, really 
only Dorsey and Thomas Robertson are trained and self-identify as diplomatic-environmental historians. 
 
26 Dorsey, “Perhaps I Was Mistaken: Writing about Environmental Diplomacy over the Last Decade,” Passport: The 
Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Review 44 (September 2013): 37–41. 
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To little surprise, what does exist in this subfield is overwhelming focused on the Cold 
War. Things as epochal as the Vietnam War and as ubiquitous as international development have 
attracted scholarly interest as traditional topics of foreign relations history with significant 
environmental components.27 Most crucially, at least in terms of this dissertation, work in this 
vein has exposed two particularly relevant areas within the Cold War confines. First, is the 
ocean. As Dorsey observes, “Work on the oceans…naturally lends itself to a combination of 
diplomatic and environmental methodologies, in part because the use of the high seas requires 
the input of diplomats, but also because the oceans present significant opportunities for scientists 
and resource managers.”28 Jacob Darwin Hamblin’s work has shown how oceans have factored 
prominently in the minds of policymakers as an important field of foreign relations. Cold War 
fisheries diplomacy has likewise generated important scholarship.29 Second, the emerging 
subfield of environmental-diplomatic history has brought to the fore the multifaceted relationship 
between “external” and “internal” processes. From fears of overpopulation, to the development 
                                                
27 Illustrative work includes Nick Cullather, The Hungry World: America’s Cold War Battle Against Poverty in Asia 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010); David Zierler, The Invention of Ecocide: Agent Orange, 
Vietnam, and the Scientists Who Changed the Way We Think about the Environment (Athens: University of Georgia 
Press, 2011); Edwin A. Martini, Agent Orange: History, Science, and the Politics of Uncertainty (Amherst: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 2012); Kate Brown, Plutopia: Nuclear Families, Atomic Cities, and the Great 
Soviet and American Plutonium Disasters (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). The publication of edited 
collections is suggestive of the subfield’s maturation; see J. R. McNeill and Corinna R. Unger, eds., Environmental 
Histories of the Cold War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); and Erika Marie Bsumek, David 
Kinkela, and Mark Atwood Lawrence, eds., Nation-States and the Global Environment: New Approaches to 
International Environmental History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).  
 
28 Dorsey, “Perhaps I was Mistaken,” 38. 
 
29 Hamblin has made substantial contributions to the environmental-diplomacy sub field, including Oceanographers 
and the Cold War: Disciples of Marine Science (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005); Poison in the Well: 
Radioactive Waste in the Oceans at the Dawn of the Nuclear Age (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2008); 
and Arming Mother Nature: The Birth of Catastrophic Environmentalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2013). Other important work on Cold War-era fisheries diplomacy include Carmel Finley’s expert study on the 
science and politics of maximum sustainable yield, and Dorsey’s own study of the International Whaling 
Commission, Whales and Nations: Environmental Diplomacy on the High Seas (Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 2013).  
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of mineral resources in the global south by the Interior Department, to the community ethic in 
the international development program, this body of literature demonstrates how Americans 
developed ideas at home that consequently had a significant influence on how the nation 
approached environments off shore.30 This dissertation builds off the strengths of environmental-
diplomatic history by placing a maritime resource at the intersection of political, economic, and 
cultural forces that are often, if artificially, relegated to the separate worlds of foreign and 
domestic.                    
While the fisheries issue brings diplomatic histories of the environment back into the 
nineteenth century, the topic is ripe for analysis.31 This dissertation not only builds on subjects 
that form the core of the subfield, but engages its underlying methodology. In setting the agenda 
for this field of study, Kurk Dorsey outlines three categories that encompass potential topics. 
First, environmental diplomatic histories would include work on treaties that explicitly address 
environmental concerns—think studies of the International Whaling Commission, of the 
Montreal Protocol for the protection of the ozone layer, or even of the recent Paris Agreement 
addressing greenhouse gas emissions to combat climate change. The second approach covers 
how American attitudes and practices influence foreign environments. This kind of study also 
                                                
30 For work in this vein see Sarah T. Phillips, This Land, This Nation: Conservation, Rural America, and the New 
Deal (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), especially the epilogue; Thomas Robertson, The Malthusian 
Moment: Global Population Growth and the Birth of American Environmentalism (New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University Press, 2012); Megan Black, “Interior’s Exterior: The State, Mining Companies, and Resource Ideologies 
in the Point Four Program,” Diplomatic History 40 (January 2016): 81–110; and Daniel Immerwahr, Thinking 
Small: The United States and the Lure of Community Development (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press). 
Studies that emphasis domestic and foreign interaction, but outside of the Cold War era include Richard P. Tucker, 
Insatiable Appetite: The United States and the Ecological Degradation of the Tropical World (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2000); John Soluri, Banana Cultures: Agriculture, Consumption, and Environmental Change in 
Honduras and the United States (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005); and  Jessica B. Teisch, Engineering 
Nature: Water, Development, and the Global Spread of American Environmental Expertise (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 2011).  
 
31 Dorsey singles out the North Atlantic fisheries disputes as deserving scholarly attention, see “International 
Environmental Issues,” 33–34; and “Dealing with the Dinosaur,” 584–585.  
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does much to tie the United States to the world as the American impact on global environments 
was, and still is, most often driven by domestic demand for commodities. Third, and most 
ambitiously, Dorsey advocates environmental analysis of the most well-studied events in 
American diplomatic history, which, he contends, could possibly allow fundamental 
reinterpretations of events as important as the Cold War.32  
To a limited extent the fisheries issue engages all of these areas. The series of treaties that 
forms the scaffolding of this study directly addressed the political operation of the American 
fishing industry, among myriad other sticking points in Anglo-American relations. These 
agreements were largely ineffectual as they sought permanent fixes for an environment that was 
constantly in flux, thereby condemning any such international agreement to almost immediate 
irrelevancy. The fisheries issue also makes direct connections between American attitudes about 
the fisheries as both political and ecological entities and the particular maritime environment 
those ideas were projected on. Finally, this project hopes to offer, if not a reinterpretation of 
Anglo-American relations during the nineteenth century, then at least a competing narrative 
demonstrating the importance of the environment, particularly the maritime environment, to the 
history of American foreign relations.                   
While the environmental perspective opens up new narratives on otherwise worn topics, 
it presents a series of methodological conundrums—namely, how can historians hope to 
understand environmental conditions and perceptions of the past? Historians have offered a 
variety of approaches in attempting to understand the environments of the past. One such 
                                                
32 Dorsey, “Dealing with the Dinosaur,” 580–587. Dorsey identifies Mark Fiege’s recent work as a model of how to 
focus the environmental lens on topics that have been thoroughly worked over in the historiography, thereby 
refreshing them for more critical analysis, The Republic of Nature: An Environmental History of the United States 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2012).   
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approach is rooted in what William Cronon has termed “the relentlessly materialist analytical 
approach.”33 This approach is necessarily interdisciplinary, building on the ecological and 
natural sciences while using sources as far afield from the historian’s ordinary methodologies as 
dendrochronologies and midden samples. The field of environmental history has developed 
around a central question: what is the causal force in history, humans or the environment? The 
question has largely been settled in favor of a combination of nature and culture, with Paul 
Sutter’s concept of hybrid environments being the most recent and persuasive statement on how 
the “natural” forces of the non-human world interact dialectally with the cultured environments 
of humanity. Although a near consensus embracing hybridity exists within the field, this 
dissertation does not so lightly dismiss what Donald Worster describes as the “autonomous, 
independent energies that do not derive from the drives and inventions of any culture.”34 Attuned 
to the non-human world, this work recognizes that many of the forces that shape the human 
experiences operated independently of humanity. During the nineteenth century changes in the 
sea were, at times, beyond human consciousness and control, even when the ramifications of 
those changes were not.              
Ocean historians like W. Jeffrey Bolster and Helen M. Rozwadowski have rooted their 
studies in this kind of materialist analysis and engage with an archive of sources generated by 
scientific disciplines. Yet they appreciate the cultural conditions and subsequent limitations for 
that body of sources, and in doing so have created scholarly models worthy of emulation.35 In his 
                                                
33 “Afterword: The Book that Almost Wasn’t,” Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New 
England (1983; New York: Hill and Wang, 2003), 184. 
 
34 Donald Worster, “Transformations of the Earth: Toward an Agroecological Perspective in History,” Journal of 
American History 76 (March 1990): 1089–1090. 
 
35 W. Jeffrey Bolster, The Mortal Sea: Fishing the Atlantic in the Age of Sail (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2012); and Helen M. Rozwadowski, Fathoming the Ocean: The Discovery and Exploration of the 
Deep Sea (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005).  
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global study of climate and crisis during the seventeenth century, historian Geoffrey Parker 
classifies his sources in two groups, the natural archives—consisting of the physical evidence of 
the earth’s historical climates found in ice cores, pollen deposits, and tree rings—and the human 
archive—consisting of sources more familiar to historians like narrative accounts and artistic 
expressions.36 While my work makes some, though limited, use of the materialist source base, 
this dissertation largely approaches more traditional historical sources in a way that is conscious 
of their environmental connections. This dissertation looks for the natural archive within the 
human archive. As fishermen compiled logs, as consular agents penned reports, and as 
politicians delivered speeches, they all communicated their understanding of the North Atlantic 
environment and left traces of the changing state of the environment in the sources that inform 
this study. 
The source base I work from is, in many respects, entirely ordinary given the political 
and diplomatic orientation of this dissertation. I rely heavily on diplomatic correspondence, 
politicians’ papers, congressional reports, and newspapers—the National Archives and Library 
of Congress appear frequently in the footnotes. And while I use this corpus of documentation to 
glean information about the state of Anglo-American relations and the nature of domestic 
politics, there is also a wealth of information about the environment, how Americans during the 
mid-nineteenth century understood that environment, and the political implications therein. By 
bringing the perspective of an environmental historian to this source base I am better able to see 
that there is much more to the story of narrowly defined politics and am thus able to construct a 
new narrative that refocuses the scholarly understanding of this period. Perhaps most helpful in 
                                                
36 Geoffrey Parker, Global Crisis: War, Climate, and Catastrophe in the Seventeenth Century (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2013), xvi–xvii. 
 
  
 
23 
gleaning environmental information from ostensibly political documents were consular reports. 
Foreign relations historians are increasingly incorporating reports generated by these commercial 
operatives who were posted to advantageous places across the globe to ensure American 
economic success in penetrating and exploiting foreign markets. These men bring an “on the 
ground” perspective as they were very often the vanguard of American foreign policy, especially 
during the nineteenth century. While the hundreds, if not thousands, of microfilm reels housed at 
the National Archives contain page after page blandly documenting the comings and goings of 
commerce, consular agents do directly comment on local conditions—political, commercial, and 
environmental. From this correspondence I have gleaned invaluable information about the state 
of North Atlantic fisheries and how actors ranging from fishermen to diplomats understood that 
environment and its changes. Although often not directly, these sources are suffused with 
environmental information.      
Maritime laborers, like the environments they operated in, also emerge as a central 
element of this source base, and consequently, this story. In the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries sailors were tied to some of the most important political, economic, and social changes 
that shaped the worlds of the Atlantic basin. From revolutionary citizenship, to the creation of 
the African American community, and even the advent of capitalism, historians have placed 
sailors and ordinary maritime laborers at the center of these epochal transformations. While 
unique in their mobility, sailors of the Atlantic world were bellwethers of the changes that swept 
through landed communities.37 Sailors were especially important in the foreign relations of the 
                                                
37 The historiography on sailors in the Atlantic world and beyond is vast. A sampling includes Jesse Lemisch, “Jack 
Tar in the Streets: Merchant Seamen in the Politics of Revolutionary America,” William and Mary Quarterly 25 
(July 1968): 371–407; Marcus Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates, and 
the Anglo-American Maritime World, 1700-1750 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987);  W. Jeffrey 
Bolster, Black Jacks: African American Seamen in the Age of Sail (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1997); Peter E. Pope, Fish into Wine: The Newfoundland Plantation in the Seventeenth Century (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2004); Paul A. Gilje, Liberty on the Waterfront: American Maritime Culture in 
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early United States. For much of the nineteenth century the diplomatic corps of the nation was 
small and clustered in the courts of Europe and the emerging states of Latin America. Consular 
agents were more numerous, but still a paltry number abroad. Sailors were by far the largest 
group of Americans to go abroad as commercial ships ranged from the Caribbean, to the 
Mediterranean, even penetrating the Asians markets of the South Seas. In early America sailors 
were de facto diplomats. As historian Brian Rouleau notes, “Sailors, simply stated, were 
nineteenth-century America’s largest class of representatives overseas, and thus the principal 
engine of its foreign relations at the time.” They were, Rouleau continues, “ambassadors in the 
forecastle.”38 
North Atlantic fishermen were in the same metaphorical boat—Americans who left 
American shores and interacted with foreign peoples and foreign places. While fishermen never 
ranged farther than Labrador, a far cry from the exotic ports of call commercial sailors and 
whalers frequented, they were still the nation’s face abroad along the coasts of British North 
America. The decisions fishermen made in pursuit of their catch were largely, though not 
entirely, shaped by economics and environments, but had important political implications for the 
conduct of American foreign policy. Throughout most of this period the federal foreign policy 
establishment reacted to the decisions fishermen made on the water, thus implicating these 
                                                
the Age of Revolution (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); Hester Blum, The View from the 
Masthead: Marime Imagination and Antebellum American Sea Narratives (Chapel Hill: University of North 
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University Press, 2013); Denver Brunsman, The Evil Necessity: British Naval Impressment in the Eighteenth-
Century Atlantic World (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2013); Matthew Taylor Raffety, The Republic 
Afloat: Law, Honor, and Citizenship in Maritime America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013); Nathan 
Perl-Rosenthal, Citizen Sailors: Becoming American in the Age of Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
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25 
maritime laborers in the foreign policy process. As American fishermen were captured by the 
British navy for plying their craft in forbidden waters, they displayed their knowledge of 
international politics and operated in the vulnerable political space available to them to address 
current crises while influencing future policy. Even if the specific decisions fishermen made 
about how they practiced their vocation were shaped by their economic and environmental 
contexts, fishermen, like other sailors, were undoubtedly political actors.39 
Fishermen also existed in American politics as potent political symbols. Despite being 
concentrated in a few counties along the coasts of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Maine, 
cod fishermen resonated in political rhetoric across the Union. Fishermen, simply, were national 
political symbols that most sections could rally around. This political potency came from the 
close association between fishermen and national security. Politicians frequently employed the 
epithet “nursery of the nation’s seamen” when describing the fisheries of the North Atlantic. This 
rhetoric built on a long-standing, Atlantic-wide tradition, in which fishermen were mustered into 
national service in time of crisis. Given their experience with ship-board life and skill in sailing, 
                                                
39 This dissertation understands nineteenth-century American fishermen in the North Atlantic to be primarily 
political actors whose decisions had far reaching consequences for Anglo-American relations and the operations of 
American diplomacy. This interpretation runs counter to the claims made by other historians. In recreating the cod 
population on the Nova Scotian shelf at midcentury, Jeff Bolster, Karen E. Alexander, and William B. Leavenworth 
make the observation that fishermen paid little attention to political boundaries or the dictates of governments at all. 
But depoliticizing fishermen in this way is shortsighted. While fishermen no doubted fished wherever they could 
find their prey, they were not indifferent or ignorant of those boundaries or of international politics. Nineteenth-
century fishermen showed themselves to be well attuned to politics. Brian Payne’s work on North Atlantic bait 
fisheries in the context of Anglo-Canadian-American relations, the study most similar to this dissertation, places 
great emphasis on the role played by ordinary fishermen. Yet Payne draws far too stark a line between local and 
international politics while emphasizing the fluid nature of national identity in the region. While borders were in 
flux and labor was portable, at key junctures fishermen appealed to federal power to serve their needs in an action 
that tied the local to the international while affirming their national loyalty. What’s more is Payne’s tendency to see 
conflict in everything. Relations among fishermen and between fishermen and government officials were, as Payne 
would have it, most often marked by friction, if not violence. As this study will make clear, fishermen used federal 
power when available, demonstrating that, at times, the goals of the federal government and the goals of ordinary 
fishermen aligned. See W. Jeffrey Bolster, Karen E. Alexander, and William B. Leavenworth, “The Historical 
Abundance of Cod on the Nova Scotian Shelf,” in Shifting Baselines: The Past and the Future of Ocean Fisheries, 
Jeremy B. C. Jackson, Karen E. Alexander, and Enric Sala, eds. (Washington, D.C., Island Press, 2011), 79–114; 
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fishermen from all reaches of the Atlantic operated as a kind of maritime militia. This was not 
mere rhetoric. Fishing schooners became warships during the Revolutionary war, aligning 
fishermen, and by extension the fisheries, with American independence.40 This relationship 
would remain strong well-through the antebellum era, making the fisheries a measure of 
independence. 
This story points to the importance of maritime laborers in nineteenth-century America, 
but it also points to the importance of the ocean. An appreciation for the ocean’s role in history is 
crucial for rendering a more faithful picture of nineteenth-century America. Between the 
Revolution and the Civil War the United States was a maritime nation. The sea was the nation’s 
connection to the world and, as scholars are increasingly appreciating, a place that was 
fundamental to the development of national identity and the functioning of American statecraft.41 
For too long the concept of the frontier has seduced historians to look west to the continent and 
not everywhere else to the oceans. But recently the Medusian gaze that has ossified a 
historiographical obsession with the continent has weakened as nineteenth-century histories 
begin to bear greater resemblance to their subject. This work joins the oceanic turn of nineteenth-
century America by placing the seas at the center of the story.        
Historical inquiry more generally has suffered from an unfortunate terracentrism that 
relegates the maritime world to at best a place in between and at worst no place at all. The seas’ 
opacity and inhospitality make it an unwelcoming place, stifling investigation. Maritime 
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historians have done much to keep the ocean in historical narratives, but only recently have 
historians critically engaged with Jeff Bolster’s observation that “salient connections were not 
only across oceans, but between people and the sea.”42 This dissertation takes this contention as 
a given and joins an emerging body of work known as the new thalassology. In setting the 
thalassological agenda for historians of the Civil War era, Robert E. Bonner defines the approach 
as “a distinctive mode of historicizing the waters of the Earth….[to] consider the high seas a 
realm of meaningful human activity.”43 The stakes of incorporating this perspective go far 
beyond just adding a new field for historical study, but by demonstrating that the oceans can fall 
victim to change, a relatively recent idea in its own right, this historicization illustrates the extent 
to which humans truly can influence their environments. This lesson is particularly important at 
this dire juncture in the environmental history of the earth.44        
*** 
This story of the relationship between the North Atlantic fisheries and the intertwined 
development of American nationalism and state building unfolds in five chronologically 
arranged chapters. This dissertation begins with the Treaty of Paris (1783). While one of the 
formative documents in the struggle for American independence, this treaty also formed the basis 
for the United States’ first legal claim to the piscine resources of the North Atlantic as British 
                                                
42 Bolster, The Mortal Sea, 3. 
 
43 Robert E. Bonner, “The Salt Water Civil War: Thalassological Approaches, Ocean-Centered Opportunities,” 
Journal of the Civil War Era 6 (June 2016): 244. 
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ministers assented to America’s “liberty to take fish” in those waters colonial North Americans 
had plied for centuries. Chapter 1, “Fisheries and the Flotsam of Revolution, 1783–1800,” covers 
the decade and a half after the Treaty of Paris that saw access to the fisheries become closely 
associated with the notion of independence: American statesmen made the fisheries, rhetorically 
at least, a measure of the United States’ newfound status as an independent nation. From the 
beginning the fisheries were tied to political independence, helping to explain why Americans, 
from fishermen to statesmen, repeatedly mounted vigorous defenses of this right. In the minds of 
these Americans they were defending independence itself. This maritime resource became 
implicated in some of the most important political developments in the early republic, from the 
struggle over the adoption of the federal Constitution, to the desire to secure international 
markets that drove much of early American foreign policy, to the polarization of the first party 
system.    
 Chapter 2, “Fisheries and Foreign Relations in a Maritime World, to the Convention of 
1818,” explores how the political history of fisheries in early America was not limited to 
Washington. Instead, ordinary fishermen exerted significant influence on the political 
proceedings as both potent political symbols and actors in their own right. Moving from the 
assumption that the United States was at its base a maritime-facing nation, this chapter begins 
with the 1792 passage of the federal cod fishing bounty—a decision that would directly subsidize 
the cod fishing industry from federal coffers for nearly eight uninterrupted decades. 
Congressmen from across the Union frequently heralded fishermen as a unique class of hearty, 
enterprising, and patriotic citizens worthy of federal largess. Here the most explicit connections 
between fishing and national security were made as the industry’s partisans described the 
fisheries as the “nursery of the nation’s seamen,” thus necessitating federal support to groom this 
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group of maritime minutemen. The chapter concludes with the chaotic conditions that 
characterized the fisheries in the aftermath of the War of 1812. With Great Britain claiming the 
war had invalidated the United States’ claims to lawful fishing in the region, the British Navy 
captured scores of American schooners in 1816 and 1817. A close reading of the testimonies 
offered by captured American fishermen reveals the extent to which these maritime laborers 
understood the workings of international relations and used their limited means to influence 
diplomacy in a way that necessitated signing the Convention of 1818. Among settling other 
outstanding issues in Anglo-American relations, the Convention declared that American 
fishermen had a right to fish in all waters except those within three miles of the Canadian shore. 
For nearly a century this agreement would shape the political tenor of fishing in the North 
Atlantic. 
 Chapter 3, “Fisheries and Politics in a Changing World, 1819–1845,” covers a period of 
relative calm in Anglo-American relations as it seemed the countries neared a détente. The 
fisheries issue, however, shows the degree to which this historiographical characterization fails 
to appreciate the degree of tension and suspicion that still marked transatlantic ties. Although the 
stipulations of the Convention of 1818 went unchallenged during this period, the treaty actually 
created the conditions by which the British capture of American vessels increased dramatically. 
By cordoning off sections of the ocean—those within three miles of the coasts—the Convention 
allowed for a greater number of confrontations. Overzealous British captains and inattentive 
American skippers now had the potential to provoke international incidents as American 
schooners violated the all-too-difficult-to-ascertain three-mile line that was now a fluid marker of 
legality on the maritime landscape. During the 1820s, the 1830s, and the 1840s, as Washington 
and London seemed to inch closer towards each other, American fishing ships were subject to 
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seizure for real or perceived violations of the Convention’s stipulations. American fishermen 
attempted to work within the limited political space available to them to remedy their plight, but 
the conditions on the water proved increasingly untenable, especially as changes in the 
environment and within the fishing industry motivated more and more fishermen to pursue 
inshore-dwelling mackerel and thus more frequently violate the three-mile limit.  
 This situation would come to a head in the events covered in chapter 4, “Sea Changes in 
Foreign and Domestic Politics, 1846–1860.” Yet this climax had little to do, at least initially, 
with the fisheries. In 1846 Great Britain repealed the Corn Laws, adopted the tenets of free trade, 
and wished to convince or coerce the United States into this emerging international order of free 
trade. Washington balked at the idea, and by 1852 London grew weary of American 
intransigence, using access to the fisheries as a way to exert pressure. Americans had resorted to 
inshore waters in increasing numbers as environmental conditions favored the proliferation of 
mackerel. British cruisers plied the fishing grounds with unprecedented vigor during the summer 
of 1852. This dispute became front page news across the nation as politicians and diplomats of 
all varieties chimed in on the crisis. Eventually the dispute fizzled, and by 1854 the transatlantic 
nations signed a reciprocal trade agreement. But despite the seeming anticlimax of this episode it 
offers unequivocal evidence of how environmental change, in a very material way, influenced 
the course of diplomacy.  
 The final chapter, “Fisheries and Foreign Relations in the Gill-ded Age, 1860–1877,” 
sees a series of fundamental changes in how the North Atlantic fisheries factored into 
transatlantic diplomacy and the American political economy. A series of changes in American 
politics and the fishing industry sapped the fishermen’s rhetorical position of its potency in 
American politics. As intellectual authority became vested in the now-vaunted men of science, 
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maritime laborers lost the authority that their hard-won practical knowledge had once given 
them. Changes in the structure of the U.S. Navy, primarily the transition to steam power, made 
the connection between fishing and national security more tenuous as sailing skills were no 
longer in demand. And the increasing capitalization of the industry squeezed out small-scale 
fishermen in favor of larger fishing firms. This slide in prestige was also seen in the realm of 
diplomacy. When Great Britain and the United States addressed the myriad tensions that were 
left over from the Civil War era, it became readily apparent that American statesmen were 
willing to sacrifice the interests of fishermen in favor of nurturing a budding Anglo-American 
rapprochement. Whereas American statesmen once saw the preservation of America’s 
unquestioned right to the fisheries as a major foreign policy goal, by the 1870s that was no 
longer the case. In 1877 an international tribunal forced the United States to pay Great Britain 
$5.5 million for decades of exploiting Canada’s inshore waters. To the fishing industry, at least, 
the agreement amounted to an admission of guilt by an American policy-making elite more 
concerned with reconciling with its former transatlantic rival than in defending the liberty to take 
fish. 
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  PROLOGUE  
FROM NATURAL HISTORY TO HUMAN HISTORY 
 
Twenty thousand years ago, at the peak of the Wisconsin glaciation, two massive ice 
sheets, thousands of feet thick descended across North America. The larger, the Laurentide Ice 
Sheet, covered a wide swath of the continent, extending from the Arctic to Long Island and ran 
in a curve that reached as far south as the modern day Ohio River and as far west as the Missouri 
River before receding north and joining the smaller Cordilleran Ice Sheet, which rested upon the 
furthest western parts of the continent. With so much of the world’s fresh water locked up in 
these icy behemoths, global ocean levels were hundreds of feet below where they currently inch 
upward. This exposed land masses that now lay below water, a map of which would look 
strikingly different from the familiar lines that demarcate land and sea in modern atlases. 
Particularly striking was a peninsula of dry land that extended to the northeast from Long Island 
Sound into what would become the north Atlantic. A series of raised ridges, formed by earlier 
tectonic processes, were shaped and gouged by the fringes of the mammoth ice sheet. These 
ridges would become the chain of banks that harbored rich fish communities as the ice sheet 
regressed for good and inundated the area with water some fifteen thousand years ago. Georges 
Bank, Banquereau, and the Grand Bank, among others, stand as underwater cliffs, still hundreds 
of feet above the sea floor around them, with only Sable Island Bank still barely peaking above 
the waves as a reminder that these prominent formations were once dry land.45  
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 The physical structure of these underwater formations determined why this region 
became a dynamic home to a number of fish and other maritime organisms. These banks stand at 
the confluence of two major ocean currents: the cold Labrador Current from the Artic and the 
warm North Atlantic Drift originating further south. In a process driven by the uneven solar 
heating of the earth, these two currents collide at the banks and with the banks, before being 
forced to continue along a northeasterly path that terminates in northern European waters. This 
collision stirs the waters, creating localized gyres that encourage the mixing of these distinct 
water masses. As a result, nutrients that would otherwise remain buried in the depths of these 
waters are forced upward, upon the banks where they interact with sunlight that can penetrate the 
surface water in what is called the photic zone. Here chlorophyll-bearing, autotrophic 
phytoplankton thrive, feeding zooplankton and, ultimately, maritime organisms up the food 
chain. This process, dubbed “primary production” by ecologists, explains the biological 
productivity of this portion of the ocean, as the necessary nutrients are brought together with the 
required oxygen, water temperature, and sunlight, to feed the microscopic organisms that then, in 
turn, feed everything else. Chemically and biologically not all ocean water is the same, nor can 
all ocean water support complex ecologies. But this portion of the North Atlantic stands at the 
confluence of factors that allows for such a rich ecology.46 
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Two important elements of this ecology, at least from the human perspective, are the 
Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua) and the Atlantic mackerel (Scomber scombrus). The conditions 
created through the climate, geology, and chemistry of the North Atlantic made it a welcoming 
home for these fish. Atlantic cod, a stocky fish that can grow to lengths greater than six feet, is 
perhaps the most Atlantic of all fish. Unlike the vast majority of fish that have, or have ever, 
called the Atlantic home, gadoids, a family of fish including cod, haddock, and pollock, 
originated and evolved in Atlantic waters. These fish are largely non-migratory, preferring to 
stay in the region’s relatively cool waters year round to feed upon capelin, small crustaceans, and 
pretty much anything they can get their mouths around. However, those cod fish that live at the 
extreme northern and southern reaches of their geographic range regularly follow favorable 
Figure 1: George Brown Goode, “The Codfish: Gadus morhua,” The Fisheries and Fishery Industry of the United States, Section 1: Natural History of 
Useful Aquatic Animals (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1884), Plate 58A. 
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ocean temperatures as the seasons dictate. All cod do, however, make a vertical migration over 
the course of their lives as the juvenile fish spawn in open surface waters before descending to 
their preferred benthic habitat upon maturity. Cod, distinguished by three dorsal fins and a chin 
barbell, most often spawn offshore where they spend much of their life cycle.47 
 
 Atlantic mackerel, on the other hand, are decidedly migratory. These small, quick fish, 
rarely to exceed two feet in length, tolerate a much greater range of temperatures than cod and, 
like their tuna and bonito relatives, regularly range to warmer waters as far south as the Mid-
Atlantic Bight. They feed on tiny crustaceans known as copepods and in maturity will consume 
anything they can fit in their mouths like very small fish, including their own young. Despite 
their perceived fickleness, mackerel follow a seasonal rhythm traveling northeastward after 
overwintering in mid Atlantic waters, as the spring’s rising temperatures would allow. In certain 
years with favorably warm temperatures, mackerel have ranged from as far south as the 
Carolinas to through the Strait of Belle Isle and into the Labrador Sea. These fish are most at 
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Figure 2: George Brown Goode, “The Mackerel: Scomber scombrus,” The Fisheries and Fishery Industry of the United States, 
Section 1: Natural History of Useful Aquatic Animals (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1884), Plate 91.  
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home in the open water and do not shy away from coming inshore, especially in the spring as 
they head north. Both cod and mackerel, like most all nonfreshwater fish, have much of their life 
cycles dictated by ocean temperatures. Migrations, food availability, maturation, and 
reproduction are all processes that depend on the ever fluctuating temperatures of the ocean. 
Over the past fifteen thousand years or so, as the general processes and drivers that have 
controlled this ecosystem have been in place, fluctuations and alterations of the atmospheric and 
oceanic climates have, at times, been significant, but only over the past handful of centuries have 
these changes been brought to bear on the human world through fisheries.48 
 Piecing together climatological history is a difficult, interdisciplinary task requiring the 
skills of both humanists and natural scientists to fit together indicators of changing climates as 
diverse as dendrochronologies and artistic expressions. Such a history of the past millennia, as 
best understood, is marked by three distinct and dramatic climate swings. The first, lasting to 
about the onset of the fourteenth century, was a period of relative warmth known as the Medieval 
Warm Period. This was followed by a period of cooling, the Little Ice Age, that lasted well into 
the nineteenth century. Finally the past couple centuries have been marked by a significant and 
unprecedented warming as humans have altered the chemistry of the atmosphere and ocean. But 
it is the Little Ice Age that most concerns the fisheries and its changes. This centuries-long 
climatic anomaly has been connected to such epochal shifts in human history as the French 
Revolution and the Irish Potato Famine. It was during this period that Europeans first began 
sailing farther and farther west in search of cod as their home stocks, perhaps in response to both 
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cooling and fishing pressures, began declining. And it was likewise during this period that 
fishermen of all provenances began the alteration, or perhaps more accurately the destruction, of 
the Northwest Atlantic’s fisheries.49 
 While native peoples made use of the maritime resources of the northwest Atlantic for 
millennia, this process of exploitation underwent an epochal shift starting with the first 
Europeans who reached these waters at about the turn of the sixteenth century. The open water 
fisheries of the northeast Atlantic had been important sites of extraction for various European 
peoples for centuries. As fishing pressures devastated inshore communities, Iberian, French, and 
English fishermen began the incremental process of travel farther and farther west in search of 
unsullied fishing grounds. Given the ecological similarities of the boreal seas of the North 
Atlantic, fishermen essentially chased cod across the ocean until, by the dawn of the sixteenth 
century, they happened upon the North American coast.50   
 The earliest Europeans to ply the fisheries of the North Atlantic left scant records of their 
impressions of this maritime environment. After all, they had little reason to divulge the location 
and nature of such a lucrative resource to potential rivals.51 But as the emerging empires of the 
North Atlantic began to focus their energies on colonization of the lands adjacent to the fisheries, 
at the expense of formerly seasonal migration of men and capital, observers did not fail to note 
the fecundity of fish communities in the region.52 Rhapsodic descriptions of New World 
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environments were a regular part of the promotional literature of European observers who hoped 
to entice investment in colonization schemes. From huge expanses of well-manicured forests, to 
species unknown in Europe, to rivers choked with fish, Europeans of all provenances were taken 
aback by the diversity and richness of environments across the North American continent. In a 
particularly evocative example, historian William Cronon cites the writing of Englishman John 
Josselyn whose travels in seventeenth-century New England brought him face to face with flocks 
of passenger pigeons numbering in the “millions of millions,” which seemed without “beginning 
nor ending, length nor breadth, and so thick that I could see no Sun.”53 For Europeans New 
England, if not the Americas more generally, was a land of plenty. The seas would likewise 
prove prodigiously productive in European eyes; this same tone was brought to maritime 
resources as well.  
 The sea fisheries of the Northwest Atlantic presented an environment to Europeans that 
was at once familiar and foreign. While the conditions of the Northeast Atlantic were strikingly 
similar to that of the Northwest in terms of water temperature, chemistry, and the relationships 
between various organisms, the marine communities, by the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
at least, were quite different as a result of centuries of exploiting the waters nearest to the 
European continent. As historian W. Jeffrey Bolster notes, “When Basque, Breton, Portuguese, 
and West Country fishermen began regularly to cross the Atlantic, the ecosystem they 
encountered was ‘new’ only in its abundance: it had not been harvested systematically for 
centuries by legions of fishermen.”54 Early observers in the region described this bounty in 
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detail. One seventeenth-century witness remarked that “[t]he aboundance of Sea-Fish are almost 
beyond beleeving, and sure I should scarce have beleeved it except I had seene it with mine 
owne eyes.” Another noted that mere hours of fishing “had pestered our ships so with Cod fish, 
that we threw numbers of them over-boored againe.”55 These maritime resources were what first 
attracted Europeans to the region and proved to be their first experience with the richness of New 
World environments. Soon this resource and this region were integrated into a developing 
transatlantic economy as fishermen began systematically exploiting these waters with the same 
technologies and motivations that had doomed the ecological vitality of Europe’s Atlantic 
fisheries.     
 Despite the descriptions of abundance that marked the earliest European impressions of 
these North Atlantic fisheries, New Englanders soon showed concern over the ability of this 
ecosystem to respond to the demands of the Atlantic market. As early as the 1660s the colony of 
Massachusetts declared “that no man shall henceforth kill any codfish, hake, haddock, or 
pollock, to be dried for sale in the month of December or January, because of their spawning 
time.”56 While colonial subjects had little understanding of the factors at play that determined the 
size and scale of fish populations in the region, they certainly had an awareness of fluctuations in 
catches across time and space. Implicitly at least, colonial residents of New England understood 
that humans had the ability to influence, for better or worse, this maritime resource. From early 
on, then, the fishing industry of the region was caught between environmentally imposed limits 
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and market forces. Despite Massachusetts’s early attempt to embrace caution, rapacious 
fishermen seemed more persuaded by the dictates of the market than by a devotion to resource 
stewardship.    
 As Europeans marveled at, exploited, and ultimately came to worry about the productive 
capacity of North Atlantic waters, these fisheries became an important element in the emerging 
Atlantic economy and, unsurprisingly, garnered the attention of emerging Atlantic empires. 
Fishing was at its base an economic enterprise—one that generated a significant amount of 
wealth in transatlantic trade. The early history of this fishery is the story of an increasingly 
integrated Atlantic-wide economy. Dried salted cod from New England and Newfoundland made 
its way to the markets of the Mediterranean to feed the Catholic populations of Europe, whose 
liturgical calendar forbade the eating of meat for hundreds of days every year. Low-grade fish, 
unfit for the European market, was sold to the emerging plantation societies in the Caribbean to 
provision the enslaved workforce for as cheaply as possible. In return for selling fish to the 
metropole and colonies of France, Spain, and Portugal, English fishermen in the Northwest 
Atlantic not only offset a centuries-old trade imbalance with Iberian and French producers of 
wine, olives, and olive oil, but fishermen themselves also became significant consumers of 
wine.57 This process made the Northwest Atlantic in general, and the island of Newfoundland in 
particular, an important node in an increasingly integrated Atlantic economy. During the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the transoceanic cod fish trade made the waters between 
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Cape Cod and Newfoundland “an Atlantic crossroads.”58 Given the economic value of this 
territory, the region would not remain isolated from the imperial politics of Europe. 
 While the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries witnessed the establishment and maturation 
of European fishing enterprises in the Northwest Atlantic, the eighteenth century would see 
fishing become part of European diplomacy at the highest level. Increasingly the British came to 
dominate the region’s fisheries, but it was not an uncontested process. The first significant 
international agreement that took the fisheries of the Northwest Atlantic into consideration was 
the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht. While the French had been important players in the early centuries of 
the fisheries, the 1713 treaty significantly limited their role. One of a series of treaties that 
restored peace to Europe after the War of the Spanish Succession, the Treaty of Utrecht 
redefined the geopolitics of North America. Perhaps more famous for recognizing British rule 
over Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Hudson’s Bay, and in the process limiting France’s 
possessions to Cape Breton Island, Prince Edward Island, and St. Pierre and Miquelon, the 1713 
treaty also stipulated that French ships were limited to the fishing grounds along the northern 
shore of Newfoundland. This agreement allowed for the expansion, and soon domination, of the 
cod fish trade by New Englanders, while also ensuring at least a century more of tension in the 
region as French ships sought to expand beyond their legally defined limit between Cape 
Bonavista and Pointe Riche. This treaty was most important, however, for setting the precedent 
that the North Atlantic fisheries could act as a makeweight in imperial politics. The fisheries 
would again enter European statecraft in 1763 as the Treaty of Paris further restricted French 
access to the fisheries by banning French ships from fishing within three miles of the shores of 
the Gulf of St. Lawrence and ceding Cape Breton Island to the British. This agreement altered 
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the dynamics of the fishing industry and inaugurated a decade of internecine conflict as New 
England fishermen vied with Newfoundland and West Country fishermen for supremacy in the 
waters ceded by France. This friction would play no small role in the coming of the next great 
imperial crisis of the 1770s.59                    
 By the time some of Britain’s subjects in North America began to chaff under the island’s 
rule, the North Atlantic fisheries were an established part of imperial politics. During the ensuing 
imperial crisis brought on by questions over the political status of thirteen of Britain’s North 
American colonies, the fisheries would became an even more important aspect of how 
international relations unfolded in the Atlantic world. While the American Revolution did not 
introduce the cod fisheries to the whims of international diplomacy, the era did set norms that 
would influence the development of American nationalism and state building for at least a 
century to come. Fishery politics were at the birth of American independence, playing, at least in 
part, the role of midwife. By establishing direct links between this maritime resource and 
independence, the Revolution imbued the fisheries with a potent kind of political salience in the 
new nation.   
 The question of causation in the American Revolution is, to put it simply, familiar waters 
for historians. Yet only recently have historians looked past the terracentric factors that have 
come to define the historiography. The maritime world generally, and the cod fisheries 
specifically, played a vital role in the struggle over American independence. As Christopher P. 
Magra plainly asserts, “the origins and progress of the American Revolution cannot be fully 
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understood without coming to terms with its maritime dimensions.”60 That New England was a 
center for both revolutionary fervor and the cod-fishing industry was no mere coincidence. 
Britain’s attempts to regulate and control the trade in dried, salted codfish helped convince 
merchants and laborers alike that their interests lay with political independence and not with the 
increasingly restrictive structures of the British Empire.   
 In the decades leading to up to the imperial crisis of the 1770s the fishermen and fish 
merchants of New England began questioning the usefulness of their inclusion in the British 
Empire. To the ocean-going men of the region it seemed as though the most significant 
impediments to their commercial success came not from foreign competition and restrictions, but 
instead from fellow Englishmen. The grand sugar planters of the West Indies and the wealthy 
West Country fishing merchants used their political clout in Parliament to the direct detriment to 
the fishing interests of New England. While initially New England cod fed the fish-eating 
populations of Europe, by the middle decades of the eighteenth century this fish found a market 
feeding the enslaved populations of the West Indies, including those laboring on the plantations 
of French sugar producers. Incensed that Yankee fish aided their commercial competitors, British 
West Indian sugar planters mobilized their influence in Parliament leading to the passage of the 
Sugar Act of 1764 that disrupted this trade.61 Yankee fishing interests were further threatened as 
West Country fish merchants—those who controlled the more lucrative Newfoundland-Europe 
fish trade—used their influence in Parliament to restrict the access of colonial ships to the rich 
fishing waters of Newfoundland.62 Finally, Parliament sought to rein in the unruly colonies in 
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New England by closing the cod-fishing industry through the Restraining Act of 1775, otherwise 
known as “The New England Trade and Fisheries Act.” In Magra’s words, this act “lit the long 
fuse of colonial resentment and convinced those involved with the colonial cod fishing industry 
that the British state no longer supported their maritime interests.” This act against the fishing 
industry of the region, Magra concludes, “motivated a cross-section of colonial society, 
entrepreneurs and laborers alike, to fight against the British Empire.”63 From the perspective of 
New England fishing interests it seemed as though the British state favored the sugar colonies of 
the West Indies or the fishing interest of the West Country at the expense of Yankee maritime 
commerce, ultimately forcing New Englanders to question their place in the British Empire.      
 But the fisheries were not important just because they served as the locus for colonial 
grievances that motivated insurrection and separation. The course of the war bore the imprint of 
the fishing industry as fishermen filled muster rolls, fishing schooners became fighting ships, and 
fish literally fed the war effort. The Revolutionary War was not only fought over fish, but fought 
with fish as well. While the commercial connections to the West Indian and Iberian markets that 
fishing merchants in New England had cultivated for decades were mobilized for the purposes of 
war making, these same merchants leased their ships to the Continental Congress for enrollment 
in the first American navy—making a tidy profit in the process.64 But perhaps the greatest legacy 
of the Revolutionary Era for the political fortunes of the fishing industry came as fishermen 
provided their manpower in actually waging war. Aboard their former fishing vessels and by 
land alike fishermen, often motivated by their remunerative desires, fought for American 
independence and in the process cemented the link between fishermen, fighting, and political 
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independence. This association would later inspire decades of federal support as this maritime 
resource was, rhetorically at least, tied to independence and national security.65   
 The New England cod-fishing industry was deeply implicated in the origins of American 
independence. Both the causes and the conduct of the Revolutionary War owed much to this 
maritime resource. When the guns fell silent and the time came to create the postwar order, 
fishermen and industry supporters expected their due. Fortunately, for them at least, one of 
Massachusetts’s most irascible sons was at Paris in 1783 to sort through the morass.       
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CHAPTER 1: FISHERIES AND THE FLOTSAM OF REVOLUTION, 1783–1800 
 
Looking back on his career in the foreign service of the burgeoning United States, John 
Adams recalled the fisheries as the primary factor that took him from his home on the shores of 
the North Atlantic to the courts of Europe. Upon receiving word of his appointment as minister 
to France in the winter of 1777, Adams considered the countervailing draws of family and 
country. Forsaking the comforts of home, Adams sailed to France in order to defend American 
interests, not least of which was continued access to North Atlantic fishing grounds. Priding 
himself on his familiarity with life and labor in Essex, Plymouth, and Barnstable Counties, 
Adams boasted of having “more knowledge both of the Cod and whale fisheries and of their 
importance both to the commerce and Naval Power of this Country than any other man.” Thus, 
he feared that refusing this commission would put the fate of this maritime resource in the hands 
of men unfamiliar with—or worse hostile to—this industry. As Adams “resolved to devote my 
family and my Life to the Cause,” he did so with the implicit understanding that the cause of 
independence was the cause of fishermen.66     
In the immediate aftermath of independence, cod fish were synonymous with 
independence itself. American state making, and war making for that matter, fused these two so 
that by a kind of political alchemy, fish went far beyond being merely a natural resource. The 
fisheries of the North Atlantic were an environment upon which early Americans inscribed 
political meaning. And it was in the realm of foreign affairs that this kind of statecraft was most 
evident. Independence was the watchword for early American foreign relations as statesmen 
were racked by an all-consuming anxiety that international forces were conspiring to render 
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independence a worthless label. The search for markets exemplified this process as early 
Americans were concerned with finding suitable markets for American fish, among other 
products, that would bolster claims to political independence.  
 In the context of the United States’ ongoing relationship with its former imperial master, 
the fisheries issue was part of the fundamental structure of relations. By no means were the 
fisheries of the North Atlantic the most important facet of Anglo-American relations, but the 
fisheries issue was indicative of how the United States and Great Britain interacted more 
generally because of its close association with national independence. The fisheries issue created 
the conditions under which Anglo-American relations were debated, contested, and constantly 
redefined. Any threat to the fisheries, real or perceived, was met with a vigorous rebuttal since 
any test amounted to a referendum on independence itself. The importance of these fishing 
waters in Anglo-Americans relations was not unique; for centuries, contest over this resource 
was a piece of transatlantic politics and diplomacy. But with the introduction of the newly 
independent United States, fishery politics were no longer the domain of Europe’s dynastic 
rivalries alone.  
 John Adams would not be alone among the pantheon of Founding Fathers who devoted 
their attention to the fisheries issue as the United States secured and legitimated its 
independence. In the decades after 1776, the likes of Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and 
Alexander Hamilton, among other prominent Revolutionaries, would labor for the new nation to 
ensure that the fisheries of the North Atlantic became an integral part to the political economy of 
the new nation. In the process, the fisheries became an unlikely nursery of ideas about the 
meaning of independence, international commerce, the role of the federal government, and 
bipartisan nationalism. From the advent of the American nation, the fisheries issue stood at the 
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nexus of some of the most important political and economic currents facing the nation. 
Unsurprisingly, the most prominent statesmen of the era did not hesitate to engage this set of 
questions about the place of this natural resource in the statecraft of the United States.        
 
PARIS, 1783 
By both sea and land, fishermen waged war in defense of America’s assertion of 
independence. But diplomats, Adams first and foremost, had to ensure that military successes 
were translated into geopolitical realities. When Adams advocated for American fishing rights at 
the Paris peace conference, however, it was not his first engagement with the question of 
fisheries in the context of imperial politics. In the summer of 1769 Adams defended the crew of 
the brig Pitt Packer, who were charged with murder after killing the captain of a British naval 
vessel that attempted to impress the crewmen into service as they returned from shipping cod to 
Bilbao and Cadiz. The crewmen of the brig who stood trial for murder were all Irishmen, though 
they resided in Marblehead, Massachusetts, thus making the Royal Navy’s attempt to impress 
these sailors into service a delicate question about the place of the mainland colonies within the 
British empire. Ultimately, the charges against the sailors were dropped as Adams successfully 
argued that the homicide was justified in the name of self-defense. But, as Adams would recall, 
this episode did much to hasten the shift in public opinion against King and Parliament. Adams 
remarked that the Pitt Packer incident “contributed largely to render the sovereignty of 
parliament odious, detestable, and horrible to the people.”67 Thus John Adams would find 
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himself, even before the War for Independence broke out, contending with the relationship 
between North Atlantic fish and American nationhood. By the end of the armed hostilities the 
Massachusetts native did not hesitate to make explicit the connection between the fisheries and 
independence.  
Having accepted his commission as the American minister to France and ensconced 
himself in the courts of Europe, Adams considered the role of fishing in the nascent American 
nation. He bemoaned that “our fish went to the West India Islands for rum…which injured our 
health and our morals,” in addition to “the other part [that] went to Spain and Portugal for gold 
and silver, almost the whole of which went to London…often for lace and ribbons.” But despite 
the vices and luxury the fish trade invited to American shores, the fisheries provided a “nursery 
of seamen” that would prove to be “an object of serious importance, and perhaps indispensable 
[and] necessary to the accomplishment and preservation of our independence.”68  
While the fishermen’s cause was paramount to Adams as a loyal citizen of the Bay State, 
Congress did not hesitate to make a similar equation of fisheries and independence.  The 
Continental Congress made the fisheries a sine qua non of any peace deal brokered by American 
representatives in Europe. Instructions sent to both Adams and Franklin in the summer and fall 
of 1779 expressed Congress’s belief that the fisheries were necessary to independence and the 
union of the states. “The common right of fishing,” Congress’s diplomatic instructions 
demanded, “shall in no case be given up…it is essential to the welfare of all these United States.” 
By the fall of 1782, as Adams, Franklin, and John Jay converged upon Paris to meet Britain’s 
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peace delegation, the right of American fishermen to continue to exploit waters in the North 
Atlantic was, by Congressional order, a prerequisite of peace and independence.69    
  It takes little imagination to understand why Congress made access to the fisheries a 
non-negotiable goal for the ensuing treaty talks. The fisheries were, quite simply, an incredibly 
important commercial resource for the mainland colonies-turned-states. Across the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries the productive capacity of New England fishermen increased 
dramatically. In 1641 Massachusetts fishermen produced 6,000 quintals of dried codfish for sale 
across the Atlantic.70 By 1765 that number had ballooned to 350,000. As the Revolution 
approached, dried, salted cod sold overseas accounted for 35 percent of the total exports of New 
England between the years 1768 and 1772. As most of this trade in fish served to feed the 
enslaved peoples of the West Indies—in fact New England supplied 82 percent of British fish 
sent to the Caribbean—the fishing industry became intimately tied to other economic sectors 
including rum distilling and sugar cane production, which itself relied on the lucrative 
transatlantic trade in humans. Closer to home for New Englanders, fishing supported various 
maritime industries including shipyards, lumber mills, ropewalks, sailmakers, carpenters, and 
blacksmiths, not to mention directly employing 8 percent of the adult male working population 
of New England in 1770. Fishing was an important sector of the early American economy, one 
the fledgling state could not afford to lose on account of inept diplomacy.71  
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 During the closing months of 1782, as Adams and his fellow negotiators settled into 
Paris, the New Englander continued to ruminate on the place of the fisheries in the new 
American polity.72 While of course this maritime resource was necessary for political 
independence, it was also necessary to foster and preserve the nascent union. After conferring 
with Franklin, and referencing the words of South Carolinian Henry Laurens in Congress, 
Adams confided to his diary that the fisheries had become a point “so tender and important that 
if not secured it would be the cause of a breach of the Union of the States,” and “lay a foundation 
for a rupture between the States.”73 But this was not the only rupture that American diplomats 
feared, believing as they did that the fisheries were important and contentious enough to portend 
renewed hostilities with Great Britain if Americans were left out of this lucrative business.74 As 
the American and British peace delegations began in earnest to end the hostilities, the future of 
the fisheries implicated both the future of Anglo-American relations, if not the relations of the 
states themselves.75   
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 Although American statesmen were quick to define their political independence in terms 
of the fisheries, a notion in part substantiated by the military and naval service of cod fishermen, 
it would take persuasion and at times deceit for British diplomats to accede to those American 
wishes. Speaking to his British counterpart Richard Oswald in Paris, John Adams summed up 
America’s demands for Britain’s post war policy as “see[ing] that American Independence is 
independent, independent of all the World, independent of yourselves as well as of France, and 
independent of both as well as of the rest of Europe.”76 Continued access to the fisheries was an 
important part of the independence Britain was to assure the United States, but such was only the 
case because of the arguments deployed by the American ministers in Paris. Adams, Franklin, 
and Jay appealed to Americans’ customary access to the fisheries, in addition to making an 
environmental argument based on the fisheries’ geographic proximity to the United States, all the 
while raising the specter of French domination of the region.        
 To a certain extent Americans based their claims to liberal fishing rights on the fact that 
North Americans had fished those waters for centuries, and the mere act of revolution did 
nothing to relinquish that right. Writing to Franklin in his role as the nation’s first Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs under the Articles of Confederation, Robert Livingston briefed the minister on 
the expected fight over access to the fisheries. “The argument,” Livingston instructed, “on which 
the people of America found their claim to fish on the banks of Newfoundland arises, first, from 
their having once formed a part of the British empire, in which state they always enjoyed, as 
fully as the people of Britain themselves, the right of fishing on those banks.” The state of war 
that existed between the two polities did nothing to invalidate this right, however, since “the 
oppressions of Great Britain forced us to a separation…and it can not certainly be contended that 
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those oppressions abridge our rights or gave new ones to Britain.” Livingston concluded that any 
contention that the United States should abandon this maritime claim was foolish, because this 
resource was quite simply, a reason for resorting to hostilities. “We have kept up our claim from 
the commencement of the war,” Livingston remarked, “and assigned the attempt of Great Britain 
to exclude us from the fisheries as one of the causes of our recurring to arms.”77   
 Livingston also proceeded to anchor America’s claim in international law. Any attempt 
by Britain to claim the vast waters off the coasts of its remaining North American colonies would 
prove a violation of the law of nations, if not the law of nature. The ground on which Americans 
placed their “right to fish on the banks of Newfoundland…is the right which nature gives to all 
mankind to use its common benefit so far as not to exclude others.”78 But even disregarding the 
technicalities of the law of nations, Livingston observed that the maritime environment of the 
fisheries made the claims of any one nation impossible to uphold, remarking that “the sea can not 
in its nature be appropriated; no nation can put its mark upon it.”79 Although Livingston may not 
have realized it at the time, these remarks hint at how the environment became a powerful ally to 
the American peace commissioners.      
 Adams boasted that his technical knowledge of the fisheries and the fishing industry was 
unparalleled by American statesmen, and he did not hesitate to demonstrate his erudition at the 
bargaining table in Paris. After an extended description of the migratory patterns of cod and 
other commercially valuable fish, Adams concluded that the right of American fishermen was 
not a question of politics, but a question of nature. Remarking upon the yearly arrival of fish at 
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the shores of Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and the rest of the maritime colonies in March and 
April, Adams observed that only American fishermen could take advantage of this resource since 
“neither [the] French nor English could go from Europe and arrive early enough for the first 
Fare,” but “our Vessells could, being so much nearer, an Advantage which God and Nature had 
put into our hands.” As Adams articulated to his American colleagues and British counterparts, it 
was the United States’ geographic proximity to this maritime environment that gave Americans 
the right to exploit those waters.80 The question of geography became a theme as Adams 
continued to push for the recognition of this right.    
 British ministers responded to American arguments, not by disputing the notion that 
American fishermen should continue to ply these North Atlantic waters. Instead they disputed 
the language that the American commissioners insisted upon using. Through its many iterations 
Adams asserted that the peace treaty should guarantee that the United States had the “right” of 
the fisheries, and not the mere “liberty” the British preferred. At one point a British 
representative went so far as to say that “the Word Right was an obnoxious Expression.” 
Responding to Britain’s intransigence, Adams resorted to an argument based on geography. “Can 
there be a clearer Right?” Adams queried his British adversaries, “When God Almighty made the 
Banks of Newfoundland at 300 League Distance from the Peoples of America and at 600 League 
distance from those of France and England, did he not give as good a Right to the former as to 
the latter.” Through geography and history the fisheries were an American right, as Adams 
asserted that “if Occupation, Use, and Possession give a Right, We have it as clearly as you. If 
War and Blood and Treasure give a Right, ours is as good as yours.” If the final treaty failed to 
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recognize this state of affairs it would, in the words of John Jay, “not be a Peace,” but instead 
“only be an insidious Truce.”81       
 Appealing to a belief in natural order, Adams’ geographically informed arguments 
demonstrated the degree to which the case made by the Americans at Paris was undergirded by 
certain environmental conceptions.82 No postwar order prove could tenable if American 
fishermen where in anyway barred from waters that nature had placed so near to America shores. 
While certainly such an understanding of the environment proved to be self-serving, since the 
final treaty made allowances for American fishermen, this episode demonstrated the degree to 
which political and natural environments could be manipulated and in this case harmonized to 
further American interests. While Adams and his compatriots used custom and nature to 
advocate on behalf of American fishermen, they made sure to demonstrate that American 
fishermen also served British ends.    
 The fisheries issue, at least as Adams and his colleagues framed it, contained both the 
seeds of dissention and of harmony. If the delegates failed to resolve the matter in a way 
satisfactory to American fishermen, the future of Anglo-American relations would be one 
characterized by discord, if not outright hostility. While Americans, obviously New Englanders 
first and foremost, would seethe with resentment for any nation that cut the United States off 
from such a lucrative trade, Adams suggested that authorities would be utterly incapable of 
restraining intrepid fishermen who dared flaunt any unfavorable international arrangement. 
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“How could We restrain our Fishermen,” who Adams called no less than the “boldest Men alive, 
from fishing in prohibited Places.”83 This threat of future clashes perhaps inspired greater 
attention from British ministers as Adams pondered aloud “why should We leave Room for 
illiterate Fishermen to wrangle and chicane,” when distinguished statesmen could settle the issue 
for good.84 Adams touched on themes that would mark the fisheries issues for decades to come 
as the New Englander offered the fisherman as a symbol of both vice and virtue, and the 
potential to be an important agent of transatlantic relations, but for the time being raised the 
threat of future clashes to demonstrate how a settlement satisfactory to American fishermen was 
in fact a settlement satisfactory to all. 
 Placid relations upon the fishing grounds would also yield monetary benefits. Adams 
hoped to persuade his British counterparts that any wealth extracted from this maritime 
environment, even if done under an American flag, would inevitably fill the coffers of Great 
Britain. “That this Advantage of ours,” as Adams referred to the fisheries, “had ever been an 
Advantage to England, because our fish had been sold in Spain and Portugal for Gold and Silver, 
and that Gold and Silver sent to London for Manufactures.”85 This transfer of specie to the 
metropole would be interrupted if Britain pursued a hardline on the fisheries since “N. England 
had no other Remittance but the Fishery.”86 
 But perhaps the most persuasive argument the Americans offered at Paris was that every 
fish caught by an American sailor was a fish taken from a Frenchman. Even though the Franco-
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American alliance proved instrumental in assuring American battlefield success, the American 
diplomats in Paris did not hesitate to exploit Britain’s fear of a fishery dominated by French 
vessels in the absence of an American fishing fleet. While Americans would happily trade their 
maritime wealth for British manufactured goods, France would be far more reluctant to pass up 
the opportunity to develop native manufacturing and in the process enrich Britian’s enemy. 
Furthermore French sailors trained in that great nursery of seamen on the fishing banks would 
prove a far more immediate threat. Although the Americans presented the French as a specter of 
what could be, they were not entirely without their own suspicions of their nominal allies.              
 Even though military victory was accomplished only with French men and materiel, 
American leaders were quite wary that such a victory would be betrayed by unscrupulous French 
action during the peace process. In both Paris and Philadelphia, Americans almost felt it 
inevitable that the French court would do whatever was necessary to prevent too favorable a 
peace to the United States. In addition to the navigation of the Mississippi and claims to the 
trans-Appalachian west, the fisheries were among the major targets, so Adams and his colleagues 
believed, of French intrigue. The idea that France would attempt to shut American fishermen out 
of the rich waters of the North Atlantic was not that farfetched however. Both at Utrecht (1713) 
and Paris (1763) France sought the expansion of their fishing rights in the region and this most 
recent negotiation seemed to present the opportunity to bar the upstart United States. This kind of 
anxiety could have been written off as mere paranoia, but the spring of 1782 witnessed a 
veritable bombshell that threatened to completely destabilize America’s first international 
alliance.   
 Before the process of peace was undertaken in earnest, a communique from Francois 
Barbe-Marbois, a French representative in the United States, to the Comte de Vergennes, 
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France’s foreign minister, was intercepted by a British naval officer and transmitted to Congress 
through John Jay. Marbois’s letter depicted Samuel Adams as a rabblerousing malcontent who 
was “using all his endeavors to raise in the State of Massachusetts Bay a strong opposition to 
peace if the eastern states are not thereby admitted to the fisheries.”87 Looking upon the 
impassioned cries of New Englanders of “No peace without the Fisheries” as inimical to French 
interests, Marbois suggested to his superior “the means for preventing the consequences of 
success to Mr. Samuel Adams and his party.”88 By suggesting that Americans could be barred 
from North Atlantic waters either through the direct intervention of the King of France or the 
conquest of Cape Breton in Nova Scotia, Marbois’s letter confirmed fears that French double-
dealing would leave the United States with little after the war. While the authenticity of this 
letter has been questioned—perhaps it was a clever ruse on the part of the British—some 
Americans were disinclined to trust their French allies at Paris. American suspicion may have in 
fact motivated the American commissioners to abandon their friends and accept an overly 
generous British peace offering.            
 The very instructions from Congress demanding that any peace refer to the fisheries also 
demanded that France agree to any deal struck between the United States and Great Britain. 
Fearing that France would never consent to a treaty that left American fishing privileges intact, 
Adams and his colleagues heartily accepted Britain’s offer to grant American fishermen the 
“liberty” of access to all North Atlantic waters. By the close of 1782, little more than a month 
since his initial arrival in Paris, Adams was content to lay the fisheries issues to rest, claiming 
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“the Fisheries are secured, as well as we could.”89 Although the fisheries “Article cost Us all the 
Industry all the Skill and Address, that We were masters of,” Adams proudly declared that 
“French Finesse,” which is to say duplicity, “in the End has been defeated, very fairly and 
honestly defeated.”90 Adams would credit this defeat of “French Finesse,” and the generous 
terms Americans secured with regard to the navigation of the Mississippi and the extent of 
western lands, to a willingness to abandon his initial instructions and make peace independent of 
French dictates. “All these Advantages,” referring to the fisheries, the navigation of the 
Mississippi, and the vast new territory of the trans-Appalachian west, “would not have been 
obtained if We had literally pursued our Instructions.”91 The willingness of Adams and his 
fellow diplomats to forsake the French alliance, a decision motivated almost entirely out of 
regard for the fisheries, ensured the spectacular success they had at Paris.92  
 All in all the Americans left Paris with a generous peace.93 While the final text of the 
treaty granted American fishermen the “liberty to take fish of every kind on such part of the 
coast of Newfoundland as British fishermen shall use… and also on the coasts, bays and creeks 
of all other of his Brittanic Majesty's dominions in America,” this did not guarantee the “right” 
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Adams sought.94 Yet such a distinction paled in comparison to the, perhaps unjustified, grant of 
land in the trans-Appalachian west to the new United States. By suasion and guile the United 
States peace commission left Paris with a new nation whose birth depended upon maintaining 
access to the fisheries of the North Atlantic.95      
 The peace process linked fisheries and independence in American political rhetoric for 
decades to come. As the United States set about the task of nation building, the perceived 
military and commercial benefits of the North Atlantic cod fishery would be indispensable in 
creating a state that was no longer dependent on Great Britain, or any other European power for 
that matter. Adams’s strident tones in defense of the fisheries in Paris would continue to echo 
through the first decades of statehood, as what was at stake was not just water and flesh but the 
tools necessary for creating an independent, commercially minded nation. Fish, quite simply, 
were never merely fish. The piscine inhabitants of the North Atlantic were symbols and building 
blocks of an independent United States, thus making access to this resource worthy of a vigorous 
defense from foes, external and domestic. The following decades would see an all-consuming 
preoccupation with maintaining commercial independence and the crafting of fishery policy 
toward that end. 
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AMERICAN FISH IN A HOSTILE WORLD 
Americans had cause for optimism in 1783. With the peace secured, some Americans felt 
the revolution was merely beginning, as this new nation would lead a revolution in how 
commercial relations mediated the intercourse of nations. Characteristic of this optimism were 
the words of Levi Frisbie. In a speech delivered before an audience at Ipswich, Massachusetts, 
Frisbie imagined a future in which international trade among all nations was unfettered by the 
mercantilist restrictions of a bygone era.96 Instead, American merchants and sailors “may rejoice 
in the liberty of the seas,” in which they were “no longer harras’d with burdensome impositions, 
or unnecessary restrictions; no longer watch’d and pillag’d by the mercenary tools of a tyrannical 
government,” and in the process “waft their commodities to every climate, without molestation 
or disturbance.”97 This example of enlightened trade would no doubt play a missionary role in 
the world as “our example and our intercourse with foreign nations [will] widely diffuse this 
sacred flame [of liberty], and extend its happy influence thro’ all the kingdoms of Europe, if not 
to the most distant quarters of the globe.”98 For Frisbie the political independence of the United 
States was worth little without a corresponding revolution in international relations that would 
open the ports of the world to American commerce. 
 The fisheries played no small role in Frisbie’s imagined commercial order. Noting the 
“ample privileges” granted to American fishermen at Paris, Frisbie called the fishery “so 
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important to our commercial interests,” because this maritime resource “afford[s] us a living and 
inexhaustible fund of wealth and traffic.” Not only would the piscine wealth pulled from the 
deep provide a commodity to be sent across the far reaches of the Atlantic, but the entire fishing 
industry would be a boon for American shipbuilders and provide experienced mariners the 
opportunity to man the fleet of trading vessels that carried both the goods of all nations and the 
distinct advantages of American liberty. Given the value the fisheries provided American 
commercial enterprises, Frisbie was content to conclude that those fisheries were “a fund of 
superior worth to all the glittering mines of Peru.”99      
This kind of optimism, however, would soon founder upon the harsh realities of the 
international system. Britain was loath to abandon its mercantile policy and the revolution of free 
trade Americans thought was imminent never materialized. Silas Deane offered a less sanguine 
picture of American commerce. Deane was a disgraced former diplomat who spent the remaining 
years of his life defending his reputation from charges of treason and malfeasances dating to his 
years as the first American minister in Paris.100 But Deane’s attempt to clear his name contained 
a somewhat prophetic vision of the difficulties American commerce would experience as an 
independent state. In a letter written to the Philadelphia merchant Robert Morris during the 
summer of 1781, and subsequently published three years later, Deane reflected on the 
commercial prospects of an independent United States. Noting that Great Britain had reason to 
encourage and protect American commerce as a colonial dependent, independence would bring 
“all duties and prohibitions laid on the commerce of other aliens and strangers,” leaving Deane 
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“convinced” that with independence “we must be losers.” Most alarming was the prospect that 
American ships would be barred from entering the British ports in the Americas that had long 
absorbed the produce of the mainland colonies-turned-states. The other nations of Europe, 
including France, Spain, and Portugal, would likewise have little inclination to offer the United 
States commercial preference to take up the slack of Britain’s restrictive policies. Furthermore, 
Deane observed, “our trade…to the Southern parts of Europe, and into the Mediterranean, must 
at all times be exposed to the Corsairs of Barbary…who pay little or no respect to the flags of the 
first maritime nations in Europe,” and “will hardly pay any to the flag of a nation, which they 
have scarcely so much as heard of.”101  
 The fisheries would obviously fall victim to the inhospitable world that would meet 
American independence. Great Britain, Deane concluded, would have little motivation to ensure 
the continued access of American fisheries post-independence. Refuting the geographic logic 
Adams deployed in Paris, Deane remarked that “it will be no purpose to plead that our local 
situation gives us a natural right to participate [in the fisheries]…that we enjoyed…with others, 
as subjects, and part of the British empire,” because “we have separated from it, and appealed to 
the sword.”102 Even though Deane penned these words before the decisive American victory at 
Yorktown, much of what he prophesied came to be. Although American fishermen continued to 
ply the waters they had as colonials, American independence was met with a host of commercial 
restrictions that barred Americans and their produce from the most lucrative of markets. 
Paramount among these was Britain’s move to exclude American shipping to the British West 
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Indies. Combined with the Barbary States’ harassment of American commerce, the United States 
was cut off from the Caribbean and Mediterranean markets that had absorbed the bulk of 
American fish before independence.103 Despite securing access to some of the richest fishing 
waters in the world, the 1780s would prove a difficult decade for American fishing.      
 Emerging from the Revolutionary War, the American fishing industry was in shambles. 
The mobilization of men and ships in the nascent American navy, while key to battle field 
victories came at an incredible price. Throughout the earliest decades of independence both 
seasoned fishermen and fishing vessels were precious commodities and despite attempts to 
reinvigorate the industry tonnage failed to reach prewar levels for at least a decade. In fact, in 
1790 fishing tonnage employed in Massachusetts represented merely three-quarters of ships 
employed in 1775.104 The postbellum nadir of American fishing was, however, not unique. War 
in the North Atlantic had discouraged all nations from plying those waters, thus creating a 
significant rise in demand with a corresponding rise in price.105 This uptick in demand would 
help to put the American industry on more solid footing by the end of the century, but the 1780s 
remained a difficult time for fishermen on account of not only a lack of men and ships but a 
parsimonious British commercial policy that kept American fish out of its natural markets, 
namely the British West Indies. From 1783 until the first Anglo-American rapprochement of the 
late 1790s, American shipping was restricted to the British Caribbean with the export of fish 
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explicitly forbidden. While American goods were temporarily allowed to land in 1784, 1785, and 
1786 to relieve Caribbean residents in the aftermath of a series of hurricanes, a British act passed 
in 1788 formalized an earlier order in council that officially severed the commercial relationship 
between the United States and British possessions in the West Indies.106 Americans were quick 
to identify British policy as a principle cause of the malaise of the 1780s.         
 The commercial restrictions imposed by Great Britain proved difficult for all American 
producers, fishermen included. With duties imposed on American goods, or their outright ban in 
some markets—as was the case with fish in the West Indies—industry in the United States 
labored under conditions that threatened to short circuit the American experiment.107 One 
editorialist remarked on the bleak situation, noting how an imbalance of trade left Americans 
with little “to support the federal and State governments, and must ultimately tend to the ruin of 
the tradesman, the decrease of our commerce and fishery, and to the breaking of our national 
faith.” Another observer commented on how the optimism of the Revolution was quickly 
betrayed by commercial woes. Despite the natural abundance of the United States’ the new 
nation faced destitution that threatened to undermine all. “Excluded from those marts where we 
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usually disposed of the surplus of the produce of our agriculture,” this writer despaired, “the 
farmer finds he tills in vain,” while “the manufacturer, in like manner, let him employ his utmost 
skill and industry in the execution of his good, finds his own market glutted with European 
articles.” And finally “the merchant…is harassed in such a manner in foreign ports by alien 
duties, that he cannot carry on trade but under such disadvantages as evidently accelerate his 
ruin.” To remedy this situation and protect American industry from the restrictions and 
predations of foreign powers required, however, the kind of unity and concerted action found 
impossible under the Articles of Confederation.108  
 The first constitution of the United States proved unable to address the problems that 
elites in Philadelphia perceived to come with independence. Paramount was the inability of the 
central government to regulate commerce and levy taxes. As Federalists like James Madison, 
Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay came together to pen their defense of a new plan for the 
central government, the Atlantic fisheries and maritime commerce were among the problems this 
new regime directly addressed. John Jay connected the fisheries of the North Atlantic to 
American state building and the young nation’s foreign policy. In Federalist No. 4 Jay argued 
that a strong national union was necessary given the likelihood of international conflicts with 
Great Britain over the fisheries. For Jay, a united national government would leave European 
powers “much more disposed to cultivate our friendship than provoke our resentment,” as the 
United States competed with the British in taking fish from the Atlantic.109 Later, in Federalist 
No. 11, Alexander Hamilton would echo these earlier themes by placing the fisheries as a right 
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inherent with union. After detailing how a strong central government could, through the use of 
prohibitory regulations, control the commerce of North America and the Caribbean—becoming 
the “arbiter of Europe in America,” to use Hamilton’s turn of phrase—Hamilton turned his 
attention to rights that required a union to defend. In addition to the navigation of the Great 
Lakes and the Mississippi, Hamilton counted the fisheries as among the “rights of the Union.” 
And he feared that the “dissolution of the Confederacy would give room for delicate questions 
concerning the future existence of these rights.” For Hamilton, union and fisheries went hand in 
hand, and the ability of that union to marshal the resources of the whole became all the more 
important as Great Britain “would hardly remain long indifferent to [the] decided mastery” of 
American fishermen in the north Atlantic.110 As American statesmen set about fixing the 
problems of the young republic and creating the kind of centralized government that had the 
power to defend the international interests of the United States, the fisheries of the North Atlantic 
factored into the logic of union.111 But the passage of the new federal Constitution was not 
enough alone to remedy the problems that beset the fishing industry.112    
 Writing to Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton in 1791, Benjamin Lincoln, the 
collector for the port of Boston, commented on the problems that continued to strain the 
fisheries. In discussing the dearth of recent shipbuilding, Lincoln pointed to the international 
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system that barred American fish from many foreign ports. Lincoln plainly stated that “we had 
too many and more fish were caught than could find a market.” Not only were the British to 
blame for continuing their West Indian embargo, but Lincoln remarked upon “the embarrassment 
which we have experienced from this unfriendly disposition of the Algerines [sic] and the 
partiality of the French Nation discovered to their own fisheries have been checks upon the sale 
of our Cod Fish and induced many to employ these vessels in an-other channel.”113 While the 
fishing industry continued to operate amidst unfriendly circumstances, the federal government 
now had the power to aid the industry. The fisheries were positioned to directly benefit from a 
newly invigorated federal government.    
 With an industry still floundering and memorials pouring in from Marblehead, 
Gloucester, and Nantucket—once the proudest cod fishing ports in the North Atlantic—
imploring the federal government to relieve the destitution of fishermen, the task fell to Secretary 
of State Thomas Jefferson to offer an appraisal of the industry and recommendations for how 
newly found federal power might ease the burden of these communities.114 Massachusetts’s 
governor, John Hancock, appealed to a sense of nationalism, beseeching the Secretary of State 
that while the fishery were “particularly beneficial to this State,” they “must at the same Time be 
of very great advantage…to the United States,” hoping that “due attention will be had to so 
interesting a Subject.”115 Jefferson would indeed pay due attention to the subject and produced a 
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report that left an indelible mark upon the fisheries issue, one that would influence the industry 
for decades to come.  
  
FISHERIES AND FEDERAL INTERVENTION 
Embracing a centuries long look at fishing in the North Atlantic, Jefferson’s “Report on 
the American Fisheries” was published in the early months of 1791 with the hope of rallying 
support for federal intervention. Placing the fisheries in the larger context of Britain and France’s 
imperial rivalry of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Jefferson made careful note that it 
was only with governmental patronage in the form of prohibitory duties and outright 
subsidization through bounties that British or French fishermen were able to thrive or, at times, 
merely survive.116 The success of these fishermen was not isolated to the maritime economy of 
these empires. Instead, Jefferson hinted that the powerful navies of Britain and France were 
undergirded by fishermen who translated the skills acquired aboard fishing schooners to the 
decks of warships. The connection of fishing and fighting was powerful in tying the fisheries to 
nationalism, but for Jefferson it was of a more immediate concern as he feared Britain as “a rival 
nation aiming at the sole empire of the seas.”117 But much had to be done before the United 
States could forestall this possibility.  
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 While the intervening decade since the British defeat at Yorktown had seen minor 
developments in the fishing industry, the situation in 1791 was still bleak. Among the “hopeless 
auspices under which this important business” was conducted were many of the problems that 
faced American production and navigation more generally. Recognizing the deleterious effects 
of the War for Independence, Jefferson remarked that “the fisheries of the United States [were] 
annihilated during the war, their vessels, utensils, and fishermen destroyed.” But an inhospitable 
international environment proved even more vexing as “their markets in the Mediterranean and 
British America lost, and their produce dutied in those of France,” while “their competitors 
enabled by bounties to meet and undersell them at the few markets remaining open.” But the 
disadvantages that American fishermen were forced to labor under were not solely the result of 
international competition and the mercantilist policy of rival nations. Jefferson singled out the 
tonnage duties placed on American fishing vessels as well as the import duties on “salt, tea, rum, 
sugar, molasses, hooks, lines, duck, cordage, cables, iron, hemp and twine,” all necessary articles 
for provisioning and outfitting fishing expeditions. Despite a number of forces that seemingly 
conspired against the profitable operation of the cod fishing industry, Jefferson was quick to 
recognize the advantages that, if encouraged, could allow American fishermen dominance in the 
region.118    
 The advantages that Jefferson recognized echoed some of the arguments Adams had put 
forth in Paris to justify American claims to those waters, namely the geographic proximity of 
Newfoundland and its rich fishing banks to the United States. Geographic proximity was 
advantageous because it allowed American fishermen to execute a greater number of fares in a 
single season compared to their European rivals. But the shorter voyage also meant that the 
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American fishing fleet was comprised of smaller, cheaper, less capital intensive vessels that 
reduced risk and insurance rates. Among other assets that were not so easily calculated, Jefferson 
pointed to the superiority of American sailors. He extolled Yankee fishermen as unsurpassed by 
their European counterparts “in skill, activity, enterprise, sobriety and order.” For Jefferson the 
nature of this maritime environment and the nature of the national character aligned with “such 
force, that while experience has proved that no other nation can make a mercantile profit on the 
Newfoundland fishery…we can make a living profit,” provided the federal government offer 
necessary support.119   
 Even with close waters, cheap ships, and able fishermen, an American fishing industry 
left alone seemed doomed to failure. The history of other nations promised as much. Cod fishing 
in Britain and France led Jefferson to the bleak realization that “it is too poor a business to be left 
to itself, even with the nation the most advantageously situated.” To help a helpless industry 
Jefferson recommended a three-fold solution. First, the United States repeal any duties placed on 
ships or the supplies necessary for fishing voyages. Second, the secretary of state suggested that 
“national influence be used abroad for obtaining better markets for their produce.” Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly, that a bounty be granted to fishermen.120 While this strategy was in 
some regard unremarkable, in fact merely an emulation of policies enacted by Britain and 
France, it represented a significant innovation for the young republic’s political economy.  With 
a federal government replacing an alliance of convenience under the Articles of Confederation, 
Jefferson advocated using this authority to intervene in the operation of the fishing industry. A 
decade of malaise had shown that the American economy would only flounder without concerted 
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action at home and advocacy abroad. Fishermen stood to benefit most from newfound 
constitutional authority.      
 The risk of letting the fishing industry remain insolvent would, in Jefferson’s estimation, 
be ruinous for the American economy more generally. Cod fishing was not an industry isolated 
to a handful of ports along the New England coast.  Fishermen were important maritime laborers, 
without which the entire maritime sector would diminish in importance. In the absence of sailors 
trained on the fishing banks, the demand for ships, shipbuilding, lumber, iron, hemp and a host 
of other resources and skills would likewise diminish. The United States would consequently be 
left without a merchant marine to carry the nation’s produce, thus forcing farmers, planters, 
miners, and manufacturers across the union to rely on foreign bottoms. Such dependence 
necessarily created vulnerability and subjected the American economy to contend with the 
whims of international relations. American goods carried on foreign ships would saddle the 
United States with higher freight and insurance rates in times of war. American merchants would 
also miss out on the “incalculable source of profit” that was the neutral trade with belligerent 
powers. Using federal authority to revive the cod fishing industry was not a mere matter of fish. 
Instead, fishing undergirded a robust maritime sector that in turn made possible commercial, if 
not political, independence.121         
 Jefferson’s appeal on behalf the American fishing industry did not fall on deaf ears. Little 
more than a year later a bill came before Congress “for the encouragement of the Bank and other 
Cod-Fisheries, and for the regulations and government of the fishermen employed therein.” The 
gist of this landmark piece of legislation was that the federal government would make yearly 
payments to the owners, captains, and crews of cod fishing vessels that plied the waters of the 
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north Atlantic at least four months of every season. Unlike a previous subsidy paid to merchants 
who exported fish—intended to act as a reimbursement for the duty placed on imported salt—
this new act promised to benefit fishermen directly and was determined by each ship’s tonnage, 
not the amount of fish sent overseas. February of 1792 witnessed a debate in Congress about 
whether this unprecedented imposition of federal authority fulfilled the promise of the nation’s 
new charter to ensure the general welfare.122     
 Critics of the measure focused on the notion of general welfare and came to the 
conclusion that such payments constituted an unfair dispensation of federal largess that benefited 
the few at the expense of the many. William B. Giles of Virginia, noting that this was “the first 
attempt as yet made by this Government to exercise such authority,” openly doubted the 
constitutionality of this measure. Going beyond the mere regulation of commerce, this bill 
promised a reordering of every manufacturing and agricultural system in the nation. Such a 
bounty on a single occupation was the degradation of “common rights,” and this attempt to 
establish a monopoly of “exclusive rights” was as unjust as it was oppressive. To allow the 
government interference in the operation of this single industry, Giles warned, “can be justified 
on no other principle than that the whole product of the labor of every individual is the real 
property of Government…[and] that every individual in the community is merely a slave and 
bondman to Government.”123 Giles’ colleague and fellow Virginian, John Page, likewise 
ruminated upon the constitutional implications of this bill. Echoing Giles’ concern with the 
general welfare, Page took the argument a step further by claiming this bill “endanger[ed] the 
sovereignty and independence of the individual States.” Page even went so far as to claim that 
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this measure was “a step towards swallowing up the powers of the State Governments, and as 
consolidating the different States into one Government.”124 Central to these critiques was an 
understanding that fairness and balance was the measure of constitutionality. Any measure that 
threatened to favor one occupation or class over another, at least in the eyes of the elite white 
men of Congress, was as harmful as any attempt to aggrandize the power of the federal 
government at the expense of the states. Oddly enough the bill’s supporters employed a similar 
argument in the hopes of convincing skeptics that this bill merely gave fishermen their fair share.   
 Leaving aside for the moment the oft repeated cry that the fisheries were central to 
national security as a “nursery” of the nation’s seamen, the defense of this bill rested upon the 
assertions that the fisheries promoted national wealth and that supporting this industry was a 
matter of justice and equity. Fisher Ames and Elbridge Gerry, both of Massachusetts, offered the 
most cogent defense of the measure before Congress. Ames was quick to assert that the fisheries 
were “an inexhaustible fund of wealth,” and a “mine of treasure,” that promised to fill federal 
coffers as the money paid out to fishermen would no doubt be less than the duty collected on the 
salt that was necessary for this business. The fisheries, then, were a truly national resource whose 
benefits could be felt well beyond the merchants and captains of the Bay State. Befitting this 
position, fishermen and their supporters asked for nothing more than “common justice.”125 Gerry 
approached the chamber with a simple request, that “the State of Massachusetts ask nothing 
more than equal justice,” and that “the same system which is applied to other parts of the Union, 
may be applied to us.” Singling out hemp growers and brewers, Gerry made the observation that 
duties placed on raising hemp and brewing beer acted in a manner not dissimilar to the proposed 
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bounty on fish. If, Gerry concluded, the bounty in one case was impermissible is was likewise in 
the other. Furthermore, the residents of Massachusetts were subject to an unjust tax for the 
defense of the western frontier. “I wish to know,” Gerry pondered, “on what principles 
gentlemen can expect that the citizens of Massachusetts should contribute two hundred thousand 
dollars…for the protection of the Western frontier against the Indians, when no contribution is 
made to support the commerce of Massachusetts.”126 Like his opponents that attacked the bill as 
an example of geographic favoritism, Gerry and his likeminded colleagues appealed to the notion 
of equality and demanded fair treatment. In the end, though, it was Gerry’s interpretation of 
equity that won the day as the bill passed and would remain part of the nation’s political 
economy for decades to come.  
 Seemingly lurking behind this debate was the question of sectionalism. Massachusetts 
and Virginia seemed to stand as proxies for an emerging rivalry of North and South, both vying 
for federal attention and both loath to see the other privileged. Hugh Williamson of North 
Carolina gave voice to this perspective as he ruminated upon the ill effects this bill would have 
in store for his home region—it promised nothing but “destruction” of the South’s “valuable 
staples” and “visionary wealth.”127 Yet a closer examination of the final vote, thirty-eight yeas to 
twenty-one nays, upend the facile conclusion that the debate on the fishery bill was merely an 
early salvo in what would lead to disunion. Instead, party affinity, such as it was in 1792, and 
geography provide more persuasive explanations for the final vote tally. Of the thirty-three 
congressmen identified as loyal to the administration’s goals, twenty-eight voted for the bill, 
with only five defectors opposing the measure. More intriguing is the group of twenty-six 
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congressmen opposed to the Washington administration. Of that group sixteen predictably voted 
against the bill, leaving a not-insignificant group of ten congressmen who supported the measure 
at hand. Not wishing to completely discount the pull of sectional affinities, this group included 
Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts along with Israel Smith and Nathaniel Niles both of Vermont, 
who quite reasonably supported the bill as it would prove beneficial to their New England 
constituents. Of the remaining seven congressmen who broke party to support the bill four, 
Samuel Sterett, Thomas Tredwell, Cornelius Schoonmaker, and Frederick Muhlenberg, 
represented districts that had direct ties to the maritime world with constituencies that would no 
doubt benefit from an activist federal government with a penchant for supporting maritime 
enterprise.128  
A look at the South further demonstrates the degree of influence geography had on this 
vote. Of the twenty-two votes coming from Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and 
Georgia, sixteen were cast in opposition of the measure. Yet eleven of those came from 
congressmen who represented inland districts removed from coastal occupations. And of the five 
nays from coastal districts in the South, two, John Baptista Ashe and Hugh Williamson, 
represented districts along North Carolina’s Outer Banks, a coastal region largely devoid of 
significant maritime traffic. Indicative of this trend was South Carolina. The three districts along 
the coast all favored the bill, while the two inland districts, representing the piedmont and back 
country citizenry, opposed the measure. Coastal people simply had more reasons to support this 
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bill and welcome a federal government with an inclination to support maritime-facing 
communities.129         
 
FISHERIES AND THE EMERGENCE OF PARTISAN POLITICS 
 With the bounty secured the place of the fisheries in national politics did not, however, 
diminish. Instead the fisheries became a prism through which some of the most important 
political developments the young nation experienced were refracted. Chief among these was the 
polarization of the First Party System.130 In the 1790s the tenor of domestic and foreign policy 
was very much up for grabs as the roles and powers of the new federal government had yet to be 
defined. To a certain extent the divide between Jeffersonian agrarians and Hamiltonian 
manufacturers typified the coalescing view points on the future of the American political 
economy. But subscribing to too sharp a distinction between the two obscures intriguing, if often 
overlooked, similarities. The fisheries issue demonstrated the degree to which Hamilton and 
Jefferson mirrored each other in action, if not echoed each other in philosophy.  
 As Jefferson penned his call for the federal government’s intrusion in the fishing 
industry, Hamilton likewise put his mind towards the delicate question of government and 
industry. What resulted was Hamilton’s most enduring legacy: his “Report on Manufactures” 
that he presented to Congress in December of 1791 became the most coherent statement of his 
brand of economic nationalism that would influence the development of American political-
economy for decades to come. Like Jefferson, Hamilton sought to address the problems that 
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beset the nation during the 1780s and used the advent of the federal government to put the 
American economy on a more stable footing.131 For Hamilton the watchword was independence 
and he crafted the report with an eye towards the promotion of domestic manufacturing “to 
render the United States independent of foreign nations, for military and other essential 
supplies.”132 Hamilton and Jefferson both focused upon markets as a key to remedy national 
problems. As Jefferson made plain, there was little opportunity to sell fish abroad, and Hamilton 
also noted that the nation lacked a vent for its produce from all sections. But it is in this regard 
that Hamilton’s report diverged significantly from Jefferson’s views as stated in the fisheries 
report. While Jefferson hoped to use the influence of the national government abroad to open 
new markets for American fish, Hamilton was not so optimistic that the newcomer United States 
could remake the system of international commerce. Instead Hamilton focused on how to create 
a greater demand at home by “enlarging the sphere of our domestic commerce,” hoping that a 
“more extensive demand for that surplus may be created at home.”133 But despite a divergence 
on what markets would absorb American produce, both Hamilton and Jefferson did advocate a 
similar plan of action. As has been seen, Jefferson successfully advocated for a fishing bounty, 
and Hamilton would do likewise, suggesting that bounties have “a more immediate tendency to 
stimulate and uphold new enterprises, increasing the chances of profit, and diminishing the risk 
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of loss.”134 Both statesmen, then, supported using government influence through the granting of 
bounties to support and revive a flagging economy.    
 Hamilton’s report even directly addressed the fisheries and their role in his newly 
imagined national economy. Hamilton understood the fisheries, like agriculture, to be a 
complement to manufacturing. Eschewing the “mischievous” notion that different economic 
sectors were necessarily antagonistic to the other, Hamilton detailed how fishing and 
manufacturing supported each other. Not only would manufacturing create a demand for fish in 
the nation’s new industrial centers—fish being a far cheaper source of protein in the diet of 
industrial laborers—but “the oils, bones, and skins, of marine animals, are of extensive use in 
various manufactures.” Thus an invigorated manufacturing sector would create “an additional 
demand for the produce of the fisheries.”135 As Jefferson’s and Hamilton’s reports show, the 
political economy envisioned by these two men, and the role of the federal government, showed 
a remarkable degree of consistency on the fisheries issue.  
 Yet despite these similarities the parties continued to coalesce around distinct visions for 
the future of the United States. The fisheries issue continued to be both implicated in the divide 
and to show how divergent political ideologies were bridged by support for this national 
resource. A pamphlet published in 1792 by ardent Hamiltonian William Loughton Smith of 
South Carolina was emblematic of how even Jefferson’s staunchest opponents supported his 
advocacy for the fisheries. Smith placed Hamilton “among the great ministers of the age,” and 
his brand of economic nationalism was no secret. The South Carolinian was Hamilton’s 
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mouthpiece in Congress, and went so far as to give him solitary praise for assuaging “the languid 
state of commerce, navigation and manufactures, the general want of confidence and credit at 
home and abroad, [and] the inability of the government to support itself,” that had racked the 
nation since independence.136 Saving his bile for Jefferson, whom he referred to only as the 
“Generalissimo,” Smith railed against the secretary of state as an insidious intriguer bent on the 
destruction of the union while cloaking himself in false republican simplicity to dupe his 
followers for selfish political gain.137 While this sort of impassioned rhetoric was a familiar part 
of party politics in the 1790s, Smith did relent in his diatribe when surveying Jefferson’s career 
as the nation’s chief foreign minister. In searching for “what part of the conduct of the 
Department of State has merited panegyrics” under Jefferson’s auspices, Smith could find but 
one—Jefferson’s report on American fisheries. Ready to write off the Washington 
administration’s conduct of foreign affairs as but “a dreary waste,” Smith did recognize at least 
one admirable action. In fact, the South Carolinian saw in the fisheries report hints of 
Hamiltonianism by recognizing that Jefferson’s call for a cod fishing bounty differed little from 
the suggested bounty for manufacturing.138 The fisheries issue, and federal support for 
fishermen, was an issue that spanned the chasm of parties, demonstrating the national character 
of this maritime resource.      
 While the fisheries provide an intriguing example of how such a resource could create a 
degree of cross-party unity, the nascent Federalist and Democratic-Republican parties continued 
to coalesce around contrasting visions of the nation’s future political economy. But it was not 
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just questions of federal debt assumption and a national bank that divided Jefferson, Hamilton, 
and their respective supporters. How the United States was to engage with foreign powers, 
particularly Great Britain and France, would serve a powerful role in determining the 
architecture of the First Party System. Jay’s Treaty, negotiated in 1794, was a flash point in party 
relations and influenced American foreign policy for the next decade. Settling a host of problems 
left over from the Revolution, including Britain vacating forts in the west and what would prove 
to be an abortive attempt to settle the northern boundary line, the treaty was most significant for 
inaugurating the “first rapprochement” in Anglo-American relations by normalizing trade, 
especially that between the United States and the British West Indies.139 This warming of 
relations with Britain was accompanied by hostilities with revolutionary France. With Great 
Britain and France at war since 1793, the treaty effectively ended any attempt on the part of the 
United States to remain neutral in that conflict. To the dismay of the Jeffersonians, the balance of 
transatlantic relations was tipped back towards Britain as many Americans, remembering French 
intrigue at the Paris peace negotiation, were already inclined to distrust their one-time French 
allies.             
As tensions between the United States and its erstwhile ally France simmered in the 
waning years of the eighteenth century, soon to erupt in outright, if undeclared, war, Secretary of 
State Timothy Pickering remarked on the history of the Franco-American alliance. In his 
estimation, France, as both a kingdom and a republic, sought nothing less than the 
dismemberment of the British empire and the usurpation of the United States’ independence. 
Most troubling was France’s perceived goal of depriving the United States of the “fairest fruits” 
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of independence, including its claim to the trans-Appalachian West, the navigation of the 
Mississippi River, and access to the rich fishing waters of the Northwest Atlantic. For Pickering 
and his countrymen, North Atlantic cod was no less important to the nation building project than 
its western territories or access to the Mississippi waterway.140 It was not mere hyperbole that 
caused the nation’s second leading diplomat to compare fish to the extent of land that would 
comprise ten states. Instead it was the increasingly strong connection in early national political 
rhetoric about the relationship between the North Atlantic fisheries and the very meaning of 
independence.   
 When Americans cast their lot with Great Britain, France was not content to sit idle as 
their cross-channel rival recruited yet another nation into its fold to wage a commercial and 
maritime war upon the revolutionary state. The closing years of the century witnessed the growth 
of maritime antagonism on the part of both the United States and France until open warfare 
broke out upon the high seas. The Quasi War confirmed the fears of Francophobes that their 
supposed republican brothers in arms were little different than the other piratical princedoms of 
Europe.141 Thomas Paine, the firebrand of 1776, took the opportunity to denounce “Gallic 
perfidy,” and to commemorate America finally freeing itself from the shackles of its once lauded 
alliance with France. With the dissolution of the treaty of alliance that bound the two nations 
since 1778, Paine enthusiastically declared that such a day “will forever be illustrious in our 
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annals” as “the completion of our Liberties, the acme of our Independence.”142 For Paine the end 
of the French alliance was no less important than declaring independence as “one annihilated our 
colonial submission…the other emancipated use from the oppressive friendship of an ambitious, 
malignant, treacherous ally.”143 From its beginning the alliance was detrimental to the United 
States. Paine remembered how “by the fiend-like hypocrisy, and collusive machinations of the 
French Minister,” France attempted to sacrifice the American right to the “inexhaustible mine of 
commerce” that was the North Atlantic fisheries, for fear that one day it would provide an able 
class of seamen that might allow the United States true independence.144 While the nascent 
United States declared independence in 1776, it was only at the turn of the century that it was 
achieved.    
 By 1800 the American fishing industry was on a firmer footing than it had been on for 
decades. Britain assented to American schooners plying waters along its remaining North 
American colonies while American fish at last was flowing into the British West Indies. As 
Thomas Jefferson was poised to ascend to the presidential chair, the fisheries seemed safe. But a 
host of other problems beset the nation. While relations with Great Britain were, at least for the 
moment placid, war would come in little more than a decade as British harassment and 
impressment of American sailors seemed to call into question the nation’s claims of 
independence. Likewise, the undeclared war with France continued to simmer and the United 
States was stuck between the two greatest European powers. It seemed as though the problems of 
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the new century would taste of salt as the United States focused its attention upon the seas and in 
the process became a truly maritime nation.     
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CHAPTER 2: FISHERMEN AND FOREIGN RELATIONS IN A MARITIME WORLD, TO THE CONVENTION 
OF 1818 
 
The problems of the 1790s seemed to foretell the international environment the United 
States would continue to face in the new century. Impressment, the harassment of American 
shipping, and the imprisonment of sailors by the Barbary States were among the myriad 
distresses that forced the United States to fix its gaze upon the waves that lapped its shores. 
Although the United States may have lacked a navy on the scale of its transatlantic rivals, sailors 
became the largest class of Americans to engage with the world beyond its coasts. The maritime 
consciousness of the United States significantly influenced both the content of political rhetoric 
and the manner in which American foreign relations were conducted.145 Domestic debates over 
the North Atlantic fisheries and the place of fishermen in the national community, combined 
with how the diplomatic proceedings concerning American access to this maritime resource 
developed, offer an opportunity to see just how maritime concerns directly influenced the 
workings of American politics. While the creation of Jefferson’s “empire of liberty” may draw 
the eye westward to the Ohio Valley, Louisiana, and beyond—perhaps in anticipation of what 
was coming—crucial developments for American statecraft were, in the early republic, much 
closer to home and far wetter in nature.  
 The two decades leading up to the War of 1812 saw the United States engage with the 
maritime world on a scale that has perhaps been unmatched in American history. Given this 
context, sailors and seagoing peoples were lauded in political rhetoric and popular discourse as 
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valuable members of the national community, earning, unlike most other ordinary laborers, a 
privileged place in this political world. The symbolic importance of this class of men, of which 
fishermen were a central, if small, group, was evident in how they were deployed in political 
discourse as national symbols that garnered the support of the federal government. But fishermen 
and sailors demanded a role in American politics apart from mere nationalistic imaginings. The 
years after the conclusion of the War of 1812 would see American fishermen implicate 
themselves, in a very direct way, in the course of Anglo-American diplomacy. In the process 
these fishermen would exhibit influence beyond what their financial position and demographic 
numbers may suggest by creating the conditions necessary for the United States and Great 
Britain to grapple with key irritants in transatlantic relations. The fulcrum upon which Anglo-
American relations during the early republic pivoted was not the War of 1812 and the subsequent 
peace made at Ghent. Instead the Convention of 1818, an agreement occasioned by the actions of 
fishermen, was of greater importance in redefining transatlantic ties.146 While often overlooked, 
fishermen were implicated in the politics and diplomacy of the early republic and fishermen, as 
both subjects and actors, were influential in the unfolding of American statecraft in ways that 
have been undervalued or entirely ignored. 
 The experiences of American sailors in the earliest decades of nationhood demonstrated 
the centrality of maritime occupations in the early republic. Restrictions on American seaborne 
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trade had hastened the coming of the Revolution. The continuation of British mercantile policy 
was a significant detriment to the early American political economy. An undeclared war with 
France made the nation, Federalists at least, see the merits of a competent navy. The capture, and 
subsequent liberation, of American sailors by the Barbary States was a cause célèbre that stoked 
nationalist fires. And the ongoing impressment of American seamen by the Royal Navy left 
many Americans seething with indignation and spoiling for another war with Britain. Quite 
simply, some of the most significant political developments the United States had to contend 
with emanated from the oceans and the culture of American politics was quick to embrace the 
humble sailor as a symbol of an emerging nationalism.147        
 
FISHERMEN IN A MARITIME NATION 
 This embrace of ordinary sailors as powerful symbols in a political rhetoric concerning 
nationalism had corollaries across the Atlantic. Unsurprisingly British politics were riven by 
acrimonious debates that put the sailors of the impressive Royal Navy at the center of different 
interpretations of both nation and empire. While British sailors were at the same time touted as 
essential elements of the imperial structure and defamed for the manner of their service and lives, 
American seamen experienced nearly universal acclaim.148 Owing to the above mentioned trials, 
American sailors became widely accepted symbols of the nation. The memory of their service 
and sacrifice during the revolutionary struggle, along with their continued role as defenders of 
the nation in times of war and purveyors of trade in time of pace, made sailors into an idea that 
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nearly all Americans could rally around. In this world of the early republic even something as 
seemingly mundane as the launching of a trade ship was given new meaning as the ship, its 
stores, and the men on deck brought to the world a definition of what this new nation was.149 
Sailors, at least as rhetorical symbols, were able to elicit such a visceral reaction because their 
military service and commercial value made this class of maritime laborers key defenders of 
liberty if not independence itself.150 By 1800 it certainly came as no surprise that Susannah 
Rowson’s verse was meet by a receptive and sympathetic audience: “For commerce whilst the 
sail we spread/To cross the foaming waves boys…/Boldly assert each sacred right/Be 
Independent, Brave & Free…/Then Huzza, Huzza, Huzza for America.”151  
 Fishermen were not excluded from the plaudits bestowed to maritime labor. Like their 
brethren in the merchant marine and navy, the cod fishermen who plied the waters of the North 
Atlantic were likewise enrolled in rhetoric that conjoined maritime labor and national definition. 
In fact fishermen were uniquely situated to cement this association, owing to their actual efforts 
during the struggle for independence. Just as other sailors were remembered for their service, 
fishermen were celebrated for putting aside their occupational pursuits, risking their ships, and 
sacrificing their lives on both sea and land in defense of American independence.152 But in this 
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instance it was not only the fishermen who were lauded as national symbols and as protectors of 
political and commercial independence. The fisheries themselves, the waters off the coast of 
Britain’s remaining North American provinces that teemed with mackerel, hake, haddock, 
halibut, but most importantly cod, were likewise associated with the nation and independence. 
Because fishermen learned the skills of seafaring upon these waves, the fisheries were dubbed 
“the nursery of the nation’s seamen.” An appeal to national security, then, was central to the 
rhetoric surrounding both fishermen and fisheries. 
 The debate over the cod fishing bounty in the early months of 1792 was, as previously 
demonstrated, a debate over the constitutional relationship between the federal government, 
individuals, and industry. But the debate also became a venue to deploy the symbolic fisherman 
in defense of the federal subsidy. Boosters of the cod fishing business were quick to describe 
New England fishermen as valuable, national resources who not only enriched the country but 
would defend it in times of need. This particular image of fishermen did not go uncontested. 
With “nursery of the nation’s seamen” as their rallying cry, the congressional delegation from 
Massachusetts set about defending this class of men and securing to them this federal 
dispensation.  
 Benjamin Goodhue, amidst the debate over the bounty, articulated what would become in 
future years the sole justification for the renewal and continuation of the bounty. Quite simply, 
Goodhue observed, the cod fishery “contributes to the national defence,” by “furnish[ing] a 
copious nursery of hardy seamen, and offers a never-failing source of protection to the 
commerce of the United States” that would be necessary in the case of a future war with any 
European maritime power. In the event of any hostilities fishermen would resort to privateering 
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to protect American interests.153 Fisher Ames would expand upon Goodhue’s remarks by 
detailing how the demands of the cod fisheries made excellent seamen. They were, Ames 
remarked, “expert and hardy seamen,” whose labor in the cold, unforgiving climes of the North 
Atlantic were made “as hardy as the bears on the islands of ice.” But it was not only their 
physical attributes and unrivaled seamanship that made these men deserving of the bounty. The 
nature of their work seemed to inspire nationalist fervor. Ames declared that memory of the 
“exploits” of the fishermen “would find every American heart…glowing with the recollection of 
them.” It was not only their service upon the seas that ingratiated these men to the nation. Ames 
implored his audience to fondly recall the fishermen who mustered into armed service at places 
like Bunker Hill and Trenton. As Ames would have, it the fishermen were the midwives of 
American independence and would remain its constant protector.154     
 Despite an appeal to a nationalist ideal, the fisherman-as-fighter image failed to convince 
everyone in Congress. Critics of the bill offered farmers and frontiersmen as perhaps more 
worthy of federal support since they, too, could be raised to serve the nation in both war and 
peace. John Page of Virginia would lead the opposition with the hopes of undermining the 
bounty’s appeal to national security. Page observed “that Congress may with as much propriety 
give bounties to our hunters in the Western country, to raise up a nursery of soldiers as barrier 
against the Indians, and to promote the fur trade,” as to “raise a nursery of seamen for the 
defence against enemies who may invade our Eastern frontiers.” Page went so far as to question 
the efficacy of fishing at all and whether or not the piscine pursuit was of advantage to the nation 
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154 Ibid, 369–70. The naval-nursery argument was not confined to the rhetoric of representative from the Bay State 
both Robert Barnwell of South Carolina and Hugh Williamson of North Carolina both vocally called attention to the 
relationship between fishing and fighting, Annals, 375, 378–380.  
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at all. “It is not clear to me,” Page remarked, “that those fishermen would not be more profitable 
to the United States, if they were cultivating the lands which now lie waste, and raising families, 
which would be of ten times more value than their fisheries.” The draw of the land and of hearth 
and home was, in Page’s estimation, a superior pursuit: “A nursery of virtuous families, which 
will produce soldiers, sailors, husbandmen, and statesmen, must be preferable to a mere nursery 
of sailors, who generally live single, and often perish at sea.”155 Proponents and critics alike 
employed images of their constituents, whether farmers or fishermen, but always as hardy, 
patriotic, and virtuous citizens, in the service of their agendas. Ultimately the fishermen would 
win the day, securing the fishing bounty for decades to come, but this episode would also 
establish this image—albeit a contested one—of fishermen in American political rhetoric.  
 In time the correspondence of fishing and fighting would become an article of faith for 
the industry’s supporters, employed whenever opponents sought to decry the fishing business as 
of a purely local concern or the beneficiary of unconstitutional favoritism. A more popular 
discourse on fishermen would take hold as newspapers editors and readers echoed many of the 
themes expounded by Ames, and other politicians who cast fishermen as integral to the nation’s 
interests. The Balance and Columbia Repository of Hudson, New York, offered an image of 
fishermen that resonated with the industrious and patriotic fisherman lionized in Congress and 
elsewhere. “Every hardy son of Neptune, who handles the harpoon, or the cod-line,” demanded 
federal largess because in times of war they may “be transmuted into privateersmen, and their 
vessels into privateers,” as had been the case in the nation’s war for independence. “The fisheries 
are,” this editorialist concluded, “to the United States in general, a defense, or a bulwark against 
the invasions of foreign nations. They are, as it were, the great Magazine of American 
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Seamen.”156 The naval-nursery argument was a meme in the early republic, used not only to 
counter the possible arguments of critics but mentioned, sometimes off hand, whenever the 
fisheries issue came to the fore.  
But the pervasiveness of this line of thinking did not necessarily mean total acceptance. 
In counter to the hardy, patriotic fishermen in the service of the national community, critics, like 
John Page in Congress, offered idealized farmers as more deserving and more useful members of 
the body politic. Editorialists would echo Page’s veneration of agriculture, declaring, as a writer 
for The Independent Chronicle and Universal Advertiser of Boston would, that “everything 
springs from the earth, as everything returns to it; and the farmer is of course the great moving 
principle, on whose virtue and activity all our fiscal operations depend.” It is the “plough, the 
harrow and the hoe,” and not the cod line and harpoon, “that are the…productive instruments of 
national wealth.”  The editorial concluded that the fishery “is an operation of the second order,” 
reasoning that “without the farmer, the fishermen would perish for want of bread.”157 This pro-
agriculture argument came from the fishermen’s own backyard, perhaps demonstrating the extent 
to which local affinity did not necessarily prefigure the tone or orientation of the ongoing debate 
about fishermen in the national polity. Farmers would even interject themselves into this context 
and claim that they were as, if not more, worthy of federal support than mere fishermen. In 1809 
hemp growers and manufacturers in Kentucky petitioned Congress, claiming to have a greater 
entitlement to federal support than fishermen in the East. While the federal government 
“granted bounties to encourage the industry of an isolated part of the Union—a species industry, 
                                                
156 The Balance and Columbia Repository (Hudson, NY), Nov. 18, 1801. Fisheries were frequently referred to as the 
“nursery of the nation’s seamen.” See United States Oracle (Portsmouth, NH), May 28, 1803; The National 
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157 “For the Chronicle,” The Independent Chronicle and Universal Advertiser, March 5, 1801, p. 2.  
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too, in which but a small portion of the citizens could participate—the fisheries,” the inhabitants 
of Kentucky placed their produce as among the most important in the nation by remarking that 
hemp was “an article perhaps as much wanted as any other, both by the Government, and by 
private citizens, engaged in every pursuit in life.” As Kentuckians labored under unfair 
circumstances and foreign competition threatened to destroy the native industry—a situation not 
dissimilar to that faced by fishermen in the immediate aftermath of independence—federal 
support remained in the East as westerners were left to fend for themselves. “No public moneys 
are expended here,” the petitioners bemoaned, “but all at Washington, and on the sea board, in 
salaries, buildings fortifications, upon the army, and on the navy, for the protection of commerce 
in which, from her local insular situation, she [Kentucky] cannot participate.”158   
 In the early republic fishermen were very much a part of American statecraft, if only as 
symbols that were used in an ongoing debate about what role such laborers should play in the 
national polity. While exposing some of the fissures that eventually rent the union, the image of 
the fisherman would prove to galvanize unity as the association of fishing and fighting had much 
purchase in the politics of the day. But the political power of fishermen was not merely confined 
to rhetoric. Fishermen were political agents in their own right whose actions were most 
consequential in the aftermath of the War of 1812 and would occasion a significant shift in 
Anglo-American relations.     
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THE WAR OF 1812 AND ITS AFTERMATH 
 As the United States and Great Britain renewed hostilities in the summer of 1812 they did 
so, primarily, because of maritime related grievances.159 The war was, in some regard, the 
culmination of the Jeffersonians’ failed attempt to correct British policy though economic and 
commercial coercion, with Jefferson’s Embargo of 1807 being the most obvious, and disastrous, 
example. Impressment of American seamen and the unlawful search of American vessels, merely 
added to the list of oceanic outrages that seemed to call American independence into question 
and ultimately pushed the Madison administration to obtain a declaration of war in June 1812. 
While some Americans no doubt cast covetous eyes on Canadian territory and sought a way to 
curb Britain’s meddling with Native Americans in the West, the proximate cause was Britain’s 
unwillingness to repeal the commercially restrictive Order in Council.160 South Carolina 
representative John C. Calhoun made a direct link between this commercial policy and 
independence, “If we submit to the pretensions of England…the independence of this nation is 
lost.”161 Yet despite these maritime causes, the war did nothing to remedy them. Britain 
                                                
159 The historiography overwhelmingly emphasizes maritime and commercial  issues as causing the War of 1812 see 
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voluntarily repealed the offensive Order in Council almost simultaneously with Madison’s 
declaration of war, but refused to renounce impressment. Even though the agreement reached at 
Ghent would cease hostilities, it would take a far more comprehensive treaty to truly occasion a 
shift in Anglo-American relations.162          
 The decade leading up to the declaration of war in the summer of 1812 witnessed a series 
of actions that served to aggrieve New Englanders and alienate the region from the Jeffersonian 
consensus that seemed to have taken hold throughout much of the nation. Most prominently, 
Massachusetts, a state intimately tied to the maritime world, took the lead in denouncing the 
ruinous Embargo of 1807.163 Motivated by a Republican belief that commercial policy could 
bring about favorable international relations, the Embargo of 1807 obviously brought misfortune 
to the maritime sector that was a key part of the New England economy, but proved insufficient 
to convince Great Britain to repeal the Order in Council that so restricted American trade.164 In 
the years preceding the war some commentators made an explicit connection between the 
offensive British policy and the fisheries. As an editorialist in the Plattsburg American Monitor, 
noted, “We believe [the British Order in Council] is intended as a net for the American 
fisheries,” with Britain’s goal being “An assumption of our national sovereignty, for the purpose 
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of regulating our commerce and controlling our resources.”165 Along with the ongoing 
impressment of Americans into the Royal Navy, the commercial warfare that preceded the actual 
outbreak of hostilities demonstrates that much of the motivation for war in 1812 came from 
maritime concerns. 
 The course of the war would reflect its maritime origins. The pithy phrase “Free trade and 
sailors’ rights,” became a convenient shorthand for the war’s justification as the conflict’s 
maritime causes were kept top of mind for many Americans.166 Given the close connection 
between the outbreak of war and the maritime world, it was no surprise that, with the exception 
of Andrew Jackson’s victory at New Orleans, the most poignant moments of the conflict, those 
that helped stoke a smoldering nationalism, came from naval engagements. James Lawrence’s 
famous dying command aboard the USS Chesapeake—“Don’t give up the ship!”—became a 
rallying cry, soon emblazoned on a banner that flew on Oliver Hazard Perry’s flagship during his 
decisive victory over the British fleet at Lake Erie.167 But despite these pivotal moments, by the 
end of the war years a Federalist resurgence—a movement that brought New England to at least 
flirt with secession—demonstrated the degree of disdain felt for the Jefferson and Madison 
administrations meddling with the region’s political economy. As the nation approached peace 
and the prospect of a postwar return to more placid international relations, New Englanders 
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especially were ready to return to their normal economic occupations—not the least of which 
was fishing.          
 In the process of negotiating the peace, however, the fisheries issue would take a 
backseat. As the American delegation settled into the Belgian city of Ghent to meet their British 
counterparts, the future of the fisheries did not seem top of mind. The five man delegation—John 
Quincy Adams, Henry Clay, Albert Gallatin, James A. Bayard, and Jonathan Russell—included 
two New Englanders, suggesting the region’s iconic industry would not be sacrificed for other 
interests during the course of negotiations. Yet diplomatic instructions emanating from 
Washington elided the fisheries issue almost entirely. This omission was, in all likelihood, not 
the result of a vindictive Jeffersonian administration looking to punish a Federalist-dominated 
region. In fact, the omission of any directive regarding the fisheries was perhaps the result of the 
Madison administration’s confidence that the fisheries issue, because of its ties to the peace 
treaty of 1783, was immune to the vagaries of diplomacy. 
 In the early days of 1814, Secretary of State James Monroe issued instructions to the 
American delegation in which he outlined the items which should garner their attention on 
account of “the cast amount of blood and treasure, which have been expended in their support.” 
Unsurprisingly, impressment and blockades topped the list. As Monroe remarked of the former, 
“This degrading practice must cease, our flag must protect the crew, of the United States, cannot 
consider themselves an independent Nation.” The only possible reference to the fisheries came as 
Monroe discussed the future of Great Britain’s hold on its North American colonies. The 
Madison administration advocated for the cession of the Canadian provinces to the United States 
under the assumption that North American peace would prove impossible to obtain so long as the 
continent hosted the ambitions of both empires. Monroe observed that “the danger of an early 
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renewal of the war….will perhaps never be removed while Great Britain retains in her hands” a 
claim to the colonies of North America. If Great Britain were to cede the North American 
Provinces to the United States, presumably an unquestioned right to the North Atlantic fisheries 
would likewise be ceded. With only an implicit reference to the fisheries in this set of 
instructions, the meeting at Ghent seemed poised to elide the fisheries issue entirely.168  
 Later, the Madison administration would double down on its support for the inclusion of 
the blockade and impressment issues in any peace treaty, yet it again failed to explicitly mention 
the fisheries. In another missive to the American peace delegation the secretary of state declared 
that in “making peace it is better for both nations that the controversy respecting blockade should 
be arranged by treaty, as well as that respecting impressment. The omission to arrange it may be 
productive of injury. Without a precise definition of blockade…might possibly hazard the future 
good understanding between the two countries.” With an explicit desire to put the blockade and 
impressment questions on a strong statutory basis, it becomes all the more curious why the 
fisheries issue failed to draw the attention of the nation’s top diplomats.169 Perhaps the Madison 
administration simply did not want to expend the political capital on including the fisheries issue 
in the negotiations, or perhaps, as American diplomats would argue after the war, access to the 
fisheries was a privilege that could not be revoked or altered solely on account of war. Either 
apathy or confidence defined the American stance on the fisheries issue as the treaty negotiations 
drew near. American and British diplomats certainly considered the questions surrounding 
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American access to the fisheries. Yet Anglo-American diplomats left this issue and many others 
unresolved.     
 Negotiations between the American and British delegations began in Ghent in earnest 
during the summer of 1814. For four months the Anglo-American diplomats wrangled with the 
many thorny questions that had compelled the nations to resume hostilities two summers before. 
Great Britain refused to renounce the practice of impressment and status quo ante became the 
guiding principle in creating the postwar order. In all, the Treaty of Ghent did little besides 
ending formal hostilities. By punting on key questions, not the least of which was the fisheries, a 
more comprehensive settlement would be necessary to truly change the trajectory of Anglo-
American relations. 
 The British delegation did broach the fisheries issue briefly by demanding that the United 
States cede something of like value for the postbellum resumption of American fishing in North 
Atlantic waters. For the British, the recent hostilities served to abrogate any previous agreement 
that existed between the two states, including the 1783 Treaty of Paris that granted the United 
States the liberty to take fish in those waters. But as the instructions coming from Washington 
suggested, the American commissioners were unprepared and not authorized by the Madison 
administration to cut any deal on the fisheries question. Although Great Britain voiced its desire 
and intention to drive American schooners from the fisheries, the Americans hoped the final 
agreement would be silent on the question. Despite this official stance, dissention grew within 
the American ranks as John Quincy Adams, the New Englander, and Henry Clay, the westerner, 
seemed more intent to serve the interests of their respective regions over the needs of the 
nation.170 
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    Western interests were implicated in the treaty negotiations as Britain suggested 
confirming the right to navigate the Mississippi as an equitable tradeoff for reaffirming the 
American liberty to fish in North Atlantic waters. As was the case at Paris in 1783, the fisheries 
and Mississippi question were intertwined. In Ghent, Britain hoped to use navigation of the 
Mississippi to achieve the more desirable goal of limiting American access to the fisheries. If the 
American delegation were to deny the continuation of the British right to navigate the 
Mississippi, the Americans would, for the sake of consistency, also, at least implicitly admit that 
the war had revoked their claim to the fisheries. Amid Britain’s diplomatic wrangling, Adams 
and Clay came to loggerheads. Clay, ever the western Anglophobe, strenuously objected to 
allowing British traffic on the key western waterway. His objection became even more pointed 
when such an allowance was made in the interest of the eastern cod fisheries. Adams likewise 
dug in his heels, hoping to assume his father’s mantle as champion of the fishermen. This spat 
between Adams and Clay demonstrated the degree to which the political axis in the early 
republic did not divide North and South. Instead the major fissure was that between the East and 
the West.171   
 Ultimately, however, the fisheries-Mississippi question proved too difficult to settle. 
Adams and Clay refused to reconcile and Great Britain was unwilling to push the question to its 
extreme. The final decision made at Ghent was no decision at all, as the treaty was silent on both 
of these issues. Like with impressment, the Treaty of Ghent was wholly unsatisfying on the 
fisheries issue. Washington insisted that the recent war did nothing to alter the liberty won at 
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Paris in 1783; London insisted that the recent hostilities abrogated all previous agreements, 
making the American liberty void.172 With the treaty’s silence on the question, the incompatible 
views of Washington and London assured that the fisheries would become a postwar problem. 
But for the time being the prospects of peace allowed Anglo-American statesmen to avoid 
considering those potential problems. Instead, it was the fishermen who had to contend with the 
diplomats’ oversights.                                         
With the conclusion of the War of 1812 American fishermen were eager to once again 
take up their hand lines and proceed to the fisheries of the North Atlantic. Not only had the 
recent hostilities with Great Britain forced American skippers to abandon the most lucrative 
waters in the region, but this interruption was merely the most recent set back fishermen faced 
dating back to Jefferson’s Embargo of 1807. But with a mood of pacification descending upon 
Anglo-American relations, the fishermen of Gloucester, Salem, Marblehead and the other 
prominent cod fishing ports along the New England coast were quite reasonable in assuming the 
1815 season would, at last, see New Englanders descending upon those estranged waters. The 
coming seasons would, however, bring more hardships than even the hard-worn veterans of the 
fisheries were used to. Fishermen sailed head-long into the rough seas and grueling labor that 
was the standard fare of fishing expeditions but now faced the intrusion of the British navy that 
touched off a diplomatic crisis. Contesting American claims to fish in these waters, which for 
many Americans was contesting claims to independence itself, the British navy began enforcing 
a strict interpretation of American fishing liberties that would, eventually, bring diplomats to the 
bargaining table. But for the time being fishermen would force the issue so that the negation of 
any American right or liberty would not go unnoticed by the powerbrokers of Washington and 
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London. The events upon which this narrative is built, the War of 1812, the Treaty of Ghent, and 
the Convention of 1818, are commonplace to any cursory understanding of early American 
foreign relations. But when Joseph Wildes aboard the schooner Raven or Thomas Decker, master 
of the Isabella, replace James Monroe and John Quincy Adams as the narrative’s principle 
actors, a once familiar narrative is refracted, revealing the extent to which the formerly 
anonymous influenced the international processes to which they may initially appear only 
tangential.              
 It should come as no surprise that these ordinary sailors were able to influence the 
proceedings of a diplomatic process that is so often left confined to the world of Anglo-
American elites. For centuries sailors and seagoing men, some of the most disenfranchised and 
powerless individuals, were important actors in some of the most significant changes that 
resonated across the Atlantic world.173 The ability of seamen to influence the economic, social, 
and political forces that seem to most often act upon, not in response to, their actions was 
perhaps cresting during the years of the early republic. With an unprofessional diplomatic corps, 
America’s most common standard bearer beyond its shores was the humble jack tar.174 While the 
penetration of American ships into the exotic waters of the Pacific and Indian Oceans brought 
about a host of political, cultural, and economic transformations to both the United States and the 
world beyond, American sailors influenced the political environment far closer to home.175 But  
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Dried	exported	cod	(in	
quintals)	
Value	of	dried	exported	
cod	
1800	 392,726	 		
1801	 410,948	 	
1802	 440,925	 		
1803	 461,870	 $1,620,000		
1804	 567,828	 2,400,000	
1805	 514,549	 2,058,000	
1806	 537,457	 2,150,000	
1807	 473,924	 1,896,000	
1808	 155,808	 623,000	
1809	 345,648	 1,123,000	
1810	 280,864	 913,000	
1811	 214,387	 757,000	
1812	 169,019	 592,000	
1813	 63,616	 210,000	
1814	 31,310	 128,000	
1815	 103,251	 494,000	
1816	 219,991	 935,000	
1817	 267,514	 1,003,000	
1818	 308,747	 1,081,000	
1819	 280,555	 1,052,000	
1820	 321,419	 964,000	
1821	 267,305	 708,778	
1822	 241,228	 666,730	
1823	 262,766	 734,024	
1824	 310,189	 873,685	
1825	 300,857	 830,356	
1826	 260,803	 667,742	
1827	 247,321	 747,171	
1828	 265,217	 819,926	
1829	 294,761	 747,541	
1830	 229,796	 530,690	
1831	 230,577	 625,393	
1832	 250,544	 749,909	
1833	 249,689	 713,317	
1834	 253,132	 630,384	
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1835	 287,721	 783,895	
1836	 240,769	 746,464	
1837	 188,943	 588,506	
1838	 206,028	 626,245	
1839	 208,720	 709,218	
1840	 211,425	 541,058	
1841	 252,199	 602,810	
1842	 256,083	 567,782	
1843	 174,220	 381,175	
1844	 271,610	 699,833	
1845	 288,380	 803,353	
1846	 277,401	 699,559	
1847	 258,870	 659,629	
1848	 206,549	 609,482	
1849	 197,457	 419,092	
1850	 168,600	 365,349	
 
Table 1: Quantity and Value of Dried Exported Cod, 1800–1850 
Source: Lorenzo Sabine, Report on the Principal Fisheries of the American Seas (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1853), 176–177. 
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as fishermen embarked on the fishing season of 1815 with the hopes that the troubles of the past 
seven years were, at long last, behind them, they did so without understanding how their actions 
would, in three years’ time, precipitate a shift in Anglo-American relations.  
 When word reached American shores that peace between the United States and Great 
Britain had been reached at Ghent, the nation was in a jubilant mood. The country was still 
aglow with pride after Colonel Andrew Jackson’s daring victory over the British on the plains of 
Chalmette had saved New Orleans from the British advance and possible destruction. With the 
Tennessean’s victory the United States was able to inaugurate an era of good feelings with the 
mistaken notion that it had, in fact, won the War of 1812 and in the process confirmed its 
independence. Hoping to reap the rewards of that successful referendum on independence, green 
hands from the cities and farms of New England descended upon the fishing ports of 
Massachusetts as the winter receded and preparations could be made for the fishing season 
ahead. These young men sought employment upon one of the many vessels that would, for the 
first time in nearly seven years, cruise the waters of the Grand Banks, the Banks of 
Newfoundland, the Bay of Fundy, and other waters that had teemed with fish and ships before 
the most recent outbreak of hostilities. With a full complement of men, salt, line and all the 
apparatus of fishing, American vessels made way for the rich waters to the north.    
 From Barnstable, Massachusetts, an unnamed ship made ready and launched from the 
Cape Cod port sometime during the waning days of April. The schooner headed north. Hugging  
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the rocky coast of New England, the American schooner was, perhaps, headed towards the Bay 
of Fundy and the banks of Nova Scotia to fill its hull with the lusty cod that would soon enough 
bring wealth back to a region ravaged by nearly a decade of commercial warfare that nearly 
hewed New England from the rest of the union. Probably towards the end of May the anonymous 
vessel returned south to unload the salted fish carcasses before embarking on the season’s second 
fare. Returning to the waters of the British provinces, the schooner most likely took a more 
easterly approach towards Nova Scotia and through the Gulf of St. Lawrence, hoping that the 
Figure 3: The Barnstable schooner would have been a sea-worthy ship outfitted for the hand-line fisheries. Before the advent of long-lining near the 
midcentury cod fishery pursued their prey by tending single-hook lines over the gunwales of their vessels, George Brown Goode, “The Bank Hand-Line 
Cod Fishery: Old style Grand Bank cod schooner; crew at rail hand-line fishing,” The Fisheries and Fishery Industry of the United States Section 5: 
History and Methods of the Fisheries (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1887), Plate 23.    
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ice-choked Strait of Belle Isle was cleared and would allow passage to the Labrador fisheries. 
The final destination, like much of this schooner’s voyage, is pure speculation, but the ship was 
unable to finish its fare. It was not strong gales or poor catches that made an abrupt end to the 
expedition, but instead the Barnstable schooner was ordered off the fishing grounds by a ship of 
His Majesty’s Navy and returned to Massachusetts with little to show for the crew’s efforts.  
 On June 19, 1815, as the schooner from Barnstable approached the southern coast of 
Nova Scotia a British cruiser, the sloop of war HMS Jaseur, under the command of Captain N. 
Lock, ordered the fishing boat not to come within sixty miles of the coast. Captain Lock offered 
no explanation as to why the Jaseur instructed the boat from Barnstable to vacate the waters 
around Nova Scotia, but the American skipper had little choice but to comply with the naval 
officer’s demands. The fishing schooner was most likely a typical fishing vessel of the time with 
thirty to thirty-five tons burthen and a crew of only five or six, including the master. By contrast 
the British war ship was nearly ten times its size and equipped with a full complement of 
eighteen guns. Unwilling to risk seizure, or perhaps worse, the fishing vessel returned to its home 
port and reported the incident to the collector of the port of Barnstable. Soon knowledge of this 
event and the heavy-handed nature of British actions would occupy the diplomats of both 
nations.176        
 A month after the Jaseur chased the American schooner from the coast of Nova Scotia, 
Secretary of State James Monroe informed the British charge de affaires in Washington of the 
indignation the United States felt at such treatment. Monroe, referring to the incident as an 
“extraordinary measure,” claimed that it “has excited no small degree of surprise” and was 
                                                
176 “From James Monroe to Mr. Baker, Charge de Affaires from England, July 18, 1815,” American State Papers: 
Foreign Affairs, 4:349. (Hereafter cited as ASP:FR).  
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“incompatible with the rights of the United States.” The secretary of state implored the British 
minister to “interpose to prevent the progress of an evil which will be so extensively and deeply 
felt by the citizens of the United States.” Although the British charge would assure the Madison 
administration that such an incident was not condoned by his government and steps had been 
taken to prevent a similar incident from occurring, this confrontation off the coast of Nova Scotia 
would become a political flash point as the United States and Great Britain harbored contrary 
notions about the rights of American fishermen. Although Anglo-American relations seemed to 
have stabilized with the Treaty of Ghent and the renewal of friendly relations, this instance 
shows not only how quickly the relationship could turn sour, but how these two nations had a 
fundamental misunderstanding of each other.177     
 The 1815 fishing season continued with little incident but diplomats on both sides of the 
Atlantic set to work defending the broadest possible interpretations of existing international 
conventions in their favor. The contrary positions staked out by the Barnstable schooner and the 
Jaseur mapped onto the respective positions staked out by Anglo-American diplomats. At the 
heart of the matter was a question of where and when American fishermen had a right to fish. 
Although Lord Bathurst, the British colonial secretary, assured John Quincy Adams, then the 
American minister to the Court of St. James, that the British government disavowed the actions 
of Captain Lock, the British position would crystallize around the contention that the War of 
1812 had abrogated all previous agreements between the two countries, including the 
revolutionary settlement. Since the Treaty of Ghent failed to make mention of the fisheries, the 
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American liberty previously enjoyed was thus nullified.178 Americans in both Washington and 
London would refute this British claim fearing the consequences of their fishermen banned from 
those waters. These statesmen would craft a series of arguments that made an explicit connection 
between that maritime environment and the independence Americans had so recently thought 
was affirmed by their second war with Great Britain.     
 In a letter to John Quincy Adams, Monroe outlined the implications of the emerging 
transatlantic conflict over the fisheries. The stakes, at least as Monroe would have them, were 
high. In direct contradiction of the British claim, the “right of the fisheries,” as Monroe did not 
even relent slightly and admit it as a liberty, “required no new stipulation to support it, it was 
sufficiently secured by the treaty of 1783.” By basing the American claims to the fisheries on the 
Treaty of Paris, the treaty that ended the American Revolution and granted the nation 
independence, Monroe continued that tradition of making a direct correlation between the 
fisheries and political independence. He even went so far as to make that connection explicit, 
proclaiming, “every right appertaining to the fisheries…constitute[es] a vital part of our political 
existence, and rest[s] on the same solid foundation as our independence itself.” The fisheries, 
like independence, were an unquestioned and foundational aspect of American statecraft.179   
 With the stakes as high as independence itself American diplomats did not hesitate to 
mount a strong defense of their interpretation of American fishing rights. This misunderstanding 
over whether or not the fishery stipulations of the Treaty of Paris were still in effect created the 
opportunity for Anglo-American diplomats to discuss some of the most basic underpinnings of 
                                                
178Later John Quincy Adams would blame Henry Clay’s refusal to accept any restrictions on American navigation of 
the Mississippi as the reason the Treaty of Ghent failed to address the fisheries at all. Clay, the westerner, was loath 
to see any advantage given to eastern interest at the expense of his home region. 
   
179 “Extract of a letter from Mr. Monroe to Mr. Adams, July 21, 1815,” ASP:FR 4: 349. 
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the transatlantic relationship. John Quincy Adams, befitting his diplomatic posting in London, 
offered the most substantive American defense of its fishing rights. Central to Britain’s claim 
that American fishermen were now barred from plying British North American waters was the 
assertion that the recent hostilities had abrogated all other previous agreements between the two 
nations, most prominently the Treaty of Paris. Adams, countering this diplomatic convention, 
relented that ordinarily war would nullify previous treaties of peace, but the treaty of 1783 “was 
not simply a treaty of peace.” Instead “it was a treaty of partition between parts of one nation,” 
who agreed “thenceforth to be separated into distinct sovereignties.” The peace settlement, then, 
constituted the basis of American independence, of which fishing rights was among the most 
important elements. This made such a right not a concession or grant that could be nullified by 
war. In Adams’s understanding of the Treaty of Paris, independence and the fisheries were 
synonymous. Control of this environment, then, served as a way of defining national 
independence and explained why Americans, politicians and diplomats at least, bristled at British 
aggression, interpreting it as a negation of liberty.180 As Adams made clear, “the sovereignty and 
independence of the United States,” which in his mind corresponded to fishing rights, “were not 
considered or understood as grants from His Majesty” and thus conditional in nature.181         
 Adams also appealed to the British colonial secretary by arguing that barring American 
fishermen from those valuable waters would be disastrous to American fishermen and British 
manufacturing alike. For the sake of humanity, Adams implored, “these fisheries afforded the 
means of subsistence to multitudes of people who were destitute of any other.” This economic 
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downturn would have serious repercussions not only for the New Englanders left in want by a 
dying industry, but would destroy a market for British goods, leaving Great Britain’s 
manufacturers grasping for new markets to absorbed excess production.182 But it was not only 
the humanity of the families that relied upon the cod fisheries for their subsistence and income 
that Adams brought to light. Adams also insisted that Britain’s decision to bar American ships 
from the fisheries was a transgression of the mores of nations and was an attack on all 
Americans. “The fisheries,” Adams declared, “were usually considered by civilized nations as 
under a sort of special sanction. It was a common practice to have them uninterrupted even in 
times of war…to interdict a fishery…far from being a usual act in the peaceable relations 
between nations, was an indication of animosity, transcending even the ordinary course of 
hostility in war.”183   
 Although Adams made appeals to international law and human conscience, Britain’s 
restrictions on American access to the fisheries was, perhaps, most untenable because it was 
unnatural. Like his father at Paris, John Quincy Adams based the American claim to continued 
access to the fishery in the notion that any treaty must comport with the dictates of nature. At 
Paris the elder Adams declared Americans should have rights in North Atlantic waters simply 
because nature had placed their fisheries nearer to American shores than those of Britain or 
France. Again in defense of American access, in the early days of 1816 Quincy Adams 
articulated his belief that international law and natural law must be harmonized, observing that 
“it was necessary, for the enjoyment of this fishery, to exercise it in conformity to the habits of 
the species of game of which it consisted.” The migratory patterns of fish made any British 
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restriction contrary to the demands of nature. Adams observed that “the places frequented by the 
fish were those to which the fishermen were obliged to resort, and these occasionally brought 
them to the borders of the British territorial jurisdiction.” Although Adams, like his father, spoke 
with a stunning degree of confidence about the ecology of the North Atlantic, the murky water 
largely remained immune to human understanding in the 1810s.184 Adams’s assertion that 
American fishermen had no choice but to trespass into British territorial jurisdiction was as much 
a political statement as an ecological one. While the specific locations American fishermen plied 
their craft in 1815 remain unknown, it is perfectly reasonable to assume the younger Adams 
mobilized ecological rhetoric for political ends and in the process harmonized perceived (or 
perhaps more appropriately imagined) environmental realties with political necessity. Adams 
advocated understanding the fishery as a kind of maritime commons, the very nature of which 
was antithetical to the kinds of restrictions and boundaries Great Britain sought to impose. In 
fact, Adams went so far as to suggest that ownership of land and ownership of adjacent waters 
were unrelated, remarking that “the property of a fishery is not necessarily in the proprietor of 
the soil,” and thus “the right to the soil may be exclusive, while the fishery may be free, or held 
in common.” The fisheries were common to all and therefore not something Great Britain could 
grant or dispose of as only it saw fit.185      
 Despite the arguments Adams offered, they fell on deaf ears. The British Colonial 
Secretary, Lord Bathurst, made clear to the American plenipotentiary that despite Adams’s 
insistence that the terms of the Treaty of Paris were still in effect, even in light of the recent 
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hostilities, such was “a position of…[a] novel nature [that] Great Britain cannot accede.”186 The 
aftermath of the Jaseur incident would see no material change in the tenor of transatlantic 
politics as each side retreated into intractable camps, refusing to bridge the divide and thus 
unable to give American fishermen any clear indication of whether venturing to British waters 
would bring stores of fish or capture and ruin.  
 
FISHERMEN AND ATLANTIC POLITICS 
    The fishing season of 1815 revealed the extent to which neither fisherman nor diplomat 
understood the international arrangement that influenced so heavily the on-the-water operations 
of the fishing industry.  Certainly fishermen and American diplomats had different reasons for 
objecting to Britain’s new interpretation, and negation, of American fishing rights. Fishermen no 
doubt protested and appealed to federal authorities out of a very material concern for the 
tenability of their livelihood. While the diplomatic elite in Washington seemed more concerned 
with saving face on the international stage and maintaining a certain political economy at home, 
both of these groups had a vested interest, at least at this historical moment, in clarifying the 
rules. The necessity of doing so—of coming to an Anglo-American understanding of how the 
nations would interact—was created by the actions of fishermen in the pursuit of their vocation. 
The actual work of American and British diplomats addressing these kinds of questions that had 
the potential to destabilize the relationship would, however, wait until the Convention of 1818. 
In the meantime, the actions of American fishermen would make the status quo untenable and 
hasten policymakers to the bargaining tables.     
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With the confrontation between the unnamed Barnstable schooner and the HMS Jaseur 
still fresh in the minds of American fishermen, captains, and ship owners, the 1816 fishing 
season was remarkably quiet. The year 1815 was marked with a certain degree of optimism as 
Americans would return to their fishing haunts in the hopes of recreating those golden, prewar 
years. Such optimism, however, would vanish the next, as fear of capture, imprisonment, the loss 
of capital, or perhaps even of life, forced Yankee skippers to keep their ships in port. Even the 
prospect of two poor seasons occasioned by the confiscation and spoiling of fish, or just an 
incomplete fare, could spell ruin for the hands on deck if not the ship owners back home. 
Although the recent war had officially concluded, violence continued in the North Atlantic. 
Though directed at ordinary fishermen—not the United States Navy—this violence did raise 
questions about what hostilities with Great Britain in fact accomplished. The year 1816 passed 
without much incident as the few schooners that did attempt to complete their fares made sure to 
avoid the harbors, ports, and coasts of Britain’s dominion. Such inaction, however, did not 
comport with an industry needing to find firmer footing and a workforce needing wages.187 
The spring and summer of 1817, however, would witness the seizure of American fishing 
vessels by the British Navy on an unprecedented scale. With diplomats still at odds over what 
conventions would determine American access to the fishing grounds, the cod fishermen of the 
New England coast would risk capture to fill their holds with valuable flesh and perhaps even 
force a break in the stalemate that characterized fisheries diplomacy. By the end of the season 
dozens of ships had been captured by British sloops and brought to Halifax for transgressing 
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Britain’s interpretation of maritime law. Many of these ships were detained for weeks if not 
months without formal charges from the Vice Admiralty Court as these hulks were left to rot in 
the harbor—their provisions consumed, their rigging and tackle destroyed, and their valuable fish 
left to spoil. The crews, meanwhile, searched in vain for redress, but were most often sent back 
to Boston aboard whatever merchant ship was willing to take on the destitute men. But perhaps 
most troubling was that, for these men, another poor season meant they returned home to an 
impoverished family with a precarious existence.    
As these fishing schooners were detained at Halifax, Digby, and other ports in the British 
dominion and the crews returned to their home berths, these men were deposed, perhaps hoping 
that their testimony might help, if not to make redress, then to inform the local customs collector, 
the Treasury Department, the secretary of state, and perhaps even the president of their hardships 
at British hands. The testimonies of the fishermen seized during the summer of 1817 reveal a 
class of vulnerable men. Notably absent is the kind of bombastic and inflated rhetoric that 
characterized the chauvinistic nationalism of seagoing Americans towards midcentury.188 Yet 
their vulnerability did not equate to powerlessness. Instead, the seemingly straightforward words 
of these seagoing men suggested individuals who sought the mantle of victim. They were victims 
of British aggression and tempestuous weather who, despite good intentions and lawful actions, 
faced financial ruin and bodily harm. Bringing their plight and the abrogation of American rights 
and liberties to the attention of federal officials, fishermen offered a constant reminder of how 
Britain conducted itself contrary to the pride and interests of the United States, something that 
                                                
188 Dane Morrison recognizes a generational divide in the rhetoric employed by seagoing Americans in the Early 
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dispassionate, and perhaps even, at times, more tolerant, understanding of foreign peoples. While the antebellum 
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could be rectified through formal diplomatic channels. By returning to the fishing grounds and 
facing British seizure the cod fishermen made this irritant an unavoidable problem in Anglo-
American relations.        
The testimony of Samuel Love was fairly typical. Hailing from Boothbay in the district 
of Maine, Love was a fisherman aboard the schooner Isabella, whose master and owner were 
also of Boothbay. When brought before Daniel Rose, the justice of the peace for the county of 
Lincoln, Love recounted the Isabella’s voyage and the circumstances that led to the ship’s 
detention by the Royal Navy. The Isabella left port on the fourth day of May, heading for the 
fishing banks off the southern and eastern coast of Nova Scotia. By May 8, the schooner had 
arrived at Cape Negro Bank, eight leagues (nearly twenty-eight miles) from the Nova Scotian 
shore. After three days on the banks the Isabella was forced to take shelter in the adjacent harbor 
of Ragged Island on account of stormy weather. There, the ship’s master, Thomas Decker, paid 
an anchorage fee to John Lock, an officer of the customs, for the privilege to use the bays and 
inlets of Nova Scotia when seeking refuge from rough seas. The Isabella would continue to fish 
the Nova Scotian banks until the fifth day of June, when the British sloop of war, HMS Dee, 
boarded the Boothbay schooner and took possession of the boat for violating Britain’s maritime 
rights. Samuel Chambers, commander of the Dee, ordered the Isabella to Halifax with her crew 
until July 20, when they were released and allowed to return to Boothbay, arriving on July 29. 
No charges were formally made against Love, his crewmates, or the master and owner of the 
ship, but Love did note that the lengthy detention period had resulted in a loss of sixty quintals of 
fish, seven hogsheads of salt, along with equipment, gear, stores and other provisions on board. 
Love was left with little recourse apart from appealing to Rose and his “protest against the 
proceedings of the said British armed ship, her master and crew, and against the proceedings of 
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the British court of vice admiralty in Nova Scotia—and against all losses sustained, or to be 
sustained by said proceedings.”189     
The themes established in Love’s testimony were remarkably consistent with other 
fishermen who gave similar stories. One such commonality that emerged was the habit for those 
testifying to specify how far they were from British shores when actively catching fish. William 
McRowan of the schooner Superb, for instance, was careful to note that from the eighth of May 
to the fourth day of June of the 1817 fishing season, he and his crewmates fished the Cape Negro 
Bank but consistently maintained a distance of “seven to eight leagues from the land” when 
landing fish. Sylvester Pierce and John M. Reed testified that their boat, the Exchange, never 
came nearer than eight leagues to the Nova Scotian coast while pursuing fish. Abdon Keen even 
noted that his command, the General Jackson, “caught about half a fare of fish, at the distance of 
thirty six leagues from any land in Nova Scotia,” and then proceeded to catch the remainder of 
his fare “about twelve leagues from land.”190  
Even though the specifics of each story varied, sometimes quite significantly with regard 
to where and how far from the coast these American schooners fished, the insistence on the part 
of these fishermen that they confined their labor to areas many miles from British shores may 
hint at how they sought to use international conventions to their benefit. While Great Britain 
claimed the Treaty of Paris was nullified, and essentially no international agreement was in place 
to regulate American access to the fishing grounds, this did not necessarily mean Britain had the 
right to set arbitrary limitations on the rights of foreign nationals on the fishing grounds. Two 
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summers previous, the commander of the HMS Jaseur instructed Americans not to proceed 
within sixty miles, a little less than twenty leagues, of the coast and now Americans were being 
detained for fishing anywhere from seven to thirty-six leagues from land. This capacious claim 
of maritime sovereignty on the part of Great Britain was contrary to an emerging international 
norm in which states had a territorial claim to a mere league, three miles, from their shores. Thus 
by offering specific distances they were fishing from the British dominion these fishermen 
documented the fact that they had become the victims of Britain’s arbitrary use of power.  
But they were not the victims of the British Navy alone. The inclement weather that was 
a frequent feature of the North Atlantic fisheries also forced fishermen to run afoul of British 
authorities. American fishermen were most often apprehended for the violation of British 
maritime rights as they were forced off the off-shore fishing grounds by stormy weather, seeking 
shelter in the various bays, coves, and inlets of the Canadian coast. The right of fishermen to 
resort to safe harbors in rough seas was a common aspect of international agreements even if a 
given fishermen did not have the right to fish the adjacent waters. Even more, most of these 
mariners reported that they were forced to pay an anchorage fee to the local collector of customs 
for the right to approach the shore when under duress. John Rand aboard the schooner Rambler, 
described this turn of events as the schooner “went into Ragged Island harbor, where one John 
Lock demanded and received light money, at the rate of six pence Novascotia currency per ton, 
and informed the master that he might enter and use the harbor on the coast during the season.” 
Later, “on account of bad weather,” the boat approached the harbor and was “taken possession of 
by the officers and crew of the boats of the British ship of war Dee.” Samuel Grant and his 
crewmates of the Pandora had a similar experience, remarking that “it being stormy weather we 
put into the harbor of Port Mills,” but were “captured and detained,” by the British sloop Dee. 
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Sylvester Pierce and John Reed likewise testified that their master had paid the necessary 
anchorage fee and were told “they had liberty to put into harbor, set their nets and fish on the 
coasts during the fishing season,” but only faced capture when resorting to safe waters amidst the 
“boisterous” weather.191  
A final feature found across the many testimonies offered by captured fishermen was an 
account of the losses occasioned by British detainment. The loss of fares, fish, equipment, and 
ships put a very real price tag on the costs of British action for American diplomats. While these 
confrontations rarely resulted in the total loss of ships, fishermen very often had to forfeit the 
remainder of fares and lost hundreds of pounds of valuable fish through spoilage as they were 
forced to wait in port for weeks before being allowed to return to their homes. Captain William 
Trefethen of the Nancy reported losing ninety quintals of fish since his schooner was forced to 
“lay in…port in hot weather so long.” Daniel Grant testified that his ship, the John of Arundel, 
was captured on June 5, “for our infringement of the Maritime rights of Great Britain,” but was 
not brought to trial until August 29 and was subsequently forced to pay $107.55 to compensate 
for the costs of the prosecution. But perhaps most galling was “that during the time of my 
detention…my vessel as considerably damaged, one of her sails being nearly ruined, and some of 
the running rigging was entirely lost, and some cut in pieces for which I could obtain no 
satisfaction.” The testimonies of George Vennard and John Trefethen likewise put a dollar 
amount on their losses at British hands. Most of the 180 quintals of codfish they had on board at 
the time of their capture spoiled, save for the fish they were allowed to consume to supply “the 
bare necessities of life” after being “reduced to great distress” during their five week detainment. 
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But their schooner, the Strong of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, was, upon her arrival at Digby, 
“immediately dismantled, one of her masts taken out, and her rudder unhung and carried away.” 
Venneard and Trefthen estimated their losses and damages as no less than $1,000.192 The loss of 
fish and damage to ships was indeed costly, if not ruinous, for fishermen who returned not with 
swelling stores of fat codfish, but instead brought back destitution and misfortune for their 
families and communities. But with each subsequent capture, and the prospect of yet another 
starving family and distressed city, the status quo became more and more untenable to the point 
where the action of fishermen could no longer be met with the inaction of diplomats.     
 The testimony offered by the unlucky fishermen who were found in violation of Britain’s 
interpretation of American maritime right demonstrated how these men sought to use whatever 
limited operating space they had to appeal to, or perhaps even influence, the world of formal 
politics. But these interviews were not the only means available for fishermen to capture 
Washington’s attention. A series of letters written on behalf of, or even at times by, fishermen 
made its way to representatives in Congress, cabinet members, and even the president, in the 
hope that fishermen and their patrons could communicate the worthiness of their cause and shape 
the course of diplomacy.  
 The most potent weapon fishermen and their supporters had at their disposal when 
appealing to political elites was the oft made connection between fishermen and national 
security. The maritime caucus in the United States parroted this line of argument in the hopes of 
rallying Congress and the president behind the fishing industry’s interests. After the alarm of the 
summer of 1817 had subsided and American fishermen were finally allowed to return to their 
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home ports a group of ship owners, masters, and even ordinary deck hands addressed a memorial 
to the President of the United States, James Monroe. Hailing from New Hampshire this group 
included some men, including George Vennard, who had been detained by the British the 
previous season. This group sought to offer “a short statement of our losses and suffering 
occasioned by the misconduct of the Officers of a Foreign Government,” as they pursued their 
lawful engagement upon the banks fisheries and in the Bay of Fundy. The fishermen noted the 
illegality of British actions, and focused on the losses they sustained as the process dragged on 
for weeks. There was “no restitution of the property, which had been lost or pillaged during the 
detention,” as we they returned to their vessels they reported that “we found our fish ruined—our 
salt wasted—our provisions consumed—our fishing tackle destroyed—our crews dispersed 
through the country, some of them begging their bread—our vessels wanting repairs—and the 
Fishing Season entirely lost.” In all, the New Hampshire men estimated their losses at no less 
than $10,000, declaring that “we have suffered, and we conceived ourselves entitled to 
reparation, either from the justice of Great Britain, or from the generosity of our country.” To 
prove their worthiness to the largess of their nation, these fishermen employed the same 
language of nationhood that politicians frequently used when discussing the fishing industry.193  
 To legitimate their entitlement to federal support, and “prove our claims to the favors of 
our country,” the New Hampshire fishermen portrayed themselves as a sympathetic class of 
patriotic men. Noting how fishing is “laborious and perilous,” and how such employment 
“separates men form their families during the larger portion of the year,” the industry naturally 
produced “a race of hardy and intrepid seamen.” But these men did not labor for mere hearth, 
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home, and region. In fact “during the long struggle which this nation has made for the 
preservation of her neutral rights…the Fishermen of New England were among the first to suffer, 
and the last to complain.” Being the victims of the Jeffersonian’s failed experiment in 
commercial warfare, having lost their traditional markets and subsistence, and engaging in the 
“naval combat of their country,” the fishermen hoped only to return to their former occupations 
with the coming of peace. Yet instead “they were disappointed,” and “have been interrupted in 
their lawful employments—have been captured—and plundered.”194   
 Fishermen attempting to elicit sympathy for their plight as the ebbs and flows of 
international relations threatened to undermine their financial solvency was a common part of 
their effort to lobby Washington. When assessing the state of the fishermen who returned to 
Boston after their detainment in the British dominion during the summer of 1817 Henry 
Deerborn, the Collector for the Port of Boston, remarked on their destitution to President 
Monroe. With their labors lost as a result of British action, Deerborn mused that when fishermen 
return to their homes and their families, “instead of carrying joy and comfort with uncommonly 
fine fares of Fish,” they will “have only a melancholy tale to relate of their suffering losses, 
while abject poverty sits enthroned in every dwelling of these hardy sons of the ocean.”195 The 
dictates of both nation and humanity compelled sympathy for this group of men and by 
appealing to both of these impulses fishermen and their supporters were able to keep this series 
of British captures in the political consciousness long enough for diplomats to take action. The 
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shape of that diplomatic action, compelled by fishermen, would likewise be determined, in part, 
by those maritime laborers.             
 Like the diplomats themselves, fishermen were unsure about what international 
agreements regulated their industry as the United States and Great Britain emerged form 
hostilities. Amidst the confusion of the fishing season of 1817, a justice of the peace in 
Massachusetts queried the Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, for a clarification on the 
rights a liberties of American fishermen, since a violation of any agreement, even if from 
ignorance, portended potential ruin. “It is a matter of the utmost importance to us, on this coast,” 
the Massachusetts magistrate declared, “to know, definitely where we can fish and where we 
cannot,” in order to avoid the “distressing and vexatious” detentions that marked the previous 
fishing season.196 Adams was unable to deliver a clear answer as to where Americans could and 
could not fish since he and his transatlantic counterpart had reached an impasse regarding that 
question. But within this fluid context, fishermen and the industry’s supporters hoped to establish 
a new series of regulations that might be even more advantageous to Americans than what was 
agreed to in 1783. American and British diplomats, seeing the potential for future conflict in the 
actions of American fishermen, would finally meet in 1818 to address not only the fisheries 
issue, but a host of other problems that were at the core of Anglo-American relations.       
 
LONDON, 1818 
 As the fishing season of 1817 showed, the state of fishery diplomacy in the North 
Atlantic had the potential to be a significant irritant in Anglo-American relations. But this was 
not the only outstanding problem that bedeviled transatlantic ties. The territorial boundary 
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between the United States and the British dominion in North America was notoriously unstable. 
Americans had shown an inclination to invade their northern neighbors and as long as the line 
between the two was so ill defined it was not unreasonable to think Americans would continue to 
covet, if not attempt to claim, those lands. Furthermore, the claims of both nations to the Oregon 
territory certainly had the potential to be a flash point if only because of the shortsighted actions 
of rowdy backwoodsmen or unscrupulous merchants. Also, Americans, particularly slave-
owning Americans, still smarted with indignation as no restitution was given for the human 
property that was taken away or otherwise lost during the most recent outbreak of armed 
hostilities. The host of problems that Great Britain and the United States confronted in 1818 were 
in some regard the legacy of the War of 1812. While the Treaty of Ghent had served to restore 
peaceful relations, the agreement was simply ineffective in addressing the myriad concerns, 
mostly maritime in nature, that had produced a declaration of war in the summer of 1812. In fact 
that agreement, as the fisheries issue and questions over enslaved property demonstrated, perhaps 
created more problems than it solved. It was only with a new round of negotiation that these 
irritants were addressed—a  round of negotiations made all the more urgent by the situation in 
the North Atlantic fisheries.      
 Unlike at Ghent, the fisheries would play the central role in the diplomatic wrangling in 
the immediate postbellum years. The fishing season of 1815 exposed the United States and Great 
Britain’s conflicting understanding of the former’s right to fish the North Atlantic. When British 
ships removed American fishermen from those waters that summer it became obvious that, at 
some point, American diplomats would need to turn their attention to putting the fisheries issue 
on firmer statutory grounds. As Secretary of State James Monroe remarked in November 1815, 
“The Fisheries form another case of great importance to the United States,” one that would be 
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brought before the British government. Later that winter, Monroe would reiterate to John Quincy 
Adams the importance of the fisheries and the centrality of this resource in Anglo-American 
relations as a satisfactory settlement of the question was “in the interest of both nations.”197 In 
the ensuing years the situation on the water served to remind American statesmen that a 
diplomatic fix was necessary.    
 In the aftermath of the fishing season of 1817, which saw dozens of American schooners 
captured and detained by the British navy, American policymakers once again identified the need 
for an Anglo-American convention to put to rest lingering questions pertaining to the American 
access to the fishing grounds. In a missive to the American minister in London, Richard Rush, 
Secretary of State John Quincy Adams informed Rush of the desire by the British government to 
settle the issue by “some conventional arrangement.” Although British leaders disavowed the 
actions of the British navy during the summer of 1815 when “sundry fishing vessels of the 
United States were arrested and interrupted in the pursuit of their occupation…and warned 
against fishing within twenty leagues of the coast,” the British government still intended “to 
exclude the American fishermen…from drying and curing fish on the shores, and from fishing 
within one marine league of the coasts of the British provinces.” Yet the heart of the 
disagreement lay in Britain continued insistence that, as Adams informed Rush, the American 
“fishing privilege was forfeited by our Declaration of War” in 1812.198 Within a year Anglo-
American statesmen would finally take up this issue, among others, and in the process put 
transatlantic relations on a more sure footing.    
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 From August to October 1818, Albert Gallatin and Richard Rush negotiated a new treaty 
that sought to adjudicate the fisheries issue as well as other irritants that continued to bedevil 
transatlantic ties. In the process Anglo-American statesmen created an agreement far more 
effective than the Treaty of Ghent for ensuring future stability of transatlantic relations. The 
Convention of 1818 provided for establishing the 49th parallel as the boundary between the 
United States and the British dominion west of the Great Lakes, while allowing for the joint 
occupation of the Oregon territory. Furthermore the Convention provided for a process to 
indemnify the owners of human property for their losses during the recent war. This agreement 
proved to be remarkably successful, being largely un-amended until the Webster-Ashburton 
Treaty of 1842. But it was with regard to the fisheries that the Convention had its greatest 
impact. The norms established in the treaty’s first article would determine the official, diplomatic 
tenor of the fisheries issue for decades to come.  
Before the negotiations even began, John Quincy Adams made clear that the fisheries 
were a priority. For those fishermen already subjected to British capture Adams instructed Rush 
to provide counsel and legal aid in the hopes of showing Great Britain that “not a particle of 
these rights will be finally yielded by the United States without a struggle, which will cost Great 
Britain more than the worth of the prize.”199 Adams instructed the envoys to press the British on 
the fisheries issue. After claiming that “all those captures [of the previous fishing seasons] have 
been illegal,” Adams cut to the very heart of the British position. While Great Britain insisted the 
recent war nullified any statutory basis for the United States’ claim to the fisheries, Adams 
declared that “we claim the rights in question not as acquired by the Treaty of 1783, but as 
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having always before enjoyed them, and as only recognized as belonging to us by that Treaty; 
and therefore never to be divested from us but by our own consent.”200  
Furthermore, Adams informed Rush and Gallatin that the administration desired that the 
right of American fishermen to catch, cure, and dry fish along a significant portion of the 
Newfoundland shore and the entirety of the Labrador coast be recognized as a permanent right, 
not a mere liberty that could be abrogated in the event of war. Two summers previous, Monroe, 
in his position as secretary of state, and John Quincy Adams, in his role as the American minister 
to Great Britain, discussed the possibility of American fishermen acquiring the right to fish these 
northernmost waters. In preparing for what would turn out to be the Rush-Bagot Treaty of 1817, 
which stipulated the United States and Great Britain would demilitarize the Great Lakes, Monroe 
stated that British minister Charles Bagot had been authorized by his government to reach a deal 
on the fisheries off the Labrador and Newfoundland coasts, something that certainly comported 
with American desires at the time. Ultimately this arrangement came to nothing as the ensuing 
treaty bearing Bagot’s name made no reference to the fisheries. But the exchange between 
Monroe and Adams demonstrated that Anglo-American policymakers were aware of the 
potential problems bound up in the fisheries issue years before they adequately addressed it.201 
By 1818, Adams and the Monroe administration clearly saw the costs of indefinite liberties and 
wanted the question settled permanently. 
 But why did Adams make such an insistence upon portions of the Newfoundland and 
Labrador coasts? After all, the previous fishing seasons had seen most American fishing 
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schooners captured near the shores of Nova Scotia as well as the nearby fishing banks and the 
Bay of Fundy. Perhaps Adams was using the opportunity of this fluid situation to expand, 
strengthen, and make permanent American rights that may not have been directly implicated in 
the confrontations of the previous summers. But Adams and his cohort of diplomats were not 
alone in their desire to make what were once liberties into rights. Two years before Rush and 
Gallatin set about their diplomatic work, appeals form fishermen made their way to Jeremiah 
Nelson, the congressional representative for the district centered upon Newburyport. These men 
acquainted with the cod fishing industry noted the many benefits of the fisheries off the southern 
and western coasts of Newfoundland, as these areas provided not only waters teaming with fish 
but were also advantageous to drying and curing fish as well.202 That same summer as Secretary 
Monroe and Minister Adams discussed the potential of including the Labrador and 
Newfoundland fisheries in what would become the Rush-Bagot Treaty, the secretary of state 
confirmed that his knowledge of those fisheries was not based on mere hearsay and conjecture. 
Instead, noting the necessity “to seek detailed information of the value” of those fishing waters, 
Monroe sought the information “from those possessing it at Marblehead and elsewhere.”203 By 
the summer of 1818 as Rush and Gallatin set about crafting a new agreement to regulate access 
to the fisheries, the State Department had directly consulted those engaged in the fishing industry 
for information that would guide diplomacy.   
 The extent to which the desires of cod fishermen fed into Adams’s thinking is arguable, 
yet there is no question that direct ties existed between the fishing wharves of Massachusetts and 
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the State Department. Successive secretaries of state consulted with industry insiders so as to be 
able to craft policy that was sympathetic to the fishing interests of the nation. Certainly by 1818 a 
kind of consensus emerged in which diplomats and fishermen alike desired the affirmation of the 
American right to fish in the waters adjacent to the Newfoundland and Labrador shores. 
Fishermen likewise served as a constant remainder of Britain’s heavy-handed actions, showing 
the need for diplomatic solution was necessary. Fisherman and statesman saw the opportunity to 
use the situation to succeed where the Treaty of Paris had failed. In the end, Americans achieved 
their aims.  
The first article of the Convention of 1818 granted American fishermen, “in common 
with the Subjects of His Britannic Majesty,” “for ever…the Liberty” to take fish upon the 
southern, western, and northern coasts of Newfoundland as well as “Northwardly indefinitely” 
along the Labrador coast from the Strait of Belle Isle. Americans would also enjoy the right to 
cure and dry fish along the uninhabited portions of the above mentioned coasts. While upon first 
glance this language differed little from what was found in the Treaty of Paris, “for ever” became 
the operative phrase as what was once a mutable liberty now became a permanent right—as 
permanent, in fact, as American independence.204 This phrasing became the most contentious 
aspect of the entire negotiation. In their debrief to Adams after the treaty was signed, Rush and 
Gallatin remarked that “the most difficult part of the negotiation related to the permanence of the 
right.” The ministers remarked that it was “impracticable” to “obtain the insertion in the body of 
the convention of a provision declaring expressly that that right should not be abrogated by war.” 
The Americans hoped the phrase “for ever”—which, the British “strenuously resisted”—would 
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prevent the abrogation of that right in the future. Yet the British continued to claim the principle 
that hostilities served to invalidate previous treaty agreements.205 The actions of both fishermen 
and diplomats had aligned, at last, to create a permanent shift in Anglo-American relations. An 
occasion such as the Convention of 1818 to settle outstanding irritants and reconsider some 
foundational aspects of the transatlantic relationship was created by fishermen on the ground and 
capitalized upon by diplomats at the bargaining table.  
 The United States affirmed its fishing rights with the Convention of 1818. But with the 
give and take nature of diplomacy, the nation had to relent elsewhere. With a permanent claim to 
the Newfoundland and Labrador fisheries, the United States did however “renounce for ever any 
Liberty hereto fore enjoyed or claimed…to take, dry, or cure Fish on, or within three marine 
Miles of any of the Coasts, Bays, Creeks, or Harbours of His Britannic Majesty’s Dominions in 
America,” apart from Newfoundland and Labrador. While at the time this was seen as a minor 
concession, since American ships could still resort to these shores in rough seas and to replenish 
provisions, the succeeding decades would see this clause become the center of transatlantic 
fishery diplomacy as Americans would consistently violate this three-mile zone in the pursuit of 
their catch, and in the process bring American and British diplomats to the bargaining table once 
again.206     
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CHAPTER 3: FISHERIES AND POLITICS IN A CHANGING WORLD, 1819–1845 
In 1824 a British warship detained two American fishing schooners in the Bay of Fundy. 
This kind of capture was not especially noteworthy. While the possible losses of property and of 
a fishing season were potentially disastrous for smaller-scale fishermen, capture was, at times, 
the cost of doing business. British and American diplomats thought this irritant had been 
remedied by the Convention of 1818. Article 1 of the convention, however, seemed to create 
more problems by declaring waters within one league—three miles—of the Canadian shore to be 
off limits to all American fishermen. While diplomats thought such clarity would bring peace to 
the waters, this act merely created the conditions for more clashes as careless fishermen or 
overzealous naval officers could bring about a confrontation over real or imagined violations of 
the three-mile line.  
 The capture of American schooners in 1824 was indicative of this new problem. But 
unlike other instances of American ships being seized by British cruisers, this crew of fishermen 
resorted to arms, fighting back against their would-be captors and retaking their ship. Yet this 
kind of violence is hard to explain in solely political terms. Although just a decade earlier the 
United States and Great Britain had yet again come to blows, by the 1820s some of the most 
significant problems in the relationship had been addressed. Despite the insecurities engendered 
by the pervasive Anglophobia of the day, the English-speaking nations had little to feud about. 
The violence exhibited on the fisheries was not born just of national insecurities but was a 
manifestation of tension felt by fishermen as they sensed the sea’s declining fecundity.  
 Across the nineteenth century knowledge about the fisheries became the purview of 
authoritative, empirical scientists. But this consolidation of expertise was a contested process; in 
the second quarter of the century, ordinary fishermen vied with naturalists for intellectual 
  
 
132 
authority. The men of science expressed a kind of naiveté in their assertions that humans could 
not possibly influence, or degrade, a natural system as vast as the world’s oceans. But the 
experiences of fishermen themselves suggested otherwise. As historian W. Jeffrey Bolster notes, 
“creeping concerns about overfishing became palpable” during this period.207 While 
technological innovation would allow humans to pull more and more biomass from the ocean, 
fishermen had a sense that the process required more men and more labor for fewer fish. Uneasy 
about the future of their livelihoods, fishermen resorted to the kind of violence witnessed in 1824 
in response to a growing sense of scarcity. The tension over this maritime resource ensured that a 
major issue in Anglo-American relations would remain unstable. 
 Taking a larger view of Anglo-American relations in the immediate aftermath of the 
Convention of 1818 reveals a relationship marked by ambiguity. The American envoy in 
London, Richard Rush, was ready to inaugurate a new era in Anglo-American relations. “Unlike 
those who have gone before me,” Rush declared, “I am here at the season when the absence of 
all angry discussions between the two nations, as well as of all occurrence of a nature to irritate, 
might well have left soon.” The reason for the epochal shift in Anglo-American relations was the 
example the American system of governance presented. “Is not,” Rush queried, “the American 
Republic, with the more commanding and durable destinies which it is no longer a question are 
secured to it, likely to become an example still more persuasive” to British subjects who shared 
with American citizens a similar origin, a common tongue, and the same “congenial habits”?  
Employing a meteorological metaphor that would have resonated with fishermen on the North 
Atlantic, Rush observed that, unlike the current moment, his predecessor “took the post when the 
storm was over, but perhaps before all the billows could have come down,” while “all who 
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preceded him were at it whilst the elements of strife were in constant motion.”208 But perhaps the 
squall had not passed entirely.   
 Lurking beneath those cultural factors that seemed destined to foster transatlantic 
cooperation lay, in Rush’s estimation, the jealousies and vindictiveness of a people harboring “a 
settled dislike to the United States.”  The American envoy had a rosy vision of the American 
future, though not of Anglo-American relations. He noted that “we have outstripped her in 
freedom,” and surpassed the international prestige of France, “destined permanently to take the 
place of that nation in the English odium.” It was in fact the United States’ and Great Britain’s 
similarities that would drive them apart, as Rush remarked that “the odium will grow as 
our…numbers and power augment the success of our rivalry…which became inflamed to the 
highest pitch by the circumstances of our common origin and language.”209 Rush’s ambiguous 
statements in the early years of the 1820s suggested that diplomats were not sure of how to 
assess the state of Anglo-American relations. Events in 1824 would, however, show that hostility 
remained between the two English-speaking peoples.  
  
THE RUBY AND REINDEER AFFAIR 
 
The fishing season of 1824 was, in a word, tense. Generating government reports, 
diplomatic exchanges, and newspaper coverage across the nation, the capture of American 
fishing vessels by the British Navy proved that the Convention of 1818 did little practically to 
stem the rising tide of Anglo-American fisheries disputes. While dozens of American fishing 
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schooners were apprehended in or near British Provincial waters during the spring and summer 
of that year, it was the captures of the schooners Ruby and Reindeer that touched off a minor 
diplomatic incident and exposed the shortcomings of diplomacy.  
 The schooners Ruby and Reindeer had more in common than the ignominious distinction 
of being the subjects of British maritime aggression when they were captured in the summer of 
1824 for alleged violations of the Convention of 1818. Robert Small, master of the Reindeer, and 
Elisha Small, master of the Ruby, were in fact brothers, and the Small family name punctuated 
the crew lists of both ships. These kinds of familial connections were certainly not uncommon in 
the New England fishing industry of the early nineteenth century. Standing in contrast to the 
polyglot, multinational crews of the merchant and whaling ships of the day, cod-fishing crews 
were remarkably homogenous; connections made through family and community manifested 
themselves in the workings of the industry.  The close connections between hands, masters, and 
the owners of fishing vessels were in part the result of the peculiar relationships evident in the 
ordering of these ships. While certainly the master lived up to such a name, the clear distinction 
between management and labor was not as evident. The federal cod-fishing bounty, while 
amended numerous times over its decades-long life, was justified, in part, on the grounds that it 
would raise a body of seamen familiar with the way of the ship and ready to serve the nation in 
times of armed crisis. Accordingly the bounty law stipulated that at least part of this dispensation 
be awarded to the laborers, usually based on their portion of the total catch. Thus even the most 
ordinary cod fisherman was not merely a wage worker but instead was invested in the success of 
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any given ship. Owners and masters would understandably look to crew their ships with men 
whom they intimately trusted.210        
 With fishing ships and crews tied to place in a way that many maritime laborers were not, 
it is unsurprising that the Ruby and Reindeer both made berth at the same port, Lubec, Maine. 
Situated along the coast in the extreme eastern region of the state—in fact the easternmost point 
in the continental United States—Lubec had easy access to the fishing grounds in the Gulf of 
Maine and the Bay of Fundy while being an uneasy neighbor with Britain’s North American 
colonies. Considering the boundary between Maine and the British colonies was left unsettled 
until the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842, Lubec was indeed a frontier town in the 1820s, 
occupying a potentially unstable geopolitical position. Despite ease of access to fishing grounds 
across the North Atlantic, and a geography that favored maritime enterprise, during the first 
quarter of the nineteenth century Maine was impoverished, at least compared to the great fishing 
ports along the Massachusetts coast north of Boston. For much of this period Maine simply 
lacked a sizeable enough population or industrial basis to support the kind of growth that the cod 
fishing industry that would experience as midcentury approached. For the time being, however, 
ports like Lubec were underpopulated and undercapitalized, leaving those people more 
vulnerable to economic and political whims. In the sole monographic study of the fishing 
industry of this region, historian Wayne M. O’Leary concludes that the Maine fisherman was  
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poor while laboring on the margins of the fisheries economy, but there is no question that he was  
tied to, if not dependent on, the cod fisheries and its continued access.211           
 When the brothers Small headed out of Lubec in the summer of 1824 it would have been 
no surprise that they made a course for the Bay of Fundy. With fishing grounds so near their 
home port, Robert and Elisha Small would have been in no need of the larger, well-built ships 
that were used when voyaging to the fishing grounds on the Grand Banks, the Gulf of St. 
Lawrence, or along the coast of Labrador. In all likelihood the Ruby and Reindeer were smaller, 
possibly previously used ships, bought on the cheap as demanded by the constraints of this 
capital-strapped region. O’Leary observes that such a second-hand ship “was one way for the 
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Figure 4: The small, make-shift fishing camps along the Maine coast demonstrated the lack of capital available in Maine’s fisheries and resulting 
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small, marginal operator to enter the field”—words that most likely described Robert and Elisha 
Small.212  
 Robert Small left the port of Lubec on July 22, 1824, in the schooner Reindeer with the 
hope of a successful cod fishing voyage to the Bay of Fundy. His crew mates included family 
and trusted community members who, like their master, probably spent the remainder of the year 
engaged in other economic activity like farming, however difficult in the thin Maine soil, or 
lumbering in the vast Maine forests. Early-nineteenth-century Mainers required this kind of 
economic diversity to support their still-precarious existence. On July 25, “finding our water 
very bad,” Robert Small directed the schooner to an uninhabited island near Grand Manan, no 
more than fifteen miles from Lubec at the convergence of the Gulf of Maine and the Bay of 
Fundy, but indisputably British. While the Convention of 1818 forbade American fishermen 
from taking fish within three marine miles of the coasts of the British provinces, the treaty did 
allow fishermen to go ashore at uninhabited places in order to take water and wood. But as Small 
made sure to note, “while on our voyage, we had caught no fish from six to eighteen miles from 
the shore.…nor did we go into a harbor for any other purpose than to procure wood and water.” 
Despite this lawful action the Reindeer was apprehended by the HMS Doterel—which, despite 
being a sloop, and thus a relatively small warship, dwarfed the tiny schooner in size and 
firepower—when the fishing ship was becalmed less than two miles from the shore. Men from 
the Doterel boarded the Reindeer for being in violation of the treaty, while, in Small’s words, 
“menacing myself and crew with violence; threatening our lives.” The men from the Reindeer 
were put on board another captured American fishing ship, the schooner Friend, to sail to St. 
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Andrew’s, New Brunswick, for questioning, while the Reindeer was to be towed elsewhere, most 
likely to be condemned.213  
 Robert’s brother, Elisha Small, faced similar hardships. Aboard the schooner Ruby, 
Elisha left port on July 7, 1824 and on July 24 stopped near Grand Menan to replenish the ship’s 
wood and water. Weak winds likewise stranded the Ruby in British waters despite the fact that 
Elisha Small claimed to have “not caught fish, or attempted to catch one, within five miles from 
the shore, nor had we been into any other harbor, until the one above named.” Even if Robert and 
Elisha had in fact violated the treaty during any part of their voyage, they exhibited a familiarity 
with diplomacy that would have garnered sympathy in Washington. The crew of the Doterel, 
however, exercised no sympathy for the fishermen, instead, bringing “on board nine men, armed 
with guns, cutlasses, dirks, and pistols,” to take command of the ship while the crew of the Ruby 
were relegated to yet another captured American schooner, the Diligence.214 Both Robert and 
Elisha Small made these statements before the justice of the peace of Washington County, home 
of Lubec, in the hopes that state or federal officials might seek to redress this grievance. They 
were certainly attuned to audience as the vulnerable fishermen portrayed themselves as the 
victims of arbitrary British power.                          
 Other affidavits told a similar story. Elias Ficket, master of the schooner Diligence of 
Harrington, Maine, declared that while visiting Grand Menan for wood and water his ship was 
apprehended by the Doterel, in the process, “interrupting us in our lawful employment and 
destroying our fishery.” Ficket likewise mentions the shabby treatment at the hands of British 
                                                
213 “Statement of Robert Small, master of the Schooner Reindeer of Lubec, Maine, July 27th, 1824,”  in House 
Documents, 18th Cong., 2nd Sess., “Message of the President of the United States Transmitting Copies of 
Correspondence upon the Subject of the Capture and Detention, by British Armed Vessels, of American Fishermen 
During the Last Season,” (Serial: 118, Washington, D.C.), 11–12. (hereafter cited as “Message of the President.”) 
 
214 “Statement of Elisha Small, master of Schooner Ruby of Lubec, Maine, July 27th, 1824,” Ibid., 12. 
 
  
 
139 
sailors as he noted being “badly used by the barge’s officers—threatening to shoot us,” given 
their orders “to capture all Americans they met with right or wrong—that there was no treaty—
and that Americans should not fish in British waters.”215 Harding Clark, Ephraim Clark, and 
William H. N. Brown, all of the schooner Hero of Dennsyville, Maine, reported that in the 
lawful pursuit of the fisheries their capture by the Doterel was “but an act of piracy committed 
on the high seas without a pretense of authority.” The crew offered their solemn “protest against 
the winds, seas, tides, armed boats, pirates, the wanton and flagrant abuse of power and 
whatsoever else that caused the seizure and dentition of [the Hero].”216 Finally Charles Tabbut, 
Thomas Wright, Benjamin Reynolds, and Josiah W. Perry, of the schooner William of Addison, 
Maine, reported that upon being boarded a British officer was enraged, inveighing that “the 
American fishermen had been damned saucy to the inhabitants of Grand Manan.”217  
 The American fishing ships captured by the HMS Doterel during the summer of 1824 
had much in common. Apart from the specifics of their ordeals, they all hailed from Maine, most 
likely sharing the marginality all Mainers experienced during the first quarter of the nineteenth 
century. This economic vulnerability made their capture all the more dire—the loss of their 
ships, equipment, and fishing season; the costs of returning home after their detention; and 
ultimately pursuing legal action for the return of their property all proved difficult. They were, 
however, not without recourse. By appealing to officials at different levels of governance they 
hoped in some way that the American state would address their grievances. The statements they 
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gave to local justices of the peace had the potential to make their way to Washington, and the 
fishermen did all they could to make themselves seem innocent and sympathetic. But those 
involved in the fishing industry themselves also appealed directly to policymakers in 
Washington. 
 Concerned citizens of Washington County, Maine, made sure those in Washington, D.C., 
were aware that the rights of Americans were being abridged by British action. As Robert and 
Elisha Small gave their statements to the Washington County justice of the peace, “merchants 
and ship owners residing at Eastport in the county of Washington and state of Maine” drafted a 
memorial to send to Secretary of State John Quincy Adams. This group of prominent Mainers 
informed Adams of and sought redress for “the many acts of violence and injustice which have 
been committed by his Britannic Majesty…in violation of the subsisting treaty between the two 
governments.” They had, in their own words, “invested a larger amount of property in vessels 
than they have heretofore done for the purpose of carrying on the business of fishing.” While 
under “the encouraging and beneficial laws of their country,” which is to say the cod fishing 
bounty, the fishermen’s “labors would have been crowned with success,” had the season been 
free of “interruption from a foreign power.” But this latest series of British captures prevented 
the fine fishermen of Maine from “enjoy[ing] the fruits of their toll.” Like the fishermen who 
endured these acts of violence first hand, the memorialists demonstrated their understanding of 
diplomacy and international politics, while portraying their plight as sympathetic and their cause 
worthy.218  
 The memorial to the State Department furthered the narrative of fishermen as hapless 
victims of British aggression. As relayed to Washington, these prominent men of Maine claimed 
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that despite “fishing agreeable to the treaty,” these fishermen were “insulted and abused” by 
British naval officers who, after their capture, “turned them on shore in a foreign country, 
entirely destitute, and without the means of returning to their homes.” Yet this was perhaps only 
the beginning of their hardship since the risk to life and property might dissuade fishermen from 
pursuing their trade in the future—“they dare not again attempt to avail themselves of the rights 
and privileges secured to them by treaty and which are well defined and well understood by 
every fisherman.” And perhaps most egregiously officers of the British Navy “said, repeatedly, 
that they would take American fishermen wherever they were found, and without regard to the 
treaty,” or even American independence for that matter.219  
 In a rhetorical move that went beyond the seemingly more parochial claims of the 
fishermen themselves, the memorialists from Maine tied these incidents to American 
nationalism. While of course the harassment of American fishing schooners entailed “great 
injury to private interest,” more importantly, taken as a whole, British aggression constituted an 
“infringement of public rights,” that was suggestive of the United States’ inferior position in a 
British Atlantic world. In an era when many Americans seethed with indignation at real or 
perceived slights to the abstract notion of American honor, portraying these incidents as a larger 
question of American—not just fishing—rights and British restrictions made for good politics. 
The memorial concluded by beseeching the federal government to “protect us in our rights and 
pursuits and that our fishermen may not be molested, nor our shores invaded with impunity by 
the subjects of any foreign power.”220  
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 With the federal government perhaps moving too slowly for the concerned citizens of 
Washington County, the self-styled “inhabitants of the county of Washington…interested in the 
fisheries in the Bay of Fundy,” penned another appeal to Adams in August 1824. This memorial 
mirrored the earlier one in its portrayal of an innocent and helpless group of American fishermen 
harassed by a tyrannical British Navy, going so far as to single out the commander of the HMS 
Doterel for his “piratical conduct” in the capture of the American vessels. The later group of 
memorialists likewise made the connection between this series of captures and national honor as 
these incidents were “indignities cast upon the American flag…[and] insults offered the citizens 
of the United States.” But this group of citizens also introduced a new strain of argumentation 
that took environmental factors into account.221  
 The August memorial made the predictable nod to the fishermen’s innocence, noting that 
they have not “as we firmly believe, in any instance, given just cause for complaint.” This 
compliance with treaty stipulations was not necessarily the result of a careful understanding of 
the treaty’s specifics on behalf of the fishermen. Instead, the memorialists claimed, fishermen 
would never have been found to be in violation of the treaty, because they simply had no reason 
to do so. “American fishermen,” the memorial stated, “have no occasion nor inducement to 
violate the provisions of the aforesaid convention.” These Maine fishermen would not have 
fished within the three-mile zone declared off limits by the Convention of 1818 because their 
piscine prey—cod—did not inhabit those waters. While these inshore waters would have been 
frequented by migratory mackerel, in 1824 the mackerel industry in the United States was still in 
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its infancy and Mainers were largely dedicated to the cod fisheries.222 Perhaps this group of 
memorialists claimed a more intimate knowledge of the on-the-water workings of the fishing 
industry as they identified themselves as mere “inhabitants” of the county interested in the 
fisheries, while the earlier group of memoralists were “merchants and ship owners,” and thus 
further removed from the toil of the industry. Such speculation aside, by the end of the summer 
of 1824 residents of Washington County, Maine, be they deck hands, ship masters, owners, fish 
merchants, or just concerned citizens, used various strategies in appealing to federal 
policymakers to redress this set of grievances. The response from American and British 
authorities, however, did little to settle the issue.  
 Among the papers addressed to the State Department during the fall of 1824 was a note 
from Henry Addington, the British charge d’affaires in Washington. Addington addressed the 
disturbances on the fisheries in his missive to Adams. But Addington’s telling, unsurprisingly, 
differed significantly from what the Mainers contended. The British minister declared that the 
capture of American vessels was entirely lawful as the fishermen were in the “commission of a 
direct infraction of the treaties…having, in fact, been found pursuing their occupation without 
the boundaries assigned to them by the terms of the convention of 1818.” But here is where 
stories really diverged. Americans were loath to accept the capture of the Ruby and Reindeer as 
Addington claimed “an attack was made…[on the Doterel] by two schooners and an open boat 
under American colors full of armed men with muskets and fixed bayonets, amounting to about 
one hundred.” Under the direction of a Mr. Howard of Eastport, Maine, purportedly a captain in 
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the U.S. militia, the armed band of Americans retook the fishing ships as the British officer 
“thought it most prudent to surrender to such superior force.” Perhaps the Small brothers were 
not the helpless, sympathetic victims they made themselves out to be.223  
 Addington went on to mull over what this episode of violence meant to the larger 
workings of Anglo-American relations. Demanding the American government punish the 
perpetrators of this maritime raid, Addington commented that “if individuals are permitted to 
expound the stipulations of treaties for themselves with arms in their hands, the preservation of 
harmony and good understanding between nations can no longer be hoped for.” While the 
indignant bluster of Mr. Addington was not the edict of the empire, the potential existed for this 
incident to devolve into an acute crisis. It was, after all, less than a decade since Anglo-American 
statesmen had, and they thought adequately, addressed the fisheries issues, the events of the 
summer of 1824 showed that the conditions for discord were still in place, if not written in to the 
terms of the treaty. The ball seemed to be in the American court.224 
Henry Addington’s source for information about the affair was British Rear Admiral W. 
T. Lake, stationed at Halifax. In early September the naval officer informed the diplomat of his 
correspondence with the captain and master of the Doterel regarding the capture and subsequent 
liberation of the Ruby and Reindeer.225 John Jones was the master of the Doterel and the man 
charged with actually boarding the captured vessels and sailing them to British ports. He thus 
witnessed the American assault first hand. Before even apprehending the renegade American 
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schooners, Jones, cruising the waters in the Doterel’s boat “for the protection of our fisheries,” 
had received information that suggested the crews of the Ruby and Reindeer acted in a less than 
neighborly manner. Upon the schooners’ arrival at Grand Manan to replenish their wood and 
water “they fired their muskets and told the inhabitants they were armed, and would not allow 
any man of war’s boats to board them.” Arriving on the scene Jones found the two schooners 
“lashed alongside each other” with all hands, numbering about thirty, assembled on deck “with 
their fire-arms and fish spears,” and was only able to board after threatening to fire on the 
American vessels.226  
 Jones noted that neither ship was in need of wood or water and that the weather was 
“fine.” Making note of these conditions suggests that, at least in Jones’s mind, the Ruby and 
Reindeer had no excuse for being so near the British provincial coast and therefore must have 
been in violation of the treaty’s terms. After putting the crews aboard two other captured 
American vessels, the Diligence and Friend, “with provision for a passage” to their homes in 
Lubec, Jones made sail for St. Andrews, New Brunswick, with the Ruby and Reindeer in tow. 
Before reaching the destination however, Jones noticed “two schooners and an open boat, full of 
armed men, muskets, and fixed bayonets, hoisting American colors.” After the impromptu 
American flotilla fired on the convoy consisting of the Doterel’s yawl and the two captured 
American schooners, Jones, “with great reluctance,” ultimately thought it “prudent to surrender 
to superior force.” Upon surrendering the American ships, Jones counted about a hundred men, 
consisting of the Ruby’s and Reindeer’s crew and “the rest having the appearance of militia 
men.”227 Quite contrary to Robert and Elisha Small’s claims that they and their crews were 
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menaced by violent British sailors, Jones’s account of the incident made the British the victims 
of an armed band of American marauders.        
 It would be hard to believe that Addington’s note was the first Adams was hearing of this 
incident. As early as August 5 newspapers in Boston informed its readers of the incident. The 
Commercial Gazette noted that upon the captures of the Ruby and Reindeer the crews of other 
schooners “were immediately furnished with arms and ammunition, went out and recaptured 
those vessels without difficulty.” “It seems,” the short report suggested, “to be their [Britain’s] 
determination, to destroy our fishing in the Bay of Fundy.” The fisheries dispute was, without 
question, revived. The Boston paper concluded, asking “would it not be well for our Government 
to look to it?”228 This would in fact be the government’s response as Adams consented to 
Addington’s suggestion that an investigation be made into the incident and enlisted the district 
attorney for Maine to depose the Americans involved in the fracas.  
 The testimonies the Small brothers provided Ether Shepley, the Maine district attorney, in 
November, painted a different picture than the statements they gave the Washington County 
justice of the peace in July. For starters, the Smalls at least admitted there was some kind of 
confrontation after their schooners were apprehended. Robert Small of the Reindeer reported a 
familiar story of coming in for water and being left stranded in British waters on account of 
uncooperative winds. He likewise testified that John Jones menaced his crew, firing on the 
Reindeer before coming aboard “in a great rage,” threatening “to carve us up like a turkey, or a 
piece of beef,” with his crew “brandishing their cutlasses about our heads.” Robert remained on 
his ship while his crew was ordered to board the recently captured Friend—just as the crew of 
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the Ruby boarded the Diligence—in order to return to Lubec. This, however, was where Robert 
Small’s story diverged from his earlier remarks. While the Reindeer made its way under British 
supervision to the port of St. Andrews, Robert Small noticed “two other vessels hove down upon 
us; one the schooner Madison, came down upon the Reindeer, there being about twenty men on 
her deck, with muskets, but not bayonets upon them.” Jones prepared to fire on the Madison but 
Robert intervened, telling the British sailor “if you fire into that vessel every man of you will be 
shot,” for “they are my neighbors; they want this vessel, and they will have her.” Unwilling to 
counter the American raiders, Jones returned the ship to Robert’s command. Although he 
relented, unlike in his July statement, that Americans retook the ship through force, Robert Small 
still admitted no wrong doing. The Reindeer had only come into British waters to resupply 
themselves, fished at five to six miles from land, and claimed that there was not “a gun fired at 
all, till after Mr. Jones [had relinquished the Reindeer]…and then only as an expression of 
joy.”229  
 Elisha Small, master of the Ruby, corroborated his brother’s account, elaborating on some 
purposeful omissions in his July testimony while admitting to no wrong doing. Elisha did, 
however, bring to light a detail that resonated with other American accounts of the incident. 
When Jones boarded the Ruby, Elisha Small defended the ship’s action as consistent with the 
Convention of 1818. Jones responded, according to Elisha, saying “he did not care a damn for 
the treaty, every vessel he caught within three miles of the land he would make a prize of.”230 
Fishermen of the schooner Galleon claimed Jones said “what is the use of talking about the 
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treaty—damn the treaty—I did not come here to learn my lesson—I learnt it before I came.”231 
And Charles Tabbut, master of the schooner William, claimed Jones “damned the treaty, and 
them that made it.”232 Whether Jones remarked on the Convention of 1818 at all is not entirely 
relevant. Instead the American fishermen’s invocation of the treaty is suggestive of the degree to 
which fishermen were self-consciously engaging with the course of American diplomacy.  
 The series of depositions gathered in November 1824 elaborated on the circumstances 
that brought the American raiders into conflict with the British Navy. As American, and later 
British, deponents would confirm, the crews, with the exception of the masters, of the Ruby and 
Reindeer were returned to their home port of Lubec with the Diligence and Friend serving as 
cartel ships. Upon his arrival, Ruby deckhand Benjamin Small, no doubt of relations with Robert 
and Elisha, immediately set to work on a plan to liberate his kinsmen. “I went to Elisha D. Green 
of Eastport,” Small stated, “and told him I wanted ten muskets, it having been agreed between 
the Ruby’s crew and the Diligence crew that we would retake the Ruby, he and another 
gentleman obtained for us seven muskets, and the two clerks in Green’s store, one named 
Howard, and the other Fields, said they would go with us.” In all, the band would consist of 
twelve men, seven muskets, two pistols, and two bayonets—a far cry from the one hundred 
armed men of Jones’s earlier claim.233 Benjamin W. Coggins, master of the schooner Friend, 
likewise commented on the response of Maine’s seaside community to the capture of the Ruby 
and Reindeer. Coggins enrolled his brother, master of the schooner Madison, in the raid. After he 
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“called round,” Coggins rallied seven men, along with “two rifles, and two muskets, and two 
pistols, and powder, and ball.” While successful in liberating the two ships, this paltry group 
bore little resemblance to the large, well-armed, unruly crowd the British supposedly observed. 
Responding to Jones’s claims that the Americans were headed by a militia captain by the name 
of Mr. Howard, Coggins remarked that “Mr. Howard is a lad, seventeen or eighteen years old” 
that had never served as a captain in any militia, but, Coggins caustically added, “I have heard 
that he was captain of a company of boys in Eastport, who trained with wooden guns and 
swords.”234 For the Americans involved, the “attack” on the British may well have been a lark. 
Their small numbers and the significant British overstatement seem to suggest the British took 
the Americans a little more seriously than they took themselves. But this kind of community 
action suggests something even more important.  
 This episode resonates with two important themes. First, the mobilization of those within 
this fishing community in response to Britain’s restrictive policy enforcement demonstrates the 
centrality of maritime labor in the community. But second, and more importantly, this incident 
demonstrates the degree to which ordinary maritime laborers were vital parts of the creation and 
implementation of American foreign policy. Without these men testing the limits of American 
international rights, the privileges afforded to Americans by the Convention of 1818 remained an 
abstraction. Furthermore, the decision these fishermen made in the pursuance of their labor 
created policy that Washington had to then account for. In the nineteenth century, the nation’s 
foreign policy was not the domain of the elite alone, but part of everyday life for these men.     
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Unsurprisingly, British officials disputed the American stories collected during the course 
of the investigation during the fall of 1824. Writing to Secretary Adams in the early months of 
1825, Addington put blame for the incident squarely on the shoulders of the American 
fishermen. Enclosing testimonies gathered from British sailors of the Doterel, Addington 
declared that the American “complaints have no just ground of accusation, against the officers of 
the Doterel nor are entitled to reparation for the loss they have sustained.” Rather the American 
fishermen put themselves in such a position as a result of the “willful irregularity of their own 
conduct.” While American fishermen may at one time have resorted to the inshore waters of 
Britain’s North American Provinces without fear of capture or harassment, that state of being 
was not a recognition of a right, but instead was a “laxity which appears to have prevailed…in 
guarding those coasts from the intrusions of foreign fishermen.” Now, the British diplomat 
informed Adams, the British would replace that laxity with “vigilance” in pursuing treaty 
infractions.235 
 The testimonies offered by British sailors largely corroborated John Jones’s initial 
account. Even before the confrontation, the crews of the Ruby and Reindeer seemed like rabble 
rousers. A Mr. Touzeau, midshipman aboard the Doterel, reported that “upon their anchoring, 
one of them fired three muskets, and said they were armed and manned, and would oppose our 
boarding them.” After taking control of the Ruby and Reindeer, for reasons Touzeau failed to 
explicitly mention, the midshipman “observed two schooners coming down toward us full of 
armed men and wearing American colors.” Among this group, Touzeau counted “forty-five 
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men,” less than half of the one hundred Jones reported, armed with “pistols, swords, and 
muskets, and fixed bayonets.” After the American raiding party successfully retook the ships, 
their ringleader, the aforementioned Mr. Howard, ordered his men “not to use violence against 
any of my men, as he had got possession of the vessel, and which was all they wanted,” before 
“fir[ing] off all their muskets and pistols” in celebration. Sailors Thomas Richardson and James 
Lloyd supported Touzeau’s story.236  
 In discussing the complete extent of testimonies taken relative to the Ruby and Reindeer 
affair, Doterel captain Richard Hoare commented to his superior, Rear Admiral Lake, that there 
was ample “proof of the propriety of detaining those vessels.” Without logs or journals from the 
American vessels it was simply the word of the fishermen against those of the British sailors, 
with Hoare observing that “it is not to be supposed that the [fishermen] will acknowledge to have 
violated the treaty existing between the two Governments.” The testimonies and reports 
furnished by the British Navy, in Hoare’s view, presented “a consistency throughout…that will 
bear the stamp of truth.” After all, “why should they detain these vessels if they had not violated 
the laws”?237 Hoare’s final observation may have betrayed his naiveté.  
 The evidence produced by British sailors uniformly point to the repeated, if not always 
intentional, violation of the Convention of 1818 by American fishermen plying their trade within 
three miles of British coasts.238 American fishermen, conversely, uniformly denied such 
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allegations, claiming compliance with the law and attributing British aggression to geopolitical 
imperatives independent of treaty statutes. The force that created the conditions that allowed for 
these kinds of clashes, however, operated more clandestinely, concerning not so much what 
happened upon the sea, but within it.  
The greater “vigilance” the British Navy displayed in enforcing the terms of the 
Convention of 1818 and the armed response on the part of American fishermen during the 
summer of 1824 were both manifestations of perceived environmental constraints. In writing his 
superiors Captain Hoare noted that a kind of unease and apprehension had descended upon the 
Figure 5: By the 1820s cod fishermen across the North Atlantic had embraced the practice of dressing their catch on the decks of 
their ships, disposing of the guts and offal overboard, George Brown Goode, “The George’s Bank Cod Fishery: dressing cod on 
deck of fishing schooner,” The Fisheries and Fishery Industry of the United States, Section 5: History and Methods of the 
Fisheries (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1887), Plate 33.  
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residents of Grand Manan Island. The islanders resented the American presence, not because 
American schooners showed up to the island guns-blazing as the Ruby and Reindeer allegedly 
did, but because they represented greater competition for what was a dwindling resource. Hoare 
reported that the fishermen of Grand Manan complained of American fishermen cutting their 
nets and taking “treble the quantity of fish this year [1824] to that of any proceeding 
year…ascrib[ing] it entirely to the American fishermen having been kept without the distance 
prescribed by treaty form the shore.” The people of Grand Manan also complained that 
American fishing practices further degraded the fisheries. Hoare commented that American 
fishermen were “bringing in the fish offal with them, and throwing it overboard on the inner 
banks, by which they drive the fish off those banks.”239 By fouling the fishing commons, 
American fishermen exacerbated the tension caused by the combination of fears over greater 
degradation and competition. Mr. Touzeau likewise commented on this practice. In his testimony 
concerning the detention of the schooner Rebecca, the British sailor noted that while “at anchor 
near Gull Cove,” the crew was spotted “cleaning fish and heaving the gurry overboard.”240 
Sensing dwindling returns from an ecosystem strained by the current techno-industrial regime, 
American fishermen, the residents of Grand Manan Island, and the British Navy all had to adapt. 
The friction evident on the fisheries during the summer of 1824 was a symptom of larger shifts 
both within and without the fisheries.     
The close of the first quarter of the nineteenth century saw a fishing industry struggling 
against its constraints. Lacking the empirical evidence that validated an emerging scientific 
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discourse, ordinary fishermen of the 1820s nonetheless sensed changes in the sea—a fear 
described as palpable during this period. Although the fisheries of the 1820s would look 
remarkably bountiful to today’s observers, North Atlantic fisheries had for decades been a 
degraded landscape that was the periodic, though not sustained, subject of calls for restraint. “By 
1800,” Bolster observers, “the northwest Atlantic was beginning to resemble European seas,” 
which is to say degraded, if not quite yet destroyed.241 While the baseline would eventually shift 
and observers would take the spoiled environ as the new norm, fishermen, at least those in 1824, 
may have been spurred to such drastic action knowing their toils produced decreasing marginal 
returns. At the time an infant mackerel industrial was experiencing its own revolution as the 
mackerel jig and bait mill inaugurated its own fish slaughter.242 In the coming decades the cod 
fisheries would undergo their own dramatic shift in technology—a so-called revolution—that 
would obscure evidence of declining catches. The single-hook hand lines that defined gadoid 
fishing for centuries eventually gave way to long line fishing. Lines studded with hundreds of 
hooks more ruthlessly exploited the maritime environment. But the observers and participants of 
the Ruby and Reindeer Affair had no idea that such a revolution was coming and instead faced 
the limitations of their soon-to-be-outdated gear, exacerbated by their marginal position on the 
edge of New England and the edge, at least for the moment, of the industry. Among the factors 
that motivated the men of Washington County, Maine, to band together during the summer of 
1824 and violently oppose British restrictions no doubt included nationalism, Anglophobia, and a 
resource ideology that favored local exploitation over external restrictions.243 But coursing 
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through these accounts was a defensiveness spawned by fears of overfishing and the loss of a 
livelihood. 
The Ruby and Reindeer Affair was not so much settled as faded from consciousness. The 
Convention of 1818 would remain in place until the 1850s as the agreement that officially 
governing American access to these fisheries. The presidential contest of 1824 no doubt 
demanded the attention of the American political community as charges of intrigue and 
corruption could easily drown out talk of fishing rights and restrictions. The coming decades 
would certainly see more American schooners captured by the British Navy for real or alleged 
infractions but a revolution in practice and the acceptance of a shifted baseline sapped some, if 
not all, urgency and fear within the cod-fishing industry, even as the shortcomings of the 
Convention of 1818 manifested themselves in more obvious and pressing ways. 
   
ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND A MOVE TOWARD DÉTENTE 
The imbroglio surrounding the fishing season of 1824 came at a pivotal moment in the 
history of American foreign relations. Less than a year earlier President James Monroe, showing 
the strategic influence of Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, articulated what would become 
known as his eponymous doctrine. “The American continents,” Monroe’s message read, “by the 
free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be 
considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.”244 These words seemed 
to be a stern warning to the nations of Europe that the Western Hemisphere would no longer 
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submit to their imperial domination. It was a startlingly assertive declaration of American foreign 
policy that, at least implicitly, claimed the entirety of the Americas as a sphere for U.S. influence 
alone. The Monroe Doctrine, as this policy statement would come to be known in the 1840s as 
the impulses of manifest destiny pushed the nation’s western boundary even further west, would 
go on to have many lives and it would influence, if not justify, a proactive American foreign 
policy for more than a century. In the process the doctrine became a key event in the history of 
American foreign relations and the standard fare of textbooks and American history surveys as a 
symbol of the growing power and assertive nature of the developing United States. This 
declaration was an example, among many, of the United States shaking off the yoke of European 
colonialism. Yet, when stripped of its subsequent history, in the 1820s this policy statement said 
as much about the United States’ relationship with Great Britain as it did about the nation’s 
relationship with its own hemisphere.  
 Perhaps the foreign policy problem that had the potential to cause the most problems for 
the United States during the 1820s were the ongoing Spanish American wars of independence. 
Beginning in the first decade of the century, peoples across the Spanish empire in the Americas 
had grown restless with European colonialism, declared their independence, and commenced a 
decades long struggle to validate that declaration. The series of wars would eventually give rise 
to a number of new nations in the Western Hemisphere, but, in the meantime, the conflicts 
presented a diplomatic challenge to the United States, and the rest of Europe for that matter.245 
Statesmen like Henry Clay, the Kentucky representative, off-and-on speaker of the house, future 
secretary of state, and perennial presidential candidate advocated for the immediate and full 
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recognition of these emerging nations, while current Secretary of State John Quincy Adams 
counseled restraint and nonintervention, lest the United States become entangled in European 
affairs. The American answer would be in the form of the Monroe Doctrine. Part of the 1823 
state of the union message, Monroe’s comments were directed at the Holy Alliance, the loose 
affiliation of reactionary European monarchies consisting of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, who 
had previously reserved the right to quell any revolution that could threaten their own security. 
While the declaration of the Holy Alliance was aimed at European movements alone, in this case 
Greek resistance to Ottoman rule, the Monroe administration feared reactionary intervention in 
the affairs of Spanish America that could upset American strategic and economic security. 
Russian activity along the northwestern coast of North America certainly did not assuage 
American fears. The final policy statement was an odd mix of anticolonialism and imperialism, 
nonintervention and proactive foreign policy. But one thing was clear, the United States 
unequivocally opposed European meddling in what it considered its hemisphere-wide sphere of 
influence.246  
 But how was the United States able to offer such a bold policy statement and expect the 
dictates of a second-rate, republican nation to be taken seriously in the courts of Europe? In a 
word: Britain. British policy makers were as apprehensive about the potential of the Holy 
Alliance intervening in the Western Hemisphere as their transatlantic counterparts where. Before 
Monroe and his cabinet had settled upon the historic doctrine, British Foreign Secretary George 
Canning had offered to issue a joint statement in warning the European monarchies of 
intervention. Britain was, of course, motivated by its own economic interest of accessing the 
emerging markets of Latin America, but there was, nonetheless, a convergence of American and 
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British aims. Ultimately, under Adams’s influence, the Monroe administration rebuffed the 
British offer and issued a unilateral declaration, but this episode came during what historian Jay 
Sexton calls “a warming of relations” as the two nations steadily retreated from conditions that 
previously brought them to arms.247 In more modern parlance, the United States was an 
international security free rider. If any European power did attempt to intervene in the western 
hemisphere the British would employ their military and naval might in opposition, leaving the 
United States free to articulate bold policy with little intention, or even ability, to enforce it. 
Scholars would be hard pressed to find keener diplomacy.  
 While the Ruby and Reindeer Affair, if not the fisheries issue generally, would give the 
impression that Anglo-American relations were fraught with problems to the point of being 
irreconcilable, putting this event alongside the Monroe Doctrine demonstrates just how difficult 
it is to characterize this relationship for much of the nineteenth century. It proves easy to define 
the relationship when it was at its most fractious—think the War of 1812—or, conversely, at its 
most cooperative—think Reagan and Thatcher—but the times in between, like the 1820s or 
maybe even the vast majority of the nineteenth century, defy simple definition. Sexton provides 
the best way through this quandary. The transatlantic relationship was most productive when 
premised on the convergence of Anglo-American interest, which did not, as the Monroe Doctrine 
illustrated, necessarily require cooperation. As Sexton concludes, “British power served as 
midwife to the rising American empire” through financial and commercial integration.248 Despite 
Anglophobia and pointed rhetoric, the United States and Great Britain could work together, yet 
such required an alignment of interests. That alignment happened in the case of the Monroe 
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Doctrine, and the string of treaties that eased tension after the War of 1812 and would crescendo 
in the 1840s even as the nations seemed to near war over the Oregon boundary. The fisheries 
issue, despite being addressed in the Convention of 1818, was perhaps the one arena in which 
Anglo-American interests remained furthest estranged and thus sheds much-needed light on the 
recesses of the relationship. But there were rare instances on the fisheries in which interests 
converged and the United States exploited British power for its own ends.  
 Despite being the main actors in the drama, the United States, Great Britain, and its 
colonial subjects were not alone. For centuries French fishermen had resorted to the waters of the 
Northwest Atlantic. By the nineteenth century, however, French ships, while free to fish the open 
waters of the banks as they pleased, were limited by treaty stipulations to a relatively confined 
inshore fishery between Cape Ray and Point Riche along the western coast of Newfoundland. 
The presence of French ships was vexatious to the British and Americans alike. During the 
fishing season of 1820 and 1821 Americans reported that “several fishing vessels of the United 
States on the coast and within the strictest territorial jurisdiction of the Island of Newfoundland 
were ordered away by the commanders of French armed vessels upon the pain of seizure and 
confiscation.” American diplomats, including Adams and Rush, disputed the French right to 
remove American fishermen from any waters in the region and protested their claim to have an 
exclusive right to fish along those coasts of Newfoundland.249 But apart from disputing the 
French claim American policy makers did little. Instead they were content to let Great Britain, 
with its superior resources, handle the problem and uphold American right.  
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 Great Britain would no doubt have looked favorably on the opportunity to restrain, or 
perhaps even remove, French competitors from the region. Furthermore, the alleged 
confrontation between the French navy and American fishermen occurred in waters off 
Newfoundland, well within Britain’s jurisdiction. In this case both American and British interests 
aligned, and American diplomats recognized it. Reflecting on the situation years later in a 
message to Adams, Rush noted that France ordering American schooners off Newfoundland 
fishing grounds put the onus on Great Britain to intervene. Rush outlined the three 
responsibilities that fell to Great Britain. First, the British had “to make good the title of the 
United States to take fish on the coast in question, as stipulated by the convention of 1818.” 
Second, if Great Britain could not do so, it must “give the United States an equivalent for the loss 
of so valuable a right.” And finally, Great Britain must “vindicate her own sovereignty over the 
island already impaired and further threatened by the conduct of the French cruizers towards the 
fishing vessels of the United States.” 250 Two years later Secretary of State Henry Clay remarked 
that “if France should again manifest an intention, and attempt, to molest our Fishermen, we 
shall except from Great Britain an effectual maintenance of their rights.”251 Essentially at the 
same time as American fishermen were brought to near blows with the British Navy, American 
diplomats expected their British counterparts to reaffirm the rights of and defend similar 
fishermen. While the simultaneity of these events suggests a kind of cognitive dissonance, it is 
illustrative of the complex nature of Anglo-American relations and how American goals, even in 
the fisheries question, still depended on British power.  
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 Despite the animosity that did, and would continue to, typify the fisheries questions, the 
1820s seemed to inaugurate a period of détente in Anglo-American relations. As Secretary of 
State Martin Van Buren noted in 1829, “There certainly never was a time better calculated for 
the improvement of the relations between the two countries than the present.”252 Earlier that 
decade Great Britain would allow the expansion of trade between the United States and the 
British West Indies, finally allowing direct shipment of fish. The détente may even have 
bloomed into a modest rapprochement at midcentury as a result of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty 
of 1842, the settlement of the Oregon Question, and, ultimately, the Marcy-Elgin Treaty of 1854. 
The fisheries question was in line with much of American diplomacy. While much friction 
attended Anglo-American relations, at times the goals of the two nations aligned and they were 
able to act in tandem, yet as the Monroe Doctrine demonstrated, the convergence of goals did not 
always depend on cooperation. But the fisheries question stands out in the broader diplomatic 
history of the United States: it remained an irritant while other problems were assuaged amid the 
growing financial and commercial integration of the two states. The view from Washington, 
however, did not always look the same as the view from the forecastle. 
 
CONSULS AND CAPTURES 
  
Early American foreign relations were conducted with little professionalism by a large 
cast of characters. While the president, the secretary of state, and State Department officials in 
ministerial posts across the globe—though primarily concentrated in Europe and the emerging 
national capitols of Latin American—were officially charged with the conduct of the nation’s 
diplomacy, people on the ground, or in most cases, water, created and executed a kind of ad hoc 
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foreign policy that could at times directly clash with dictates from Washington. Maritime 
laborers were the largest class of Americans to leave the nation’s shores and were the nation’s 
primary contact with foreign peoples and places.253 But given the commercial imperative of so 
much of the nation’s foreign relations, the consular service played an important, though only 
recently appreciated, role in facilitating American intercourse with the world beyond. With 
federal sanction and postings in ports and entrepôts across the globe, American consuls were 
uniquely situated to observe, and when necessary intervene in, the relationships between 
American individuals and enterprises, and those of other nations.254           
American consuls during the first few decades of the nineteenth century were 
disorganized and received little from Washington in the way of training or salary. They were, 
from the beginning, charged with facilitating trade and commercial opportunities and unlike the 
diplomatic core were not culled from elite, politically connected families. Instead they came 
from the merchant class and were well attuned to the commercial needs of the nation and 
themselves. They were, however, not always versed in the actual operations of their position. 
Appointed as the American consul to Halifax in 1833, John Morrow queried Secretary of State 
Louis McLane about his posting in 1834, wondering whether American consuls abroad were to 
be held to the same standards as foreign consuls to the United States were. Morrow remarked, 
“having been the first Counsel appointed in the British North American Colonies, and without a 
knowledge of the consideration, in which Counsels of other countries in the United States are 
held,” the American in Halifax requested to be informed of “the privileges, immunities, and 
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advantages…which are granted to Counsels residing in the United States.”255 Later that decade 
the American consul to Pictou, Nova Scotia, James Primrose, requested information about his 
powers in dealing with a rash of fishing schooner seizures. Primrose requested “to be fully 
informed what my powers are over seamen of the U. States in this port,” hoping such 
information would “enable me to put forth every proper effort, to arrest the progress of an evil of 
so much magnitude.”256 American consuls were sent to the field with little direction apart from a 
commercial imperative.   
Naturally the maritime world became the central concern of consular agents as ships and 
sailors were the conduits of trade. The latter would, however, become a constant source of 
friction as consuls groused to their superiors in Washington that rowdy sailors seemed too often 
to make the kind of trouble with locals that bedeviled smooth commercial relations. In the exotic 
ports of the Pacific lone consuls often found themselves attempting to minimize the fall-out as 
the racist impulses of American sailors ensured their contact with islanders was limited to 
fighting and fornicating. Such interactions made for poor diplomacy.257 Closer to home consuls 
were less concerned with restraining the impulses of maritime laborers as the commercial goals 
of fishermen and the state seemed to better align in the North Atlantic than the Far East. In the 
maritime Provinces, American consuls were not entirely consumed by confrontations and 
rambunctious seamen. One of John Morrow’s first tasks upon his appointment to Halifax was to 
secure remuneration from provincial authorities for Joseph Gorham, master of the schooner 
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Golconda of Harwich, Massachusetts, who aided the St. Joseph of St. Johns, Newfoundland. 
Captain Gorham had “broke a blood vessel…and has become convalescent,” in performing “a 
sacred duty,” by rescuing the crew of the Canadian ship that was in danger of sinking. Morrow 
successfully sought recompense for the provisions consumed by the crew of the St. Joseph after 
Captain Gorham was moved by the “principle of humanity to save the lives of so many human 
beings who were in danger of perishing.”258 This kind of cooperation was, however, not the 
norm.  
Given its prominent position in the maritime Provinces, many of the complaints 
emanating from the fisheries were directed through the consul at Halifax. Morrow reported to 
Washington in the early months of 1837 that the provincial legislature had passed an act that 
would entail stricter enforcement of Britain’s rights on the fisheries in accordance with the 
Convention of 1818—he “anticipate[d] much trouble from its operation.”259 The late 1830s and 
early 1840s would witness a spike in the number of captures for real or imagined violations of 
the three mile proscription of the 1818 treaty. The response of American fishermen would be 
largely the same—appealing to American authorities to defend their rights. The British would, 
however, develop and articulate a somewhat novel reading of the convention in an effort to bar 
American fishermen from even more waters, leaving those fisheries free for the exploitation of 
provincials alone. But fishermen from both sides would grow aggravated with the convention as 
it grew increasingly out of touch with the reality of the situation.  
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The most spectacular of these captures came during the fishing season of 1841. On 
October 4 of that year Francis Bennett, master of the schooner Mars, was deposed in Halifax for 
alleged infractions. Unlike the Ruby, Reindeer, and other schooners captured a decade and a half 
earlier, the Mars made berth at Gloucester, one of the great cod fishing ports of Massachusetts. If 
Lubec stood on the periphery of the fishing industry, Gloucester was its center. Befitting this 
position, the Mars was most likely a more capital-intensive enterprise, with a much larger 
geographic footprint. Leaving its home port on September 5, the Mars sailed through the Gut of 
Canso—the narrow strait separating Cape Breton Island from the mainland of Nova Scotia—
headed toward the fishing grounds of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, or possibly even through the 
strait of Belle Isle to the Labrador Sea. But the voyage was cut short as on September 22, while 
“almost seven marine miles from any land” the Mars was “saluted by a shot” from a vessel 
“carrying American Colours and no other flying.” Yet the ship festooned in American colors 
“proved to be the British Government cutter, although she wore the National colours of the 
United States of America.” British sailors “all armed with pistols” boarded the American 
schooner, leaving the American crew “at the mercy of the invaders.” The Mars was towed to 
Guysborough and the crew “put onshore…and there set adrift.” In his defense, Bennett claimed 
that the Mars had only engaged in fishing one day of the journey, doing so on September 19 
while “four marine miles from the land.” In many ways this was typical of fishermen 
depositions. Yet details of this capture raised questions about the place of the United States on 
the high seas. This capture was unique in that deponents claimed British ships used the American 
flag as a kind of cover to lull the American schooner into a feeling of security, making capture 
all the easier. Whether this story was true or embellished, the impression remained that the 
United States could not police the use of its flag in the maritime world. Coming at the same time 
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as illicit slave traders flew the American flag to avoid inspection by the British Navy, this 
episode suggests American sovereignty on the ocean was a fiction and perhaps even questioned 
national legitimacy.260 
Yet alongside this bizarre episode was a series of more mundane captures that when 
taken together suggested a shift in British policy. The consuls in both Halifax and Pictou 
remarked that deposed American skippers indicated that British officials had introduced a change 
in practice. First, officials in Nova Scotia began charging American ships for passage through the 
Gut of Canso, if not outright barring American fishermen from using that waterway. The 
American consul in Pictou, James Primrose, remarked that allowing this restriction set a poor 
precedent as “the Provincial Government may at any time impose such restrictions on its 
navigation as would amount to a prohibition of its use as a commodious access to the fishing 
grounds in the Gulf of Saint Lawrence.”261 Second, British officials sought to bar all American 
fishermen from the Bay of Fundy by claiming the three-mile zone off limits to Americans 
extended from an imaginary line drawn from either of the bay’s headlands. The so called 
“headland doctrine” was confirmed by the home government, as instructions to the governor of 
Nova Scotia indicated that “the proscribed distance of three miles is to be measured from the 
headland or other points of land next to the sea of the coasts; or of the entrance of the Bay, and 
not from the indention of such Bays or indents of the coast.” A report of the Commercial Society 
of Halifax noted that such an interpretation served the “double purpose of protecting the rights of 
our own fishermen and the provincial revenue.” “If the opinion lately given by the highest legal 
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authorities in the mother country be followed,” the report continued, “the value of the British 
Fisheries may at a future day be greatly enhanced.”262  
An American fisherman would later mock the logic of the headland doctrine. Following 
the capture of the schooner Argus during the summer of 1844, master William Doughty appealed 
directly to Washington in a missive to Secretary of State John C. Calhoun. Crafting a familiar 
story of helpless fishermen in an unfair world, Doughty did note that even though his ship was 
captured fifteen miles from land, “if the British construction of the Treaty is right, then no 
American can fish in the Bay of Fundy, even if he is fifty miles from any shore.” The fishermen 
would go on to sardonically suggest that, in keeping with the spirit of British policy, America 
might “draw a line from Cape Florida to Cape Cod and say that means three ‘Marine miles from 
our shores’ between these capes.”263     
For the American fishermen, the emerging status quo was untenable. The Convention of 
1818 seemed to be creating more problems, and American consuls did not fail to notice the 
shortcomings. While the deceptively clear language of the convention supposedly laid out the 
rights of American fishermen, it was the harbinger of more and greater friction. From Halifax the 
American consul noted that Britain’s instance on a stricter defense of their fisheries would be 
costly for both the United States and Great Britain. Following the capture of five fishing 
schooner during the fall of 1841 the consul reported that “unless something more definite than 
the Convention [of 1818]…shall be carried into effect, these seizures must…be a source of great 
annoyance both to the Government of the United States as well as that of Great Britain.”264 From 
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Pictou, consul James Primrose called the “almost indiscriminate seizure of American fishing 
craft,” a “great evil.”265  
But American critiques of the convention and its shortcomings were not confined to 
ruminating on larger political consequences. The treaty of 1818 was obnoxious because it did not 
comport with nature. One Yankee skipper, Isaac Smith, master of the schooner Pioneer of 
Sullivan, Maine, remarked that the three-mile limit was absurd given the nature of the 
environment of the open sea. Following his capture during the 1841 season, despite not being 
within British waters, the commander of the British vessel “endeavored to ascertain the distance 
by sailing his vessel towards the shore, calculating the distance by comparing the rate of her 
sailing as ascertained by her log, with the time spent in running the distance between the place of 
seizure and shore, but,” the testimony went on, “deponent saith that he commenced to run at least 
half a mile within the spot where deponent’s schooner had been at anchor, nor did he proceed 
nearer the shore than a quarter of a mile, and the wind at the time was so variable.” This 
convoluted deposition suggests the problems of measuring distance across the homogenous, 
undifferentiated sea. Smith concluded by observing “that it is impossible…[to] have measured 
the distance with any certainty.”266 The rigidity of the three-mile rule made little sense in a fluid 
world. 
Changes in the structure of the fishing industry and the ecology of the region also 
demonstrated the shortcomings of the Convention of 1818. By the 1840s the treaty was simply 
out of date. In 1818 cod was almost exclusively the fish of commercial importance, as had been 
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the case for centuries. As mid-century approached mackerel grew increasingly important and the 
fish’s habits and ecology demanded transgressing the artificially imposed three-mile limit. In an 
1844 dispatch to Secretary of State Abel Upshur from T. B. Livingston, consul at Halifax, the 
consul noted that mackerel catches had been “unusually large,” on account of the fact that “the 
Fish ran in shore and thus become an easy prey to the fishermen.” This habit was, however, 
problematic given the current geopolitical situation. Livingston “regretted that some better 
understanding in regard to the Fisheries could not be entered into between the United States and 
Great Britain, as the present Treaty prevents American Fishermen from taking or curing fish 
within three marine miles.” The consul continued, noting, “It is a well known fact that in order to 
take ‘Mackerel’ our fishermen must encroach within these limits, and generally escape seizure 
from out sailing the British cruisers.”267  
This sentiment was reflected in James Primrose’s observations from Pictou. Primrose did 
note that Britain’s greater vigilance on the fisheries “has had its origin in the disappointed 
feelings of Nova Scotia fishermen, on seeing themselves so far outstripped, in the successful 
pursuit of so valuable a branch of commerce, by the superior perseverance and skill of their 
enterprising neighbors.” But also owing to that vigilance was the blatant violation of the treaty 
by American fishermen, as “a tempting shoal of fish is sometime, either from ignorance or the 
excitement of the moment, followed across the prescribed limit.” While fishermen did in fact 
invade British waters, despite what their testimonies may have suggested, they were lured there 
by the prospect of hearty catches in demonstration of the convention’s faults.268 The world the 
Convention of 1818 was made for was, in fact, no longer the world these diplomats and 
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fishermen lived in. In time mackerel catching in British waters would prime the pump of a 
significant Anglo-American confrontation, but for now it gave fishermen grounds on which to 
dispute both the convention and Britain’s stricter enforcement of its provisions. American 
fishermen were, however, not alone in their growing uneasiness with the treaty.   
The perspectives of the fishermen and merchants of the British provinces were, 
understandably, not often found in the diplomatic and consular correspondence of the United 
States. Glimpses, though, do exist among these records. These fragments suggest that provincial 
subjects likewise chafed under the current fisheries regime as they groused about both American 
and French competition in the region. Like their American counterparts, provincial fishermen 
and merchants appealed to authorities while emphasizing their innocence and victimhood. In an 
odd irony both American and provincial fishermen, competitors on the water, used similar tactics 
in the hope of, surprisingly, achieving similar aims. 
A memorial of George Handley, a merchant from Halifax with interest in a number of 
fishing vessels, illustrated the kinds of complaints provincials addressed to British authorities. 
While Handley and his crews had made all the necessary arrangements for a successful fishing 
voyage, “from the interference of foreigners fishing on the British coasts,” Handley and his like 
have “been subjected to heavy loss and to disappointment painful and unexpected as result from 
circumstances against which a British subject should not be called upon to guard.” The grim 
reality of the situation for Handley was that “it is impossible for British subjects under such 
circumstances to prosecute their business…unless some protection is afforded…the British 
fisheries must be abandoned.” The fisheries issue would emerge as an important element in 
British intraimperial politics as provincial residents, like Handley, obviously had a far greater 
interest in the fisheries than other British subjects, a designation he likewise claimed. For 
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Handley and those in his employ the problem was too great a competition from French and 
American fishermen. The French had, for centuries, claimed right to fish along the western coast 
of Newfoundland. Yet as Peter McPhee, part owner with Handley of the brigantine Dove of 
Halifax, claimed the French had upset their lawful fishing. During June 1836 the Dove, while 
seining for herring in St. George’s Bay were engaged by “about forty Frenchmen, armed with 
guns,” and forced to stop fishing. The French captain, a Mr. Baullett, claimed “that British 
subjects had no right to take Fish in that Bay, or on the coast,” and that he alone possessed a 
grant from the French government to fish those waters. This story was corroborated by a number 
of the British crewmen and the Dove was forced to return home with but a fraction of the fish it 
hoped to take. Handley and his men admitted no wrongdoing, yet later a merchant from St. 
George’s Bay, John Misservey, claimed residents of the coast appealed to the French captain to 
arrest the crew of the Dove, not because they were British, but because of how they went about 
their fishing. Misservery noted that seining was “contrary to the custom of the fishing in this 
harbor, at so early a period, as by so doing the Herrings are driven out from the harbor, to the 
manifest loss and disadvantage of every fisherman here residing, and the major part of whom are 
British subject.” In all the crew of the Dove brought that misfortune upon themselves “by 
willfully and maliciously preserving, contrary to the custom of this Bay, in injuring the fishery.” 
As would become a standard part of fishery politics, how fish were caught mattered as much as 
when and where.269   
While the above incident did not directly implicate American fishermen or the 
Convention of 1818 it was indicative of how restive provincials were becoming about the state of 
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their fisheries. A report emanating from Nova Scotia’s assembly house directly attacked the 
Convention of 1818, regretting Great Britain ever gave American fishermen the right to fish 
those waters. The report appeared in the Novascotian Colonial Herald and was authored by 
James B. Uniacke, later the first premier of Nova Scotia. Uniacke did not mince words as he 
described the current state of the fisheries as “a melancholy picture of the evil consequences 
flowing from…the flagrant violation of the subsisting treaties” between the United States and 
Great Britain. The Nova Scotian traced this evil to the Treaty of Paris, the source from “which 
flowed a torrent of misfortune to the inhabitants of this Province.” Insisting that the fisheries 
were the “inherent right” of the provincials and “unquestionably belonged to Britain,” Uniacke 
continued his attack, inveighing that under the 1818 treaty “the inhabitants of this Colony have 
been a second time stripped of their natural rights.” In all, the “fatal Treaty,” deprived provincial 
subjects “their most valuable Birthright, The Fisheries.” Uniacke’s critique was not solely based 
on abstract notions of rights, but was, in part, an environmental critique. The United States posed 
a threat to the fishing commons as “the mode of taking fish by the Americans, particularly 
Mackerel, has a tendency to impair, and will ultimately destroy the fishery.”  Mackerel jigging 
was “a system destructive to the Fishery, by wounding more fish than are taken,” ultimately 
driving the fish “an immense distance form land, and beyond the reach of the Net or Shore 
fishermen.”270 Uniacke concluded with the observation that “the present situation of the fisheries 
of Nova Scotia is appalling.” While the fishery was once “close to inexhaustible source of 
wealth,” now “the whole is paralyzed by the interference of other Nations, and the people must 
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abandon the net and shore fishery,” or “follow the example of their rivals, and adopt a 
mischievous and ultimately destructive system.”271  
Fishermen and those interested in this maritime resource were, from both the United 
States and the British provinces dissatisfied with the Convention of 1818. Both sides felt the 
treaty stipulations worked to their disadvantage. While for someone like Uniacke the fisheries 
issue and complaints about the 1818 treaty may have just been a way to address larger problems 
in the province’s relationship with Great Britain, the situation on the water seemed like it was 
heading toward a more dire confrontation. Diplomats in Washington and London, however, were 
soon to inaugurate a minor, if overstated, flowering of Anglo-American relations that merely 
allowed tension on the fisheries to fester.   
In 1842 as American consuls funneled the complaints of fishermen to Washington, 
diplomats, particularly Secretary of State Daniel Webster, focused attention on larger strategic 
terms as they reconsidered the nature of Anglo-American relations. Friction on the fisheries was 
not the only issue that threatened the peaceful and productive intercourse of the transatlantic 
nations. Instead questions of the United States’ northern border, crimes subject to extradition, 
and ongoing attempts to end the transatlantic slave trade, captured the attention of Anglo-
American policymakers as the two nations again resorted to treaty making to remedy 
international irritants. The resulting agreement, the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, has been hailed 
as an important part of a kind of mid-century rapprochement between the two English speaking 
nations. Along with the settlement of the Oregon Question and the conclusion of the U.S-
Mexican War, the Webster-Ashburton Treaty was, as some historians would have it, part of 
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Great Britain finally recognizing the United States as an emerging world power and a competent 
peer. Seeing the decade of the 1840s, beginning with the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, as a 
significant turning point in Anglo-American relations, however, overlooks the degree to which 
the fisheries issue remained unresolved and a potential stumbling block in Anglo-American 
relations.     
The Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842 was negotiated in Washington by Secretary of 
State Daniel Webster and British diplomat, Lord Ashburton, scion of the prominent Baring 
banking family. Although the treaty did include provisions that finally required the United States 
to actively participate in international efforts to end the transatlantic slave trade by committing a 
certain number of vessels to the African coast, much of the treaty concerned North American 
issues. Most prominently, the treaty settled the northeastern boundary between Maine and New 
Brunswick, a question that dated to the Revolutionary era. Strangely, even though many of the 
events and issues that precipitated the treaty negotiations concerned friction along the American-
Canadian frontier—including the Caroline Affair and the resulting trial of Alexander McLeod, 
and the Aroostook War—the course of negotiations and the ultimate treaty itself remained silent 
on as old a North American question as there was: the fisheries.272 
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Such an oversight has been shared by historians of the treaty. In what is still the standard 
account of the treaty and its negotiation historian Howard Jones makes no reference to the 
fisheries question while concluding that the agreement potentially forestalled a third Anglo-
American war by fixing a relationship that neared total breakdown. As Jones would have it, the 
Webster-Ashburton Treaty affirmed, for Americans, that they had at last earned British 
approval.273 The ongoing fisheries question would, however, seem to upset those conclusions as 
Britain’s heavy handed tactics suggested the United States was still the junior partner. The 
treaty’s elision of the fisheries issue may, actually, have been symptomatic of a desire among 
diplomats for this kind of détente. The fisheries question was simply too fraught to address. 
Exposing the uneasy peace—at least as those in Washington would have seen it—that the 
fisheries experienced under the Convention of 1818 to greater scrutiny would have brought to 
light its shortcomings and the necessity of a full scale revision. In a rare case of choosing 
political expediency over this maritime resource, fishermen and fish took a back seat to other 
geopolitical goals. The American government opted to kick the fisheries can further down the 
road in favor of a de-escalation of what policymakers feared was a more immediate threat. The 
personalities of these diplomats in particular, Webster and Ashburton, were central to the 
conclusion of this agreement as both men, for personal, cultural, and financial reasons, favored 
conciliation to confrontation, finesse to friction.274 In time the fisheries issue would return to the 
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top of the Anglo-American political agenda as Britain’s embrace of free trade in 1846 would 
change the calculus of the relationship, but for now Americans overlooked protests from the 
fisheries in favor of an unstable peace on the water and settling other concerns. In the face of 
diplomatic stasis, however, the fishing went on.    
 
“OUR LIVING IS TRULY THAT OF FISHERMEN”  
 
 After slow growth during the 1830s, and the mackerel industry even bottoming out 
following the Panic of 1837, the 1840s would witness both cod and mackerel fishermen 
experience rising catches as they committed more men and ships to the endeavor, even if catch 
efficiencies dropped, indicating an ecosystem straining to accommodate the loss of more and 
more biomass. But in the face of bigger loads of fish coming in, such fretting failed to stop 
processes already in motion. Those schooners that left their New England berths during this 
decade to extract wealth from the seas, were all largely motivated by similar desires, and used 
similar tactics in pursuing their goals. No vessel was more extraordinary than any other. Yet one 
schooner did leave what is perhaps a unique trace on the historical record, offering a singular 
perspective on the American fisheries at midcentury.  
 In the summer of 1847 the schooner Mary C. Ames left Newburyport, Massachusetts, 
headed for a the cod fishing grounds of Newfoundland and Labrador. She carried the usual 
assortment of men who made fishing voyages. They most likely ranged in age from their teens to 
their forties; some were lifelong mariners, while others worked shipboard seasonally as they 
spent the rest of the year as agricultural laborers; and they all probably had some connection to 
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Newburyport, if not a familial connection to each other.275 But among this group was someone 
unique: a diarist.276 Including the perspectives of maritime laborers is certainly not a novel twist 
on writing maritime history; including the remarks of an unnamed diarist aboard a fishing 
schooner during the mid-nineteenth century, however, might be.277 The nature of the labor 
accounts for this discrepancy. During the nineteenth century a whaling voyage, for instance, took 
men away from their homes for years, leaving them much idle time to write—some even 
learning to do so on such voyages—carve scrimshaw, and in other ways create physical artifacts 
of their time at sea. Cod fishing, however, was quite different. Typical voyages lasted mere 
months, if not weeks, making this kind of record keep difficult given the short duration of time at 
sea and the intensity of labor. Although this diary, by its very uniqueness, offers an idiosyncratic 
perspective on the cod fishing industry of nineteenth-century America, it offers a wealth of 
information. 
 The schooner that departed Newburyport in June 1847 was different from the schooners 
captured in the Bay of Fundy more than two decades earlier—she was bigger, newer, and made 
for much longer voyages. The Mary C. Ames was built in 1845 in Newburyport by James L. 
Townsend and William Currier. She carried 108 tons, much larger and more sea worthy than the 
Maine schooners that made quick jaunts to the Bay of Fundy. Instead, the Mary C. Ames sailed 
many times farther, for the Newfoundland fishing grounds, or even through the Strait of Belle 
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Isle for the Labrador Sea. She took a complement of approximately a dozen sailors, which, in 
1847, would have included our unnamed diarist.278  
Little is known of the diary keeper as the diary was left unsigned. What we do know, 
however, is that the diarist made the voyage in order to improve his health. While it seems 
counterintuitive that anyone would believe in the palliative effects of maritime labor, notoriously 
dangerous work that it was (and still is), the diary is littered with references to his health, 
wellbeing, and his meditations on death. From his arrival in Newburyport the diarist commented 
on the salubrity of the maritime environment, noting that “I should think it must be quite healthy 
here in consequence of the purity of the atmosphere. The buildings are not so crowded together 
here, as they are in many places.”279 Just as good health was his goal, death and his own 
mortality were never far from his mind. Upon seeing a cemetery in Newburyport the diarist 
remarked that there “all lie entombed together, locked in the embrace of death! O! Proud man! 
What are all the boastings in thy vain-glorious strength! Thou will soon be as a thing of naught; 
as the dust which is scattered upon the strange winds.” Later during the voyage “a brother sailor 
and fishermen” had died from an unspecified malady, leaving the diarist to wax poetic on 
mortality. “Alas!” he intoned, “For the vanity of human existence: Death is upon us in the midst 
of Life.” Yet the diarist felt “melancholy was begotten in my bosom,” when he considered the 
deceased fisherman was left so far from home and the comfort of kin, and instead died “in the 
hand of strangers.”280 These musing on life and death made invocations of the divine a theme 
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running through his writing, he clearly was moved by a sense of religiosity, yet his most 
rhapsodic passages were reserved for describing the divine creation of the environments that 
surrounded him. 
With an eye for the Romantic and sublimity of the environment the diarist aboard the 
Mary C. Ames was awestruck by the aesthetic experience of the maritime world. The diarist 
needed no more proof of divine creation, remarking how the churning of an ocean squall stirred 
“up most intense feelings of beauty and sublimity, and awakens a reverence for Him who rules 
the storm which are never experienced amid the dull monotony of land.” The northern reaches of 
the voyage brought the diarist into direct contact with entirely foreign environments for him. The 
aurora borealis, the diarist remarked, “was most brilliantly shining, and threw halo of light over 
the whole scene making it grand beyond the conception of him who never witnessed it.” Along 
the coasts of Newfoundland and Labrador, significantly further north than his native 
Massachusetts, the diarist was taken aback by the unusual times of sunrise and sunset. In 
response to a three o’clock sunrise, the diarist wrote, “the wildness of the scenery, the great 
change in day and night, and the deep almost speaking solitude of the place all conspire to induce 
such a feeling of romance into my mind, that I can hardly believe it all a reality.”281       
Of more immediate concern for the diarist and his health, however, was seasickness. 
Days long gaps pepper the diary as the writer was left “unable to write…because of seasickness.” 
He described restless nights “spent in walking the deck stopping occasionally to vomit over the 
side of the vessel.” And at one point declared himself “ready to die of sea-sickness.”282 Taken 
with his declaration on June 8 that he began “to feel quite easy on ship board,” and that he 
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“highly enjoy[ed] the change from the hustle of land, to the quietness of the ocean,” his 
adjustments to shipboard life suggests that the diarist was neither a seasoned fishermen nor a 
sailor of any kind—a true greenhorn, in fact. But the observations of a non-professional—
someone less familiar with the operations and politics of the industry—still has much to offer on 
both the mundane and the extraordinary aspects of a fishing voyage.   
Much of the unnamed diarist’s attention was, unsurprisingly, devoted to the labor of 
fishing and the routines of shipboard life. Despite his early observation that “unremitting labor 
has a debasing influence on the mind,” the diarist labored shoulder-to-shoulder with his fellow 
crewmates in their arduous task. Fishing was of course the primary occupation, but was neither 
steady nor predictable. At times the diarist complained of having spent “nearly twenty 
hours…since I arose from my couch of boards,” on account of the constant demands of fishing. 
On June 21s he commented that “all hands [were] out fishing,” yet only two days later there were 
“not many fish this morning.” Later that same week, on June 25, the diarist reported that “no fish 
[were] caught today,” and two days later he noted “we went after fish but found no Cod.” Yet 
that very same day he reported dressing more than 1,400 fish that had previously been brought 
in. The actual act of fishing was not the only kind of labor necessary aboard these ships as the 
fish caught were gutted on board, ready to be air dried and salted on shore before being packed 
in barrels for shipment. The diarist commented on learning how to dress the fish, noting on June 
19 that “we have caught some fish today, contrary to our expectations and I have a trail at 
dressing not so as I had anticipated—guess I can ‘go it’ after a little practice.” A few days later 
he reported dressing “3 or 4 hundred” fish, a numbered he considered “not many,” but describe 
the labor as having “g[a]ve me some trouble, my hands are sore and feel rather disagreeable.” By 
July 6, the diarist reported having “dressed about 1,000 fish and today am at work quite 
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steadily,” with another 1,300 cod on deck after having spent the previous couple days recovering 
from a cut on his finger severe enough to require stitches.283 Yet despite the dangers and tedium 
of dressing the fish, it was a welcome job to the back-breaking labor of rowing. 
“Heading fish,” the anonymous diarist declared, “is not so bad as rowing boat.” These 
fishing expeditions used smaller, human-powered boats, variously called dories or tag boats, for 
reasons including going to shore in order to resupply the ship with wood and water. But they 
were used for fishing as well. As fishermen sensed the changes in the sea during the middle 
decades of the nineteenth century, they adapted their technology to the situation in order to pull 
more life from the oceans. Over the course of the next decade these fishermen would employ 
longlines but for the time being they continued to use single-hook hand lines, yet did so from 
smaller tag boats, away from the main schooner, to expanded the ship’s fishing footprint. The 
diarist described this mode of fishing. These tag boats were also used for catching bait. Using a 
kind of vertical hanging net—seine, in fishing parlance—fishermen were sent out in these 
rowboats to gather the kind of forage fish that would bait the hooks that brought in the valuable 
cod. Gathering bait required miles of rowing at a time, leaving the diarist to remark, “I think I 
shall either be killed or cured this summer. Plenty of work on hand, more coming.”284         
Storms and squalls created work, too. On June 9, for instance, as the Mary C. Ames 
passed Halifax, the diarist noted that while at one time the sea was “a beautiful emblem of peace 
and calmness of mind,” inclement weather now made the oceans act “as if it were a thing 
possessed of life, and filled with passion, the rough waves are angrily chasing each other, 
fanning as they go, like ten thousand wars steeds pursuing after each other in the confusion of 
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battle.” The ship “would reel to an angle of 41 degrees” allowing water “into the forecastle and 
wet[ting] all our berths.” This kind of weather would have forced all hands on deck to steady the 
ship until the storm passed, then left the crew to literally pick up the pieces. Such storms could 
necessitate dozens of hours of uninterrupted labor. But even in the best of conditions life aboard 
a fishing schooner afforded few comforts. On June 17, when the ice-choked Strait of Belle Isle 
finally allowed clear passage, the diarist commented that “the weather is very cold this 
morning…clothes wet and the wind is blowing upon us, no fire to be got at.” In all, “not the most 
pleasant circumstances imaginable surely,” he concluded. The food, a tedious menu limited to 
codfish, potatoes, and coffee, likewise offered like respite. Back-breaking labor, dangerous 
weather, and meager creature comforts left the diarist with only one conclusion, that “our living 
is truly that of fishermen.” The diarist did, however, seem to take comfort in the company of his 
fellow fishermen, remarking on the sagacity and good nature of his crewmates. “Social 
endearment,” he remarked, “are the brightest and purest of man’s privileges, they are the Oasis in 
the desert of cane and turmoil of life, they enliven, refresh, and renew man’s wearied powers.” 
He did not find such charm in all of the ship’s crew, reserving his ire for a Mr. Sylvester, whom 
our diarist remarked was “universally disliked and has not as I have discerned one redeeming 
quality about him.”285 The life of North Atlantic fishermen was indeed a rough one, but poor 
food and rough weather were not the only agents of the fishermen’s difficulties.  
Sailing from Newburyport to Newfoundland obviously took the Mary C. Ames near, and 
in some cases through, British waters. The diarist and his crewmates had no choice but to face 
the political arrangements and diplomatic dealings that, to a significant extent, determined how 
fishermen interacted with this maritime resource and environment. Some passages did reflect an 
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appreciation for the political context that shaped the experience. The body of maritime laborers 
that composed ordinary fishing crews was to a certain extent multinational. Differing conditions 
on either side of the U.S./Canadian divide encouraged the portability of labor.286 But fishing 
crews were a far cry from the polyglot, multiethnic, multicultural groups that could be found 
aboard ostensibly American ships in the Pacific. The Mary C. Ames and the diarist aboard were 
undoubtedly, in provenance, privilege, and outlook, American. Affirming those patriotic ties, the 
diarist commented on the revelry that the crew met the anniversary of American independence. 
“The ‘glorious fourth,’” the diarist declared, “has come and gone with its many hallowed 
recollections. To us it seemed a jovial day although in a foreign land. Pleasant emotions aimed as 
we think of home and its happy inmates never before were we away from out native land on our 
birthday of freedom.” This last statement may have been a bit of an overstatement as, for 
seasoned fishermen, the Fourth of July annually came during the middle of fishing season. But 
that point aside, the diarist seemed to closely identify with a sense of American nationalism.287  
Like his American brethren, the diarist held prejudiced views of the subjects of British 
America. The diarist did not view British Canadians as competitors in the fishing industry, so his 
comment that “the inhabitants are not much above brutes, pitiable objects surely,” was not borne 
of competition or jealousy. His comments smack of a feeling of superiority as he elsewhere 
noted that other residents rely on wild game, not fishing or agriculture, implicitly suggesting a 
lesser existence. The only other residents of the area the Mary C. Ames came across were “some 
Indian squaws” who were “dressed in true Indian style” of which the diarist called “quite an 
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interesting sight.”288 Fishermen would have no doubt felt themselves superior to these first nation 
peoples as American mariners of all stripes carried with them American-bred stereotypes of 
native peoples across the globe.289 But clearly the diarist’s most cutting words were saved for the 
Anglo inhabitants of the maritime provinces. This sentiment resonated with more popular 
thought of the day. Amid the pointed fishery dispute with Great Britain during the summer of 
1852, Massachusetts Congressman Zeno Scudder had choice words for his northern neighbors. 
Demonstrating a certain disdain, Scudder remarked, in a statement that was born of economic 
competition in a way the diarist’s was not, that Canadian fishermen could be hired for far less 
than their American counterparts because the Canadian’s “manner of living and educating their 
children…is far below that of the fishermen of the States.”290 Insults were easy to hurl in the us-
versus-them game of national rivalries. But as the diarist realized, the American fishermen’s 
greatest rival was Great Britain, the nation most responsible for the geographic restrictions the 
fishing industry labored under. 
The diarist could not help but notice the asymmetries of resource access the Convention 
of 1818 created. Early on in the voyage he observed that not all waters were created equal. The 
diary-keeper-turned-fisherman noted that the waters off Cape Sable, the southernmost point of 
Nova Scotia, were rich in fish. “Fish appear to be very plenty, but” the diarist lamented, 
“American vessels are not allowed to fish there,” as a result of the restrictions imposed by the 
Convention of 1818.291 Although this particular observer was neither a seasoned fisherman nor a 
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life-long resident upon the waves, there is no question that maritime laborers were well aware 
and knowledgeable of the diplomatic and political contexts that shaped, and at times 
circumscribed, their lives and economic opportunities. Though removed from the formal 
channels of diplomacy, these ordinary workers were still very much so part of it, at times 
complying with its dictates, while at other times resisting.292  
The story of the Ruby and Reindeer was not the only instance of fishermen actively 
resisting the enforcement of treaty stipulations that ran counter to their interests. Robert Bayley, 
captain and owner of the Mary C. Ames, related to the ship’s diary keeper a story indicative of 
how American fishermen attempted to undercut British efforts to enforce the restrictions of the 
1818 treaty. The story, as the diarist recorded it, described how “an American vessel…found 
fishing in waters forbidden by the treaty…was seized by an English man-of-war.” The captain of 
that unnamed vessel—the story was short on those kinds of details—did not intend to meekly 
submit to his British captors and “prior to the seizure [he] sent below seven or eight of his hands 
and put them in some hogsheads.” As was customary in these sort of captures the English captain 
left a small number of his sailors aboard the fishing schooner to sail the renegade ship back to a 
British port. Yet in the course of doing so “the bottled up Americans came on deck in due time 
and with the assistance of their comrades being now the superior number ordered the English 
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crew to give the ship.” The American fishermen had retaken their vessel and gave those British 
sailors “their choice between being thrown overboard, going to the states, or going on shore in a 
boat,” of which they chose the latter. In all, the diarist reflected on this episode as “illustrative of 
the ingenuity of Yankee sailors.”293 It was no surprise that the diarist, and presumably his fellow 
fishermen, was captivated by the drama of their clandestine brethren and countrymen springing 
forward at a key moment to retake their ship in what was a microcosm of so much of early 
American foreign relations. These fishermen lived up to the most idealized versions of 
themselves—bold, patriotic, resourceful. But was this story true? 
The multitude of stories found in congressional reports, speeches, newspapers, and 
diplomatic and consular correspondence that described the capture of American fishing vessels 
shared a similar structure and tone. This story related to the diarist, however, bears little 
resemblance to those other stories, suggesting it was either an entirely exceptional case (unlikely) 
or was perhaps a fabrication that circulated as fact. Fishermen resisting their captors, while odd, 
was certainly not exceptional among these tales. What set this telling apart had more to do with 
audience. The stories fishermen told that were intended for federal officials or a wider public 
emphasized that they had done nothing wrong, even giving their exact location from the shore in 
an attempt to build sympathy and support for their entirely lawful enterprises. This awareness 
demonstrated savvy political minds among these maritime laborers. The story recorded in the 
diary, however, made no such pretension, freely admitting that this particular ship had indeed 
violated treaty stipulations and was subject to lawful capture. This story, told by and for 
fishermen, perhaps did more to reinforce their own self-understanding, one that resonated with 
the popular rhetoric surrounding this class of maritime laborers. Whether this particular story 
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was based on actual events or not may be irrelevant, as the fact that it was told in this context 
suggests these fishermen bought in to, and perhaps even shaped, popular perceptions of their 
service. But in any event this episode did relate how fishermen understood and engaged with the 
political and diplomatic contexts that surrounded their vocation, showing they were not passive 
subjects acted on by elite policymakers.   
 At the close of the 1840s the Anglo-American relationship was remarkably placid. The 
previous couple decades witnessed the residual ardor and unanswered questions of America’s 
second war for independence largely melt away as a series of resolutions occasioned a short-
lived, if still important, transatlantic détente. Anglophobia, always a powerful, if at times 
limiting, political tool, had to some degree subsided as stable borders and a newly taken 
continental empire suggested the United States had shed at least some of its early-national 
insecurities and become Great Britain’s peer. The view from Washington was optimistic; the 
view from the fisheries, however, was not.  
 For American fishermen the Convention of 1818, a treaty intended to bring order to the 
fisheries, was a failure. The agreement was unable to accommodate the ecological or industrial 
changes that governed how and where fishermen plied their craft. In fact, the treaty only created 
conditions for more captures and more confrontations that could, yet never did, interrupt the 
ameliorative trajectory of American diplomacy with Great Britain. As the 1820s, 1830s, and 
1840s saw fishermen pursuing new species, primarily mackerel, with new technologies, 
primarily the mackerel jig, and as a result ran afoul of the restrictive Convention of 1818, little 
changed diplomatically. In 1820, as in 1850, the 1818 treaty governed fishery access and waters 
within three miles of British provincial coasts remained off limits to American fishermen. The 
incongruity between how the fisheries were governed and how they operated aroused protest 
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from the fishermen, but the dissonance was not enough to spur policymakers given political 
developments elsewhere. Perspective mattered mightily during these decades. 
 Fishermen did what they could in this climate, appealing to the federal government when 
necessary and outright resisting the British Navy when able. Fishermen were unequivocally 
political actors who used whatever methods they could to claim a stake in the acts of diplomacy. 
But they alone seemed unable to force a change; an outside shift was needed. Such a shift came 
in 1846 as Great Britain repealed the Corn Laws, embraced free trade, and waged an 
international campaign to bring nations, including the United States, in to the free trade fold. The 
British would ultimately use the fisheries to exert pressure on the United States to achieve this 
political aim. Both looking from Washington and looking from the forecastle, observers would 
witness immense changes over the next couple decades.     
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CHAPTER 4: SEA CHANGES IN FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLITICS, 1846–1860 
 
At midcentury Anglo-American relations seemed to be entering a new phase. The 
Caroline and MacLeod Affairs, as well as the Aroostook War seemed to be settled by the 
Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842. In some cases this single agreement assuaged disputes that 
had simmered since independence. The saber-rattling of the Oregon Question was silenced in 
1848. And America’s convincing victory in the U.S.-Mexican War seemed to announce to the 
world, Britain first and foremost, that the former colonials had become full-fledged imperialists. 
The 1840s was a period of immense change in the tenor of Anglo-American relations. Yet the 
Fisheries Dispute of 1852 reveals the extent to which, despite a continental empire and stable 
borders, the United States remained a second-rate nation in Britain’s Atlantic world. British 
warships arrived upon the fishing grounds in an effort to strong-arm the United States into 
accepting a trade agreement that American leaders had shown little interest in. While the 1840s 
seemed to portend a fundamental shift in transatlantic relations, the fisheries issues demonstrated 
the degree to which the United States remained the inferior partner.294 
Domestically the fisheries issues became embroiled in the sectional politics that often 
defines histories of the 1850s. Because of its close association with territorial expansion and 
federal bounties, the antebellum fishing industry became a locus for questions about the 
relationship between the federal government and individual sections of the Union to be debated. 
While for much of the antebellum period the fisheries questions remained, surprisingly enough, 
immune to the sectional wrangling between free and slave state, by the end of the 1850s this 
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sectional fracture was mapped onto debates that seemed to center on the fisheries. In the process 
debates, over annexing Canada and the federal cod fishing bounty became debates about the 
meaning and nature of Union itself. In the end it should come as no surprise that questions of 
Union were inherent in the fisheries issues since the relationship between the fisheries and 
American nationalism ran deep.  
 
CHANGES IN THE SEA 
 
The summer of 1852 witnessed the most pointed nineteenth-century diplomatic exchange 
between the United States and Great Britain over the North Atlantic fisheries. British officials 
dispatched warships to the contested region with orders to bar American fishermen from the 
fishing grounds. Secretary of State Daniel Webster, speaking from his home in Marshfield, 
Massachusetts, offered an unequivocal vow that the federal government would stand with the 
nation’s fishermen. “Be assured,” Webster intoned to a crowd that welcomed him home, “the 
interest will not be neglected by this administration, under any circumstances,” and, in words 
that no doubt resonated with the inhabitants of a seaside town, “the fishermen shall be protected 
in all their right of property, and in all their rights of occupation…hook and line, and bob and 
sinker.” As Webster noted, the hardy sons of Neptune who exploited the piscine wealth of the 
North Atlantic were “the very nurseries of our navy,” and thus an essential component of 
American statecraft. Webster’s claim for America’s uninterrupted access of these waters was one 
based in custom, fallaciously claiming that “the pursuits of our citizens…had been carried on 
more than thirty years without interruption or molestation…in the same waters and on the same 
coast.”295 
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 Webster appealed to the Convention of 1818, but he overlooked shifts in imperial politics 
that, by 1852, made the fisheries a coercive element in Britain’s drive to incorporate the United 
States in the emerging international system of free trade. By invoking a thirty year period 
“without interruption or molestation,” Webster decontextualized the American fishing industry 
from the vagaries of Anglo-American relations, but also hinted at an unnatural gulf between the 
political situation on the sea and the ecological changes in the sea. The middle decades of the 
nineteenth century were marked by flux. Changes in transatlantic politics, as well as changes in 
the Atlantic itself, made possible the confrontation that erupted in the summer of 1852. Neither 
politics nor environments were static.  
 Environmental change was a necessary part of this diplomatic dispute. Owing to 
centuries of climatic change and fishery pressures, the middle decades of the nineteenth century 
witnessed significant shifts in how, where, and what kinds of fish Americans pursued in the 
north Atlantic. These changes were as important as Britain’s ostensibly diplomatic goals in how 
this conflict unfolded. The political and the environmental, then, aligned in such a way to offer 
insights on the fundamental nature of Anglo-American relations. The state of Anglo-American 
relations marks the diplomatic correspondence of these two nations. But the state of the 
environment is also inscribed upon such official discourse. The confluence of these two, 
intertwined archives, that of humans and that of nature, demonstrate the degree to which 
diplomacy, if not the entirety of the American and British states, were at the sufferance of 
nature.296  
 Understanding how the fisheries issue came to a head in the summer of 1852 requires an 
environmental perspective on nineteenth-century Anglo-American relations. The so-called 
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postcolonial readings of early American history posit that American identity formed in the 
liminal space between the pride of independence and revulsion of continued reliance on British 
cultural mores. This existing work, however, privileges political and cultural perspectives when 
the environment, and this maritime resource, served as an arena for both national self-definition 
and acute anxiety born of a sense of inferiority.297        
 The fisheries issue laid bare fundamental aspects of the Anglo-American relationship that 
otherwise remained obscured. While the environment may seem to be an issue far from the 
minds of diplomats, especially in an era anterior to the age of environmentalism, the Fisheries 
Dispute of 1852 provides an excellent example of how foreign relations is rendered 
incomprehensible without acknowledging the environmental context as well.298 This episode 
argues for the efficacy of the concept of “deep contingency,” as articulated by historian Edward 
L. Ayers in his study of Civil War causation. But this diplomatic dispute suggests the myopia of 
understanding contingency as a product of human society alone. Instead the convergence of 
trends in the summer of 1852 makes an eloquent case for including the environment in “the 
dense and intricate connections in which lives and events are embedded.”299   Diplomatic change 
and environmental change constantly interacted, the intercourse of human enterprises was 
predicated upon the nonhuman world. Politics and the environment conspired in the summer of 
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1852 to pit the United States and Great Britain against each other in an intense, albeit brief, 
conflict that was millennia in the making.  
Two important, at least from the human perspective, elements of the ecology of the North 
Atlantic are the Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua) and Atlantic mackerel (Scomber scombrus). The 
conditions created by the climate, geology, and chemistry of the North Atlantic made it a 
welcoming home for these fish. Cod and its gadoid relatives are largely non-migratory, 
preferring to stay in the region’s relatively cool waters year round to feed upon capelin and small 
crustaceans. While those cod that live at the extreme northern and southern reaches of their 
geographic range regularly follow favorable ocean temperatures as the seasons dictate. All cod, 
however, make a vertical migration over the course of their lives as the juvenile fish spawn in 
open surface waters before descending to their preferred benthic habitat upon maturity. Cod most 
often spawn offshore where they spend much of their life cycle.300 
 Atlantic mackerel, on the other hand, are decidedly migratory. Like their tuna and bonito 
relatives, mackerel regularly range to warmer waters as far south as the Mid-Atlantic Bight. 
Mackerel follow a seasonal rhythm traveling northeastward after overwintering in mid-Atlantic 
waters as the spring’s rising temperatures allow. In certain years with favorably warm 
temperatures mackerel have ranged as far south as the Carolinas and as far north as the Strait of 
Belle Isle and the Labrador Sea. These fish are most at home in the open water and do not shy 
away from coming inshore, especially in the spring as they head north. Both cod and mackerel, 
like most all fish, have much of their life cycles dictated by ocean temperatures. Migrations, food 
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availability, maturation, and reproduction are all processes that depend on the ever-fluctuating 
temperatures of the ocean.301  
Over the past fifteen thousand years the earth’s climate has shifted often, sometimes even 
violently, but only over the past handful of centuries have these changes been brought to bear on 
the human world through the fisheries. The climate history of the past millennia, as best 
understood, is marked by three distinct and dramatic climate swings. The first, lasting to about 
the onset of the fourteenth century, was a period of relative warmth known as the Medieval 
Warm Period. This was followed by a period of cooling, the Little Ice Age, that lasted well into 
the nineteenth century. Finally the past couple centuries have been marked by a significant and 
unprecedented warming as humans have altered the chemistry of the atmosphere and ocean. But 
it is the Little Ice Age that most concerns the fisheries. It was during this period that Europeans 
first began sailing further and further west in search of cod as their home stocks began declining. 
It was likewise during this period that fishermen of all provenances began the alteration, or 
perhaps more accurately the destruction, of the northwest Atlantic’s fisheries. But this period of 
cooling itself had in store its own changes that influenced the nature of human action. The effects 
of such changes were felt most acutely during the summer of 1852.302                                      
 The Fisheries Dispute of 1852 came at the “last gasps” of the Little Ice Age. Across 
North America the second quarter of the nineteenth century was marked by a rapid decline in 
temperatures. Bioproductivity declined as plankton responded to cooler temperatures with lower 
yields and cod bore the ill-effects of this cooling. Cod, despite being a cold water fish, was 
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unequipped to contend with such a significant cooling. As temperatures dipped below the 
optimal threshold for spawning and growth the population of cod in the northwest Atlantic 
declined. By 1850 cod had disappeared from the western coast of Greenland with Newfoundland 
experiencing a dramatic decline as well. By the middle of the nineteenth century the environment 
of the northwest Atlantic no longer supported such a large community of cod for fishermen of all 
nations to exploit. While cod numbers declined significantly amid this cooling, mackerel fared 
better, if only marginally.303 
 Mackerel were not as devastated by the cooling of the mid-nineteenth century. Although 
their migratory range was severely curtailed, failing to even reach Newfoundland, these fish 
remained in relatively warmer waters as the southern contingent overwintered and spawned in 
mid-Atlantic waters. The northern contingent of mackerel may have been severely weakened by 
the cooling trend, but mackerel continued to reach at least the Bay of Fundy, the shores of Nova 
Scotia, and some of the more southerly banks during its summer migration. The climatic cooling 
of the nineteenth century created an ecology that, by the 1850s, faced a significant decline in the 
cod population while allowing for a relative rise in mackerel. Fishermen responded accordingly. 
This period could be characterized as one of crisis and created tension among fishermen as long 
held practices were forced to change to accommodate new environmental realities. Yet the 
political practices that governed the fisheries failed to change as American fishermen devoted 
more attention than ever to pursuing and catching the inshore-dwelling mackerel.304  
                                                
303 Rose, Cod, 70–71, 284–286; Ottersen et al., “The Response of Fish Populations to Ocean Climate Fluctuations,” 
74–77; Bolster, The Mortal Sea, 122–124; Kenneth F. Drinkwater et al., “The Response of Marine Ecosystems to 
Climate Variability Associated with the North Atlantic Oscillation,” in The North Atlantic Oscillation: Climate 
Significance and Environmental Impact, Geophysical Monograph 134 (Washington, D.C., American Geophysical 
Union, 2003), 221–222. 
 
304 Rose, Cod, 117–118; Ottersen et al., “The Response of Fish Populations to Ocean Climate Fluctuations,” 80; 
Bolster, The Mortal Sea, 103–104; Bigelow and Schroeder, 234, 527–528. 
  
 
196 
            Amidst the environmental changes that operated at decade and century long scales, 
largely beyond the reach or influence of humans, was a veritable revolution in the fishing 
industry.  This “fishing revolution,” a term noted by historian W. Jeffrey Bolster, was part of a  
larger set of changes most often simplified with the term “modernization,” that include 
“mechanization, technological innovation, product development, market expansion, and the 
cultural acceptance of—and legal justification for—possessive individualism.” These changes 
reinforced, contradicted, and in every way interacted with the shifting environments of the region 
with profound ecological and political ramifications. While other industries at this time radically 
changed with the coming and growing sophistication of mechanization, fishing largely remained 
an industry dependent upon the energies of wind and human muscle. But this in no way limited 
the destruction wrought by its practitioners. The most significant changes would prove to be 
those in the technology of the gear employed. Seining, which is to say net fishing, made 
capturing fish a more efficient, if indiscriminate endeavor as producing nets became cheaper and 
easier during the middle decades of the nineteenth century. Another important change, especially 
as it related to the cod fishery was the adoption of long line technology. For literal centuries cod 
fishing was performed by individuals who were able to tend, at most, a few hooks apiece. But 
with the adoption of long lines—also known as tub-trawling, set-lining, and bultow fishing—
individual fishermen could set lines, each with hundreds of hooks, on weighted ground lines. 
These two adoptions, seine and long line fishing, demanded even more fish and shell fish as bait 
and resulted in the significant growth of by-catch as catches rose dramatically. This, of course, 
came with a host of ecological consequences as fishermen began to realize their unchecked 
efforts were changing the seas as the seas themselves changed. While this fact was hotly debated 
among fishermen and ichthyologists alike, the situation on the fisheries became more dire when 
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fishermen continued their ruthless assault on the environment with little regard for their piscine 
prey or political neighbors. Although fishermen failed to curtail their efforts they labored under 
the fear that such changes may undercut their livelihood. When American citizens and British 
subjects confronted each other in the summer of 1852 they did so in a world where 
environmental and ecological changes fostered such tension.305 
 
THE FISHERIES DISPUTE OF 1852: A FISH-EYED VIEW 
 While the environmental conditions that made the dispute of 1852 possible were long in 
the making, the proximate cause was much more recent—simply put, it was free trade. Reform 
was everywhere in midcentury Britain as the concerned among the queen’s subjects attacked 
issues ranging from the empire’s embrace of slavery to the narrowness of the elected franchise. 
While these causes met success during the 1830s, it was during the 1840s that the reform-minded 
aimed at no less than a revolution in the intercourse of nations. This was to be done through 
shedding the mercantilist inspired trade restrictions that still yoked the empire, if not all of 
mankind. By 1846 and the repeal of the Corn Laws, Great Britain’s most substantive free trade 
policy decision, the political community in Britain waxed rhapsodically. A writer in the 
Manchester Times and Gazette even went to so far as to claim that “free-trade is civilization, and 
prohibition is barbarism.” Such a policy would do nothing short of remaking the world and 
represent a watershed moment in human history since with “liberty of commerce,” the world 
would “defy religious rancour, wars, famine, poverty, all the evils which have hitherto been the 
heritage of humanity to perpetuate their existence. Believe not this to be a question of purely 
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material interests; it is one intimately connected with morality and intelligence.”306 Obviously 
Great Britain had high hopes for what free trade would do, not only economically but also 
politically, and morally. The enforcement of this revolution in human sentiment would, however, 
require the Royal Navy, as Americans were still, by 1852, uninclined to so eagerly adopt the 
British free trade directive.307 
With this sea change in Britain’s imperial policies, the British administration sought the 
world’s acquiescence. The loss of imperial preference meant Britain’s North American colonies 
stood to lose much in a new world of free trade. Thus Britain endeavored to entice the United 
States into offering its northern neighbors a favorable trade agreement in order to vent Canada’s 
surplus production of lumber, wheat, and coal. The United States, itself a producer of these 
commodities, was, however, slow to action. Secretary of State Daniel Webster made clear why 
Congress was disinclined to offer the British provinces any trading agreement, remarking to 
Henry Layton Bulwer, the British minister to the United States, that simply “the bill seems much 
more advantageous to Canada than to us,” since “we give her a large market, and she gives us a 
small one, for articles which are the common products of both.”308 The British minister sought to 
entice Webster with a carrot instead of the usual stick of British diplomacy. If, Bulwer intimated, 
the United States enacted legislation amicable to the commercial needs of Canada, Americans 
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would be guaranteed free access to the St. Lawrence and, more importantly, the expansion of 
fishing rights on the coasts of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia.309 Still unmoved, Webster left 
the cause of North American free trade to flounder.   
Not content with American foot dragging on an issue as important as free trade, in 1852 
the newly installed Derby ministry turned the carrot of North Atlantic fishing rights into the stick 
of coercion. In early July, in the midst of the fishing season John Crampton, the new British 
minister to the United States, delivered to Daniel Webster notice that ships from the Royal Navy 
would be stationed in those waters in order to enforce a strict interpretation of the Convention of 
1818.310 While Crampton failed to make an explicit connection between reciprocal trade with the 
British provinces and the fisheries issues, it was clear to Webster that British leaders sought to 
use the latter in order to accomplish the former, and at a time when the coastal waters off limits 
to American fishermen were particularly valuable given shifts in the industry and changes in the 
sea. 
Two weeks elapsed before Webster made public his reaction to Britain’s heavy-handed 
tactics. At the heart of the matter was the status of bays and inlets. Britain asserted that the three 
miles of territorial waters extended from the headlands of large bays, thereby excluding 
Americans from the largest inlets such as the Bay of Fundy. Webster, in his initial response, did 
not counter or dispute this British assertion, only lamenting “to make so large a concession to 
England,” was “undoubtedly an oversight of the Convention of 1818,” even as the United States 
“considered that those vast inlets…ought to be open to American fishermen, as freely as the sea 
itself.”311 Conceding the point almost entirely, Webster observed “that by a strict and rigid 
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construction [of the Convention of 1818] fishing vessels of the United States are precluded from 
entering into the bays or harbors of the British Provinces.”312 The secretary of state concluded 
with little reassurance to fishermen or other Americans. “The immediate effect,” of British ships 
in North American waters, “will be the loss of the valuable fall fishing to American fishermen; a 
complete interruption of this extensive fishing business of New England,” and “constant 
collisions…threatening the peace of the two countries.”313 Webster’s initial reaction beheld an 
alarmed statesman and an America only reacting to decision emanating from London.314  
Webster’s editorial seemed to abandon the cause of the fishermen and in the process 
created much alarm among those in Washington, including President Millard Fillmore. Webster 
promulgated this policy paper without the input of the president or any other cabinet members. 
Fillmore remarked to Webster that the publication of the editorial “has consequently created 
unnecessary alarm,” but that its content “is somewhat misunderstood.” To remedy the situation 
Fillmore instructed his secretary of state to express that while negotiations with Great Britain 
over the fisheries would soon begin to put the issue to rest, “our citizens had the unquestioned 
right of fishing on the southern and western shore of the island of Newfoundland,” among other 
places.315 Webster’s next public pronouncement on the unfolding fisheries dispute, an address 
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made from his home in Marshfield, Massachusetts, was a clear rebuke of his earlier timidity as 
he offered unequivocal support for American fishermen that verged on bellicosity. In his “hook 
and line, and bob and sinker” speech Webster put to rest any fear that the Fillmore administration 
might meekly surrender any American right or privilege enjoyed by American fishermen. In fact, 
Webster positioned the fisheries as an integral component of national security and American 
state-building by declaring that “the fisheries were the seeds from which…glorious triumphs 
were born and sprung.” Any success ever enjoyed by the United States navy owed to the 
fisheries and the skills its pursuit instilled in those who plied its waters.316  
Again, Fillmore counseled against Webster’s extreme rhetoric in a dispute that was 
developing in to a delicate international situation. The president, recognizing the United States as 
the junior partner, instructed his secretary of state that the United States may have to, “at the 
sacrifice of self-interest,” submit to Britain’s wishes so as to not “unnecessarily stir up anger, 
cause popular agitation…[and] place us in the wrong by appearing before the world to have 
claimed that to which we were not entitled.”317 Furthermore, Fillmore confided to Webster that 
timidity and prudence, perhaps just euphemisms for submission, were preferred to a hardline 
stance, out of a “fear [that] G[reat] B[ritain] is right in her construction of the treaty.”318 Webster 
responded by declaring that despite his intentions to express the delicacy Fillmore desired, his 
words were twisted by the press and imbued with a belligerent tone. His remarks that the federal 
government would stand with American fishermen, right or wrong, were “jumbled and 
imperfect,” as a result of “the neglect of their [editors] appropriate duties.”319  As the Fillmore 
                                                
316 “Hon. Daniel Webster’s Reception at Marshfield,” Boston Daily Atlas, July 26, 1852, p.2. 
 
317 Fillmore to Webster, July 25, 1852, Webster Papers, 698. 
 
318 Ibid., 699. 
 
319 Webster to Fillmore, August 1, 1852, Webster Papers, 705. 
  
 
202 
administration groped for a response to British actions, it seemed to settle upon vacillation and 
poor communication.            
While Fillmore, Webster, and their associates were abuzz, actual action was less hurried. 
Apart from a nebulous plan for Webster to begin a series of talks with the British minister to the 
United States with the aim of a comprehensive treaty to settle the fisheries and free trade issues, 
Fillmore settled on sending Matthew C. Perry to the contested region in the hope that an 
American military presence would forestall bloodshed. Perry proceeded to the fishing grounds 
aboard the frigate U.S.S. Mississippi in the early days of August. While Perry’s cruise along the 
coast of Nova Scotia and into the Gulf of St. Lawrence produced a series of detailed reports on 
fishing in the region, this was, more or less, the extent of the Fillmore administration’s actions. 
Despite perhaps unfounded fears, American fishermen and the British navy never came to blows 
and this interrupted fishing season came to a quiet conclusion. The same, however, could not be 
said of how Congress and the press responded to that summer’s perceived British indignity. 
Beyond the tight circle of the executive department, the American political community made 
clear that the fisheries dispute was indicative of Britain’s deep-seated disdain for the United 
States, confirming America’s inferior status within that relationship. 
The American political community did not hesitate to take up the issue during the 
summer of 1852 and put this most recent British slight in the larger context of Anglo-American 
relations. In Congress, among the usual panegyrics to the patriotic fervor and service of the 
nation’s fishermen, statesmen dwelled on the themes of British resentment and American 
inferiority. John Mason, the chair of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, charged that 
the sudden dispatch of British war ships to American waters was “a far higher offense than a 
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breach of national courtesy,” but instead was “one of insult and indignity to the American 
people,” as Great Britain lacked even the slightest bit of regard for America and its citizens.320  
 The more bellicose among those in Congress were quick to find evidence that little over 
the past seven decades of American independence suggested Great Britain respected the United 
States, even as the events of the 1840s adjudicated numerous outstanding irritants. Senators 
claimed that Britain wished to negotiate “at the cannon’s mouth,” showing that the two states 
were, in fact, not equals. For those such as Solon Borland of Arkansas this example of British 
aggression was unprecedented, as he questioned “has it ever happened before, in the whole 
history of our country, from the day when our independence was acknowledged by Great Britain 
until this administration, that negotiations have been opened with us through the medium of 
cannon pointed against our citizens and our ships?”321 Thomas Rusk of Texas mirrored his 
colleague’s sentiment—“Can we negotiate at the cannon’s mouth?” an emphatic “no” was the 
senator’s answer.322   
Moreover, American politicians claimed Great Britain ran roughshod over the norms of 
international relations. The British, at least in the eyes of Congress, sought a novel, if not illegal, 
interpretation of international agreement. Much of the debate between Anglo-American 
statesmen during this crisis was over interpretations of the Convention of 1818. While this treaty 
forbade American fishermen from taking fishing within three miles of the coast of Britain’s 
North American Provinces, Americans claimed the right to enter large bays whose mouths were 
greater than six miles. Britain, however, claimed that the three mile limit extended from an 
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imaginary line that connected each headland of these larger bays. This so-called headland 
doctrine was disputed by American senators as an unprecedented interpretation of the 1818 
convention and thus carried no legal weight. Such a contention was often dismissed as a mere 
pretention, but other senators, namely the noted Anglophobe of Michigan Lewis Cass, disputed 
the notion that fisheries could even be regulated or demarcated and such power certainly did not 
come from Great Britain. Cass plainly stated that “no nation can appropriate [the ocean] to 
itself,” for the seas are a “common highway, and “a liquid field” “whose abundant supply of food 
for man is among the most wonderful and beneficent dispensations of nature.” Thus American 
access to these fisheries was not something granted by the British, but instead was a right “from 
the Almighty God.”323 Any attempt by Britain to curtail or reinterpret that right was an example 
of arrogance and disdain. 
Despite any claim that America would stoutly resist any British designs on the fisheries, 
Congress still recognized American inferiority in maritime and military arenas. John Bell of 
Tennessee noted “that we are not in a condition either in regard to the fisheries or our interest in 
the States south of us, or in regard to the islands on the Pacific coast, to negotiate on precisely 
equal terms with such a Power as Great Britain . . . . She has great advantages over us.” Bell 
understood American shortcomings as cause for alarm in the short term, but still had confidence 
that “the American spirit is ready to maintain the honor of this country against all odds.” Yet Bell 
relented that “we would be in a condition to be overawed” by the superiority of British force if 
the nations came to blows.324 
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While a few voices in Congress urged restraint, cautioning that Great Britain would not 
be so foolish as to alienate, if not spark war with, a major commercial and financial ally, the 
popular press was not so nuanced. Across the Union newspapers speculated as to why the British 
had insisted upon this new construction of the Convention of 1818. Many, of course, pointed to 
reciprocal trade with Canada. But others felt that behind this lay a decades old disdain for the 
United States on the part of the British ruling class. Less than a month after Crampton informed 
Webster of the Derby government’s decision to suspend American fishing rights in some 
Canadian waters, the Boston Evening Transcript offered harsh words for British leaders. With an 
incredulous tone the paper commented, “It is, we believe, an entirely new principle in 
international law that an administration, cabinet or government of a country, is at liberty to 
disregard the stipulations or concession of an administration or government which has preceded 
it.” Without mincing words, the article described the actions of Derby and his minsters as 
“manifestly unwarranted.” Behind these outrageous British actions lay the machinations of a 
class unable to live in peace with the American republic. While the author of this editorial had 
trouble believing that “Lord Derby has been guilty of the folly of putting forward these absurd 
pretensions as a cover to a scheme for fomenting a hostile feeling between the two countries,” 
the writings and speeches of “many individuals of the high Tory class in England” would 
confirm such a suspicion. Motivating Britain’s actions was a conservative desire to maintain its 
imperial foothold in North America. The ruling elites of Britain exhibit a “soreness at witnessing 
the growth of the republican spirit among the inhabitants of British America, and have declared it 
as their opinion that nothing but a timely war with the United States would save the colonies to 
Great Britain.”325  
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The Baltimore Sun similarly suspected Lord Derby of harboring resentment of the United 
States. Even though Derby’s ministry acknowledged the importance of reciprocity between the 
United States and the Provinces, the Sun doubted that Derby “exclusively British and altogether 
as he is…cares a button about the Canadian project of reciprocity.” Instead Derby’s decision to 
curtail American fishing rights was but an example of “his contempt for the power and national 
character of the American Union.”326 Later the Sun would describe the feeling of disdain felt for 
Americans across all of Europe in declaring “we know that the rapid advance of the United 
States in prosperity and importance, is regarded with jealous eyes by the legitimacy of Europe. 
Beneath the courtesies of national intercourse, we discern the cordial hate of despotisms.”327 The 
Picayune of New Orleans succinctly summed up the issue. This crisis did not arise from the 
substance of the Fisheries Dispute, but from the “hot, haste, arrogance, and discourtesy of the 
British Ministry.”328 Americans remained suspicious of British actions, and were still unprepared 
to live peacefully alongside the British Empire as an inferior. 
Political cartoonists likewise turned their attention to this diplomatic standoff. The most 
prominent print maker of the day, Edward Williams Clay, lampooned the fisheries crisis in a way 
that resonated with the odd mix of insecurity and confidence that typified the American 
response. The Fisheries Dispute of 1852 was ripe for political cartooning. During the second 
quarter of the nineteenth century advances in print-making and transportation technologies 
allowed cartoonists to more easily reach a wider audience that demanded printed materials of all 
kinds. Sold as single sheets, political cartoons of this period were unique among printed 
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materials for being affordable to even general laborers in cities such as Boston, Philadelphia, and 
the center of the cartooning world, New York. Additionally the political changes of the Age of 
Jackson encouraged the rise of a politically aware audience receptive to this kind of artistic 
expression.329  
Among the prints Clay produced that summer was one entitled “John Bull’s Fish 
Monopoly.” At the center of the image Brother Johnathan, a stock character used to personify the 
United States during the nineteenth century, exhorted his British counterpart, John Bull, to 
recognize the American right to access these fisheries.330 John Bull, literally possessing the fish 
monopoly, was unswayed. Reflecting a degree of sectional unity, to the right of this 
confrontation a foppish eastern and a rustic frontiersman of the west have come to the consensus 
that the United States needed to teach John Bull another “New Orleans lesson” if American 
rights are to be respected. But perhaps the most interesting character in the scene occupies a 
secondary position at the extreme left of the frame.    
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A fisherman sits slump shouldered and dejected. Because of British restrictions the 
fisherman was out of work and unable to pursue his livelihood to support his family. His wife 
and daughter looked on, the only ones left to console him. While his posture suggests 
resignation, the fisherman promised “to go on board a man [of] war” to pay “that d—d 
Britisher…back in bullets.” Wittingly or not Clay made the connection between fishing and 
fighting that was the standard fare of the rhetoric surrounding the fisheries during the antebellum 
era. But this element of the print also hints at why the fisheries issue was so important to many 
Americans, not just at this critical juncture but throughout this period. During the summer of 
1852 the British were not just encroaching on American fishing rights, but, in fact, attacking 
American manhood.       
Figure 6: Edward Williams Clay, “John Bull’s Fish Monopoly,” Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, LC-USZ762-
14090. 
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 The dejected fisherman represented the two strains of masculinity in nineteenth-century 
America. As Amy S. Greenberg notes in her study of gender in the age of manifest destiny, there 
were two kinds of masculinity at midcentury. First, there is what she terms “martial manhood.” 
This kind of manhood was a definition of self that was defined by violence, strength, aggression, 
and most often associated with the expansionistic impulses of the Democratic Party. The 
fisherman’s vow to resort to arms in order to assert American rights exemplified the kind of 
military valor that defined the martial man.331  
While the fisherman’s words indicated a martial man, his image, and the fact that he was 
surrounded by his wife and daughter, suggest that the out-of-work fisherman was the 
embodiment of what Greenberg calls “restrained manhood.” Instead of violence and aggression, 
the restrained man defined himself through domestic life and his family, financial success, not 
military triumphs, and the progressive, business-minded outlook of the Whig Party. Although 
never stated explicitly, the fisherman’s body language in this image suggested defeat because, 
without the ability to pursue his trade, he was no longer able to provide for hearth and home as 
the good restrained man should. Flanking the unemployed fisherman, his wife and daughter 
illustrated the real costs of Britain’s aggressive international politics as they would be the ones 
most likely to suffer.332 This political cartoon succinctly explained what was at stake in the 
ongoing fisheries dispute. So many Americans reacted so viscerally to encroachments on this 
American right because, at least in part, they understood it as an encroachment on the position of 
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men in a well-ordered society. British restrictions robbed Americans of their ability to provide 
for their families and communities, and thus also robbed them of their identity as men.          
Although much of the rhetoric surrounding this dispute centered on the Anglo-American 
relationship, many Americans were equally, if not more so, suspicious of their northern 
neighbors. With a propensity for invading those British colonies, early Americans were never 
able to embrace their Anglophone border-mates in any way that approximated fraternal bonds. 
The American-Canadian relationship gave the fisheries dispute a more obvious economic 
rationale given the direct competition between American and Canadian fishermen. 
Representative Zeno Scudder of Massachusetts was no doubt aware of the competition of 
Canadian fishermen given the importance of the fisheries to his constituents. The selling of 
Canadian fish not only threatened the economic well-being of American fishing interests on the 
international market, but Canada was poised to become the paramount supplier of fish within the 
United States. An “obstacle to the prosperity of our fisheries,” Scudder remarked, “is the unequal 
competition when we meet with those of the British colonies.” Not only were “the inhabitants of 
those Provinces…formidable competitors in the foreign market… [but] they are made rivals in 
our own.” Scudder, a Whig, introduced a partisan inflection to the debate by blaming the Walker 
Tariff, a remarkably low tariff passed in 1846 under the direction of Democrat James K. Polk’s 
Secretary of the Treasury Robert Walker, for allowing Canadian fishermen to play such a 
predatory role in the American market. Additionally, Canadians, Scudder contended, could 
undercut American fishermen because of their lower standard of living. Demonstrating a certain 
disdain for his northern neighbors Scudder remarked that “their habits of life, and social 
relations, permit them to pursue the business with a smaller profit than we can or do.” Canadian 
fishermen could be hired for far less than their American counterparts because the Canadian’s 
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“manner of living and educating their children…is far below that of the fishermen of the 
States.”333   
 While men like Scudder looked down on Canadians because of their competition and 
perceived unrefined manner, others were suspicious of the British subjects, feeling as though the 
provincials were the ones driving British policy. In William Henry Seward’s view the 
fundamental difference in the interpretation of the Convention of 1818 was not between the 
United States and Great Britain, but between the United States and Canada. The “provincial 
authorities” have always insisted upon the “technical and rigorous construction of the treaty,” 
while American officials prefer the “more liberal and just” interpretation. Seward reduced the 
debate over fisheries to its essential elements; “the British Colonists insist upon the rigorous 
construction of the convention of 1818, so as to exclude us from entering the large British bays, 
and distract and annoy our fishermen; and the people of the United States resist that construction, 
and they never will yield it.”334 John Davis of Massachusetts concurred with Seward’s estimation 
of the role the Canadians played in driving British policy. For Davis, the decades since the 
adoption of the Convention of 1818 had witnessed a “pretty earnest and determined effort” on 
the part of Canadian authorities to establish an agreement between the British North American 
Provinces and the United States that “they call reciprocity in trade.”335  
 The fisheries dispute offered the opportunity to reconsider some of the fundamental 
aspects of Anglo-American, and Canadian, relations. But this crisis also offered the rhetorical 
space for a wider ranging discussion about American foreign relations, locating the ongoing 
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fisheries issue in the broader context of American diplomacy. A partisan tone, no doubt 
encouraged in part by election year politicking, pervaded such a discussion in an exemplification 
of the “paradox” of Anglophobia. While Britain could exert a galvanizing force in American 
politics, this unity exposed other divisions that rent the republic.336Isaac Toucey, a Democrat 
from Connecticut, took the opportunity presented by the fisheries dispute to offer a withering 
indictment of the Fillmore administration’s foreign policy more generally. The fisheries dispute 
was but the latest example of the administration’s failure to steadfastly defend American rights 
and honor. Toucey admitted that he had “not that confidence in the Executive which, perhaps, I 
ought to have,” because the administration boasted a lackluster record on foreign affairs. Toucey 
claimed he could only lack confidence in the administration “after what I have witnessed on the 
coast of Cuba.”337 Toucey made reference to the Fillmore administration’s timidity in responding 
to the execution of American filibusters who joined in Narciso Lopez’s ill-fated attempt to 
liberate Cuba in 1851.  
 The failure of the Lopez expedition was resurrected during the summer of 1852 in an 
attempt to show that Fillmore’s Whig administration lacked resolve in the realm of foreign 
affairs. The Daily Ohio Statesman hammered away at this point and in doing so drew a direct 
connection between executed filibusters and North Atlantic cod. “In the Cuban affair from 
beginning to end,” this editorialist remarked, “American citizens were involved, American rights 
came into conflict with Spanish rights. Spain dictated and the American government instantly 
submitted.” In the view of this paper the Cuban affair was emblematic of Whig foreign policy 
generally and the propensity of Fillmore and Webster to idly standby while insults were heaped 
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upon America. “The whole diplomatic policy of the whig administration,” the Daily Ohio 
Statesman opined, “is one series of tame and quiet SUBMISSION to British, French, and Spanish 
AGGRESSION, and not even so much as one firm protest is to be found in all the archives of the 
times.” Given the past conduct of the Fillmore administration the paper could only predict more 
disgrace to beset the United States since “a whig administration allows an errant insult to the 
American Flag to pass over unexplained, they cannot be presumed to care more about an 
American Cod Fish,” and by extension the American fishermen. The editorial ended by pointing 
out the absurdity of allowing a party with such a poor record in foreign policy to continue in 
office for four more years.338  
Other nations, so the Democrats claimed, took their cues from the Spanish and British 
examples to disregard American right and expose American inferiority. Recent instances of 
French, Greek, and Mexican disregard added greater detail to what the New Hampshire Patriot 
described as a “graphic but humiliating picture of the disgraceful position in which our country 
has been reduced, in its foreign relations, by the truckling imbecility of the present federal 
administration.” The fisheries dispute came at a time when the flag seemed to sag. Through the 
eyes of the paranoid and jealous, American honor was attacked on all sides and showed the 
inability of the nation to contend with such problems. Anglo-American relations, as a microcosm 
of American foreign relations more generally, demonstrated how the United States was still the 
junior party in a British world. Despite the bilateral treaties and a continental empire, Americans 
were quick to take offense from slights, real or perceived, from Great Britain, or any nation for 
that matter. As the New Hampshire Patriot remarked, the conduct American foreign policy could 
                                                
338 “Cod Fishery and Whiggery,” Daily Ohio Statesman, August 9, 1852, p. 2.   
 
  
 
214 
only be described as “weak, timid, truckling and pusillanimous”—indeed the “source of extreme 
mortification to every true-hearted American.”339 
While the 1852 Fisheries Dispute exposed partisan divisions, in the process illustrating 
Haynes’ “paradox” of Anglophobia, sectional tension simmered under a veneer of cross-region 
cooperation. Newspapers across the nation paid lip service to the idea of Union, and while this 
sentiment may have been sincere, this episode does demonstrate just how galvanizing a force the 
British could be. Recognizing this influence the Mississippi Free Trade remarked amidst the 
conflict that during times of crisis “we are one people…In the time of peace we quarrel among 
ourselves…but when danger threatens from abroad, we seek protection under the same 
constitution.”340 In response to this kind of sentiment emanating from southern editors New 
York’s Plattsburgh Republican  remarked, “It is a matter of honest pride and satisfaction to us to 
observe the course taken by southern men on the fishery question.” Admitting that “northern 
men and northern capital are almost entirely and exclusively engaged in this enterprise,” this 
editorial was heartened that “the first voice raised in our legislative halls against British 
assumption, and in patriotic defense of our rights was that of a Senator from ‘Old Virginia’—a 
state south of Mason and Dixon’s line.” Optimistically the Plattsburgh Republican predicated 
the Fisheries Dispute to be but the beginning of a domestic rapprochement between peoples 
North and South. “The spirit manifested in this matter must prove like oil poured upon troubled 
waters. This watchful jealousy over a great northern interest, coming from such a quarter, will go 
a great way to bring back those feelings of brotherly love and unity which has thus far developed 
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our resources and given us strength and greatness beyond precedent in the history of nations.”341 
In the face of British encroachment there was “but one voice as to the final result of the 
controversy.” From quarters North and South the only sensible response was that “the American 
fishermen must be protected in their just rights.”342  
Not all observers that summer were inclined to buy into this rosy picture of Union-wide 
cooperation. Theodore Parker, an unrelenting foe of slavery, understood the fisheries dispute in 
terms of the unwarranted power and influence of the South in national politics. Because of the 
intimate commercial relationship between Great Britain and the South, war between the two 
nations would be impossible, even if the United States was forced to sacrifice its honor and 
prestige. Parker, in a sermon reprinted in William Lloyd Garrison’s Liberator, observed that “the 
material interests of England requires peace,” thus “the nation of shopkeepers will not quarrel 
with their best customer.” Even though Great Britain had forbidden Americans from fishing in 
the great bays of eastern Canada, Parker “solemnly believe[d] that the United States would,” in a 
clever inversion of Webster’s declaration at Marshfield “abandon their fishery, ‘bob and sinker, 
hook and line,’ sooner than fire a shot at Old England.” Behind the American inaction was the 
Slave Power of the South. Even though the South had “made the last war with England…[it] 
would be exceedingly slow to try it again,” knowing that “in such a contingency, every slave 
would be set free; not as in the West Indies, with peaceful sentiments but his hand filled with 
firebrands.” In concluding Parker remarked that “the fisheries are Northern property, which if 
really in peril, would get no protection from the slaveholders of the South.”343 Parker’s 
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observation would prove prescient, as the fisheries dispute would soon succumb to North-South 
political wrangling. But for the time being the American political community seemed to speak 
with one voice.  
 
THE FISHERIES DISPUTE OF 1852: A FISH’S-EYE VIEW 
The American political community made clear that the fisheries dispute that unfolded that 
summer was the result of Britain’s long held desire to cow the United States to the British world 
order. But the view from the fisheries was far different. As reports from American diplomatic 
and military agents indicated, the clash that spiraled into a wide ranging conversation about the 
United States’ place in the world was, more or less, an accident of nature. Changes in the sea 
demanded changes in American fishing practices; changes that ran up against the politically and 
ecologically outdated agreements Great Britain and the United States reached decades 
beforehand. The pretext for this diplomatic confrontation was created by the mere fact that 
during the mid-nineteenth century American fishermen began catching more mackerel than they 
previously had.  
In what amounted to the Millard Fillmore administration’s most substantive response to 
the announcement of British restrictions, the president sent famed naval commander Matthew C. 
Perry to the region with the ostensible goal of protecting the lives and property of American 
fishermen. Coming from a prominent Newport, Rhode Island, family, Perry was perhaps the 
most important active-duty American seamen of the antebellum era. He did much to introduce 
steam power to the fleet and shaped the early years of the Naval Academy after its founding in 
1845. Perry’s service record was likewise impressive, having served during the War of 1812—
his brother, Oliver Hazard, was remembered as the hero of the battle of Lake Erie—the U.S.-
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Mexican War, and was the first commander of the anti-slave trade African Squadron after its 
creation as part of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842. But Perry would be best remembered 
for the so-called opening of Japan to foreign trade in 1854. The fact that the Fillmore 
administration landed on as distinguished a seaman as Perry to patrol the fisheries during the 
summer of 1852 may hint at the symbolic importance accorded this mission, and by extension, 
the fisheries.  
 In his instructions emanating from the Navy Department, Perry was charged with, above 
all else, gathering information about the series of seizures of American fishing vessels that 
crested with the announcement of British restrictions that summer. As Secretary of the Navy 
John P. Kennedy conveyed to Perry, “It has…become necessary that the Executive of the United 
States should speedily inquire into and become acquainted with all that has transpired in 
reference to the said seizures, the cause which has led to the same, and the manner in which they 
have been made.” Thus Perry was instructed to consult “authentic and reliable sources relating to 
the facts and circumstances of any seizure,” with the hope of compiling “all the facts which may 
be necessary to be known.” Although Kennedy insisted that such information would support the 
“prompt and efficient protection” of American fishermen, Perry’s instructions seemed far more 
concerned with gathering information than curtailing these seizures. But the Navy Department’s 
instructions focused solely on the information pertaining to the situation upon the seas—the 
circumstances of seizures—and not on the situation within the seas.344           
 When the Fillmore administration sent Perry to the fishing grounds, Washington had little 
inkling that Perry’s reports would be concerned as much with the fish as with the fishermen 
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themselves. During his cruise along the coast of Cape Breton, the Magdalen Islands, and across 
the Bay of Chaleur—what Perry concluded to be the “most frequented resorts of the American 
Fishermen in the Gulf of St. Lawrence”—the naval commander came to the conclusion that of 
the “great number of American vessels,” most were “engaged in the mackerel fishery.” Noting 
how the American mackerel fleet “absolutely whiten[ed] the water of these coasts,” Perry was 
also struck by the paucity of cod fishermen in the region.345 The cod fisheries had, of course, for 
centuries dominated the Atlantic trade in fish as the most valuable, with perhaps the exception of 
the meat and oil of whales, commodity drawn from the seas. But changes in the ocean, and in the 
fishing industry, at midcentury made the small, oily, swift-finned mackerel an increasingly 
valuable catch. 
 The second quarter of the nineteenth century witnessed an unprecedented uptick in the 
number of mackerel fishing ventures launched from American shores. Beginning in the second 
decade of the nineteenth century Yankee fishermen devised, and subsequently improved, a 
method of catching mackerel that relied upon a new kind of fishing jig that did not require the 
laborious process of baiting each and every hook.346 With increasingly ruthless efficiency 
American fishermen soon overran the mackerel stocks nearest to American shores, thus forcing 
skippers to sail further and further afield in search of their prey. Reaching a peak in the early 
1830s, mackerel fishing was, on the eve of the 1852 fisheries dispute, once again in its 
ascendency as American fishermen invaded North Atlantic waters with seemingly little regard 
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for decades-old treaty stipulations.347 These changes, however, were not solely the result of 
increased technological efficiency, but had an environmental component as well.     
 Mackerel fishing was, despite its booming popularity in the 1820s−1840s, a precarious 
endeavor. One contemporary observer of this fishery, Lorenzo Sabine, noted that “serious 
depressions and ruinous losses…are not uncommon” in the pursuit of such a “capricious and 
sportive fish.” This fickle fish followed a seasonal pattern of migration as summers brought 
about warmer temperatures and rich phytoplankton blooms. Yet despite this seasonal pattern 
year to year variations were significant, leaving New England fishermen with little concept of 
what was normal. Such an ill-defined baseline was even more susceptible to radically shifting 
expectations and demands. As more and more American outfitted boats specifically designed for 
the needs of the mackerel fishery during the quarter century before 1850, environmental 
conditions favored the proliferation of these fish. Changes in ocean temperature and chemistry 
during this period—changes driven by the North Atlantic Oscillation—created huge loads that 
lead, in subsequent years, to huge busts. For a period at least the environment accommodated 
human pressures. The year 1831 was a particularly productive year as fishermen brought in hauls 
of mackerel unparalleled until the 1880s. Yet five years later those numbers fell by half leaving 
an industry hobbled as it entered the financial panic of 1837. Mackerel, unlike the longer-lived 
cod, was prone to more radical fluctuations in responding to the changes in the sea. The industry 
responded in the 1840s with a desperate search for this erratic fish in unexploited waters. When 
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the United States and Great Britain faced off in the summer of 1852, the mackerel fishery was on 
the precipice of yet another downturn.348 
   While American fishermen constantly altered their fishing habits across the nineteenth 
century in an effort to more ruthlessly exploit North Atlantic waters, the relative rise in the 
number of mackerel fishers had political consequences. Unlike the benthic dwelling codfish that 
had for so long occupied the attention of New England’s fishing fleets, the mackerel was a 
migratory species that moved into coastal waters during the course of the summer fishing season. 
This ecology was poised to create trouble in a diplomatic regime that barred American fishermen 
from the waters nearest the shores of Britain’s North American Provinces. Perry observed this 
tension first hand. “The mackerel,” Perry explained, “usually resort in shoal to the Bays, and 
indents of the coasts,” leaving fishermen little choice but to pursue their catch to the imaginary 
line that demarked Britain’s exclusive waters. But, as to be expected, in the “engrossing and 
exciting occupation of taking them in thousands with the hook, they frequently follow the fish 
into forbidden waters, doubtless in many instances…when the weather is thick or hazy, and 
when distances, computed by the eye…are deceptive.”349 It was, then, not the vindictiveness of 
the British, the machinations of the provincials, or the ignorance of the Americans, that created 
controversy in the summer of 1852. Instead, it was the fish. The natural “fickleness” of those 
scaly operatives did much in creating these tense diplomatic circumstances.  
 The remedy to this situation was, of course, political, and the problem was not one of 
information. Perry’s instructions stressed “the necessity of full and timely explanations…to the 
fishermen of the United States of the obligation which they owe equally to the laws of their own 
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country and to the rights of the British Crown to avoid any infraction or violation of the 
stipulations of the treaty of 1818.”350 Yet during his cruise Perry gave credit to the acuity of 
American fishermen. In addition to the paeans to the hardiness and patriotism of American 
fishermen so common in nineteenth-century political rhetoric, Perry praised the fishermen as 
“exceedingly intelligent” men who “understand very well the usually recognized boundary, 
across which they…pass…at their own risk and if in the pursuit of fish, they trespass beyond the 
proscribed limits, they knowingly take the chance of seizure.”351    
Instead, a political fix required taking ecology into consideration. Perry “presumed that 
the mackerel will continue their periodical visit to their usual haunts,” and thus render the status 
quo of the Convention of 1818 untenable. American fishermen complained of the difficulties 
imposed by the arbitrary maritime boundary. Provincials in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, at 
least as Perry surmised from his cruise, likewise desired altering the status of American fishing 
rights as they were “anxious to draw tight the bonds of neighborly friendship.”352 Perry, in his 
perspective from the fisheries, advocated for a reappraisal of the Anglo-American convention 
and urged those in Washington to make any concession necessary to secure expanding fishing 
rights. “Any concession of interest,” like free trade, Perry remarked, “would be cheap for the 
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inappreciable privileges of taking fish…within the entire waters of the Provinces.” The shores of 
Newfoundland and Labrador provided an example of where the “right to fish is better defined by 
the Treaty,” and consequently a place devoid of the confrontations that marked the littoral of 
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. Perry even suggested that a treaty that aligned political needs 
and ecological realties would ensure the continued health of this ecosystem. While “these 
sources of wealth seem to be exhaustless,” they “will be seriously injured in consequence of the 
wanton destruction of the fish, and the disturbance of their fishing grounds, and hence the 
necessity of stringent laws for their preservation.”353 Perry’s cruise on the contested waters of the 
North Atlantic demonstrated how the environment was a crucial component of transatlantic 
relations. Any political arrangement failing to comport with this ecology would do little more 
than sow Anglo-American discord.     
 Perry was not alone in observing the ecological origins of this dispute. The American 
consul at St. John, Israel Andrews, likewise made the connection between mackerel fishing and 
the outbreak of hostilities in Britain’s provincial waters. Situated on the shores of the Bay of 
Fundy, Andrews was well position at St. John to comment on the American fishing industry. In a 
communique to Secretary of State Daniel Webster, Andrews bemoaned how the ongoing 
fisheries dispute seemed poised to disrupt the cordial relations between the United States, Great 
Britain, and Britain’s remaining North American colonies. While the American consul remarked 
to the secretary of state on the esoteric and legalistic interpretation of the Convention of 1818 as 
it related to the American right to enter the Bay of Fundy—merely more rhetorical wrangling on 
the disputed “headland doctrine”—something far more material undergirded his interpretation of 
this most recent dispute. “From the commencement of this fishing season…the American fishing 
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vessels peruse their business at some distance from the land,” yet, Andrews declared, “after the 
first of September the fish draw in to the shore and are followed by the fishermen.” Such fish 
that enticed American fishermen to transgress the statutory limit of American waters was 
doubtless the mackerel, given its proclivity to retreat shoreward during the course of the fishing 
season. Andrews even cited the words of the Commissioners of the Fisheries in the Province of 
Nova Scotia who, in a report to the provincial governor, claimed that “the nature of the Fall 
fishing renders it absolutely necessary for pursuit of fish within three miles of the shore.” As 
fishermen, forced by the nature of the fish themselves, pursued their piscine prey into forbidden 
waters, they faced capture and potential ruin at the hands of a British ministry who sought to use 
the situation to further the free trade agenda.354   
 Without alteration to the status quo, American fishermen would remain vulnerable to 
being preyed upon by the British and provincial navies. As long as fish like mackerel traversed 
the arbitrary three-mile boundary, Anglo-American relations would be subject to periodic 
diplomatic confrontations. Andrews remarked that “there is no doubt whatever of the fish 
remaining in the shore after the first of September, particularly mackerel,” thus giving the consul 
“positive certainty of more seizures being made.”355 The “failure” of mackerel to comply with 
the dictates of transatlantic relations exposed the fatal flaw of fisheries diplomacy—namely that 
disputes were a product of the gulf that existed between ecology and politics. 
 While the connection between changes in the fisheries and diplomatic disputes was 
obvious to men like Matthew Perry and Israel Andrews, who had first-hand experience with the 
                                                
354 Israel Andrews to Daniel Webster, August 21, 1852, Despatches from US Consul in St. John, New Brunswick, 
Canada, 1835–1906 (National Archives Microfilm Publication T485, roll 2); Records of the Department of State, 
Record Group 59; National Archives, College Park, Md. 
 
355 Ibid. 
 
  
 
224 
fishing industry, who had sailed those waters, and who interviewed those fishermen, the point 
was not lost in its transmission to Washington. Writing to the American minister to London, 
Secretary of State Edward Everett, having ascended to the position in the wake of Webster’s, 
penned the Fillmore administration’s most complete response to the fisheries dispute. Dated 
early December, when the passions aroused that summer had time to settle, Everett’s missive 
explored the myriad misunderstandings and contingencies that lead to the Great Britain’s 
decision to bar—by force—American fishermen from provincial waters. Of course the secretary 
of state singled out the reciprocity issue as a central irritant in this dispute. But Everett also 
attacked Britain’s support for the spurious “headland doctrine,” suggested that the dispute was 
mere “electioneering” on the British ministry’s part, and reiterated the genuine alarm Americans 
felt in response to Britain’s aggressive tactics. He even went so far as to claim that colonial 
leaders were really the ones responsible for British action as provincial authorities had, for 
decades, wanted to rein in American fishermen. But amidst commercial politics, legal arguments, 
and subtle paranoia, Everett gave credit to the fish for the role they played in the dispute.     
 Even removed from the ordinary operations of the fisheries in the north Atlantic, Everett 
grasped how the pursuit of mackerel by American fishermen seemed to be the inevitable cause of 
the numerous violations of the convention line. Everett remarked that by “inadvertence or even 
design” American fishermen “pass[ed] the line of the Convention in the eager pursuit of a shoal 
of mackerel.” Casting a suspicious eye upon the motives of the United States’ colonial 
neighbors, Everett accused Canadians of “too keenly” enforcing “their monopoly of the best 
fishing grounds,” with the implication that provincial leaders, not those in Whitehall, were 
responsible for this newly vigorous policy. But Everett’s appreciation for the environmental 
elements of the fishery dispute did not necessarily mean the secretary of state grasped the 
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ecological complexities of the region. In an interpretation that resonated with the day’s scientific 
understanding, not to mention America’s political goals, Everett claimed that admitting 
American fishermen to these waters would do little to hurt the provincial fishing industry or the 
sea’s ecological health. Citing the “resort of two centuries and half,” the secretary of state 
claimed the “inexhaustible abundance” of those “prolific waters” remained “undiminished,” and 
that “the gain of one implies no loss to another.”356 American statesmen were consistent in 
articulating the need to align international agreements with ecology realities—or at least the 
ecology realities as these politicians understood them.  
Mackerel fishing was central to how American policymakers understood the narrative of 
the fishery dispute of the summer of 1852. In 1854 as American statesmen finally sought a treaty 
to replace the out of date Convention of 1818. Secretary of State William Marcy conveyed this 
understanding to the American minister in London, James Buchanan, when articulating the 
shortcomings of the Convention of 1818 and how its ecologically out of date provisions “will 
prove a constant source of irritation and controversy may disturb…peaceful relations” between 
the United States and Great Britain. Marcy observed that “when the Convention of 1818 was 
entered into the taking of cod was the all important branch of the fisheries,” but “now it is 
superseded in point of importance by the mackerel” fishery. Given the profit seeking motive of 
American fishermen, “when they fall in with shoals of them [mackerel]” fishermen could not be 
expected to “resist the temptation of following them within the shore limit fixed by the 
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Convention of 1818.”357 Although American fishermen had been and would continue to be 
important actors in the transatlantic politics of fishing, the fish themselves were accomplices.     
 The dispute would fizzle come fall as the fish, mackerel at least, retreated to their 
overwinter grounds and politicians, American at least, turned their attention to the presidential 
contest. Soon, but not simply, the free trade issue would be settled as the nations, in 1854 with 
the Marcy-Elgin Treaty, came to an agreement whereby the American market and Canadian 
waters opened to the penetration of the other. But despite this seemingly amicable end to the 
fisheries dispute the summer of 1852 showed that the United States remained sensitive to 
Britain’s international policies. Mutual respect and the British recognition of American parity 
were necessary if the Anglo-American relationship was to truly transform.  
The New Orleans Picayune, in early November, speculated about whether America and 
Great Britain were on the precipice of a monumental change in their relationship. The 
transatlantic relationship could only be put on a constructive footing if Great Britain came to the 
realization that the “American continent is no longer a sphere for the planting of British colonies, 
the attempt to exercise a controlling political influence, or even for the permanent maintenance 
of dominion which is still retained in parts of North America.” The Canadian colonies were in a 
period of transition, soon enough Britain would be forced to leave North America and only then 
could the Anglo-American relationship be reformed; “The withdrawal, gradually and gracefully, 
of all British dominion from the continent, as part of the grand recognition which must come of 
the principle that America is to belong to the Americans and be governed by American ideas, 
will be the guarantee of a perpetual peace between England and the United States.” Both nations 
must work together to build a new relationship built on trust, the key component of an effective 
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rapprochement, and only “by mutual non-interference and mutual good will” could both nations 
“advance prosperously and gloriously.”358 
If the kind of goodwill and mutual respect that was necessary for the nations to ensure 
each other’s prosperity and glory was in short supply there was, at least by 1854, a mutual 
recognition that some kind of change was necessary. The resulting Marcy-Elgin Treaty 
inaugurated more than a decade of free trade and free fishing across the U.S.-Canadian 
boundary, yet the American-British suspicion that had marked the fisheries question was 
replaced by the mutual suspicion of the North and the South. Owing to its central position in 
American statecraft and nation building the North Atlantic fisheries were directly implicated in 
the growing sectional crisis that ultimately led to disunion. 
 
DOMESTIC POLITICS: EXPANSION 
 In what no doubt registers as historical irony, the heyday of expansionist fervor in the 
United States came at time when few acres were actually added to the Union. When filibustering 
was all the rage and Americans, southerners at least, dreamed of a Caribbean empire, only a 
paltry strip of land south of the Gila River was wrestled into the American dominion. While it 
certainly was of consequence, the Gadsden Purchase seemed inconsequential when compared to 
the much larger Mexican Cession of the previous decade. Although the impulses of manifest 
destiny brought expeditions to the shores of Cuba and Nicaragua, American expansionists of 
midcentury were not singularly obsessed with creating an American Mediterranean. Canadian 
lands beckoned as well.     
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 The United States was certainly no stranger to the rhetoric of Canadian annexation. 
Having invaded the British colonies a number of times, nineteenth-century Americans seemed 
confident that broad swath of territory would, eventually, become part of the American 
imperium. During the 1850s this question was tied to both the sectional question and the fisheries 
question in a kind of triangulation that brought sectional rancor and fishery politics into direct 
contact. The connecting tissue proved to be trade reciprocity. Despite the tension that erupted 
during the summer of 1852, American politicians were not inveterate anti-free traders. Almost 
immediately after the presidential contest of 1852, American congressmen set to work on a 
reciprocity bill that would, policy makers hoped, make the kind of tensions of that summer a 
thing of the past. That year’s election proved to be enormously important as it would be the 
Whig Party’s last stand before foundering on the rock of slavery, signaling the demise of the 
Second Party System and the rise of sectionalism as the primary identification in American 
politics.359   
In the early months of 1853 John Davis of Massachusetts introduced a bill in the Senate 
designed to protect American fishing rights in Canadian waters while extending reciprocal 
trading and fishing privileges to America’s northern neighbor. The measure, however, was 
opposed by many southern senators. In an effort led by Stephen Mallory of Florida, an 
amendment to the bill forbade foreign nationals from fishing in southern waters. Using a states’ 
rights argument, Mallory claimed the federal government had no power to force any state to open 
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its territorial waters to foreign fishermen under the fear that free black fishermen from the British 
Caribbean may invade southern ports to foment slave insurrections. This amendment was added 
to Davis’s reciprocity bill, which was ultimately defeated in the Senate. But this episode 
demonstrates how soon the cooperation of 1852 faded and slaveholders began using the fisheries 
issue to protect their own sectional interests. A wider ranging debate about reciprocity and 
sectional interest would wait for the Elgin-Marcy Treaty of 1854 and the subsequent debate over 
the legislation that would put the treaty’s stipulations into effect.360   
Fulfilling its constitutional duty, the Senate considered the Elgin-Marcy Treaty in the 
summer of 1854. The treaty, negotiated by American Secretary of State William Marcy and 
Canadian Governor General Lord Elgin, admitted Canadian goods—most importantly timber, 
grain, and coal—duty free to the United States, while Americans were granted expanded fishing 
rights and the free navigation of the St. Lawrence. The Thirty-Third Congress may be better 
remembered for considering the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, but this seemingly innocuous trade bill 
became part of the same conversation and served as a proxy for discussing the growing 
estrangement of North and South. Although the fisheries issues and trade reciprocity were far 
removed from the blood soaked plains of Kansas, they were all part of a similar sectional 
rhetoric. The final tally on the reciprocity bill (32 yeas to 11 nays) may seem like a rare moment 
of agreement in the summer of 1854, but senators from both the North and South sought to use 
the issue for their own ends.361  
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While the Senate deliberated behind closed doors in an executive session, newspaper 
editors did not hesitate to comment on what the treaty might mean for domestic relations. 
Writing on behalf of the Daily National Era of Washington, D.C. a more optimistic observer 
hoped sectional rivalries would not tinge the proceedings, wishing that “blear-eyed sectionalism, 
or a bigoted devotion to merely local interest, should prevent the consummation” of this wise 
measure. But most commenters felt it was a foregone conclusion that sectional affinity would 
determine the outcome of the vote. As the Register of Salem, Massachusetts, lamented, a vote 
along strictly sectional lines would create a feeling “very unfavorable to the future harmony of 
the country.”362  
Northerners expressed the greatest trepidation at the prospect of the fisheries and 
reciprocity issues being subjected to the politics of section. The disproportionate representation 
of the South in Washington made possible the chance that a legislature and executive 
sympathetic to southern interests would willingly sacrifice the interests of the northeast. The 
Boston Evening Transcript remarked that even though “our gallant New England fishermen 
suffered from outrages and abuses at the hand of the English and Colonial officials,” such 
indignities “have failed thus far to receive proper attention from the American government,” 
because the administration “seems entirely devoted to southern interests.” The same paper would 
later criticize both the Fillmore and Pierce administrations for subjecting “a large class of hardy, 
patriotic, and enterprising men,” to “broken promises” and “cold neglect.”363     
                                                
362 Daily National Era (Washington, D.C.), June 17, 1854; Register (Salem, MA), July 31, 1854. Also see Sun 
(Baltimore), July 27, 1854; and Cleveland (OH) Plain Dealer, June 15, 1854. 
 
363 Boston Evening Transcript, June 6 and August 3, 1854. 
 
  
 
231 
For many in the political community the Reciprocity Bill, the legislative manifestation of 
the Elgin-Marcy Treaty, was frequently tied to the territorial aspirations of the South. The issue 
of expanding slavery’s territorial grip was paramount in the early 1850s as the Mexican Cession 
and the Kansas-Nebraska Bill brought the question to the forefront of the nation’s consciousness. 
Given the bill’s close association with the interests of northerners, the bill was situated in the 
context of the South’s territorial aspirations in Mexico and Cuba. As the Daily National Era of 
Washington, D.C. observed, the summer of 1854 witnessed the Senate consider both the 
Reciprocity Treaty and the Gadsden Treaty. The paper remarked that the Gadsden Treaty was 
“of special importance to the slave interest of the South,” while “the free interest of the North,” 
had a greater stake in the Reciprocity Treaty. Consequently this editorialist speculated that both 
treaties “may be linked together, so that one cannot be ratified without the other,” thus ceding an 
advantage to both the free and slave sections of the nation. While the slave South may have used 
the reciprocity and fisheries issues to ensure the passage of the Gadsden Treaty, an editorialist in 
New Jersey cautioned against such a linkage. The Gadsden Treaty benefited merely one section 
of the nation, while the reciprocity treaty was a national measure tied to the navigation and 
security of the entire nation. For that reason alone protecting the fisheries “would be better for 
the country than all the everlasting clamor for Mexico and Cuba.”364   
Even though the South’s dream of an empire encircling the Gulf of Mexico dominated 
headlines and congressional debates during the 1850s, the Reciprocity Bill was most often 
associated with American designs on its northern neighbor. Antebellum Americans often 
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speculated when—not if—the Canadian colonies would join the United States. Even in the 
fisheries dispute during the summer of 1852, as the prospect of war reared its grim, if unlikely, 
visage, Americans both North and South assumed any hostility with Great Britain would 
naturally entail the annexation of Canada to the United States. Amidst a debate concerning the 
place of fishermen in the union, commenters also considered the potential place of Canada in the 
union. Reflecting a sense of national unity during that summer, both northerners and southerners 
concluded that annexing Canada would prove disastrous for their section and the union. 
Southerners feared Canadian annexation was merely a ploy to increase the number of free states 
in the union, while those in the North felt annexation was a guise for re-enslaving those few who 
had reached freedom. While this conversation hinted at how the fisheries issue would be 
mobilized in the competition of North and South, it was merely speculative and both sides 
seemed weary of annexing such a large expanse of land. During the debate over the Reciprocity 
Bill in 1854, however, annexation seemed imminent and the debate was held along the North-
South line.365         
Reciprocity, supporters believed, was but a precursor to annexation. Free trade between 
the United States and Canada would naturally erase the political line that existed between the 
two polities, and as these economies became intertwined a political union was inevitable. 
However, the ramifications of such a union became fodder for a debate over the interests of both 
the North and South. While southerners feared annexation had the potential to add free states to 
the union and thus disrupt that delicate balance, a belief existed among some that free trade 
would serve to promote Canadian independence and stifle any agitation for annexation. 
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Furthermore southerners may have even considered reciprocity as a way to further their agenda 
by using annexation as an opportunity to enact an even stronger Fugitive Slave Law and pursue 
those formerly enslaved into America’s new northern dominion. While southerners employed the 
fisheries and reciprocity treaty on behalf of their unique interests, northerners did likewise. Long 
had fishery supporters used fishermen to bolster their own interests under the mantle of the 
national good. But the summer of 1854 witnessed northerners situate Canadian annexation as 
part of a larger program of territorial expansion with only sectional good in mind. The Boston 
Courier detailed “the gigantic plans of Northern annexation,” by which northern senators were 
“openly demanding…the acquisition of all British America,” Vancouver’s Island, Sitka, and 
even the Sandwich Islands, all “with a view to the increase of Northern power.” Ultimately the 
Reciprocity Bill would pass. For more than a decade Canada enjoyed exporting its goods duty 
free to the United States, while American fishermen exploited their expanded fishing rights in 
Canadian waters. But sectional alienation was as important a legacy of this trade measure, if not 
the fisheries question itself.366 
 
DOMESTIC POLITICS: THE BOUNTY 
 Sectional animosity also flared over the federal cod fishing bounty. Passed by Congress 
in the 1790s this measure was subjected to sectional politics throughout the antebellum era. 
However, it was only during the 1850s that the debate over the bounty was waged along North-
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South lines. Previously, western interests depicted the bounty as evidence of the federal 
government privileging coastal endeavors at the frontier’s expense.  
The year 1840 witnessed the first major challenge to the cod fishing bounty. 
Unsurprisingly this fight against sectional privilege was waged by the scion of western interests, 
Missouri Senator Thomas Hart Benton. A Jacksonian leery of undue privilege in any guise, a 
part, of course, from the privileges he enjoyed only on account of his white skin and masculine 
gender, Benton attacked the bounty as injurious to his home region and the entire union alike. In 
his mind the bounty and its supporters’ nationalist posturing was merely a ruse to funnel wealth 
from federal coffers to the northeast at the expense of the farmers and husbandmen of the West. 
Refusing to see the West disadvantaged Benton attacked the foundation upon which the bounty 
stood: the often repeated claim that the fisheries were a vital part of national security.     
In a report compiled by Benton to ascertain the origin of the fishing bounty, the senator 
concluded that there was simply no relationship between the cod fishing bounty and the need to 
train seamen for the nation’s navy. From the very beginning, Benton claimed, “the bounty to 
dried and cured fish was nothing but a drawback of the salt duty” and thus bore “no relation to 
the training of seamen.” Since salt was a necessity for cod fishermen the federal government 
instituted the bounty in order to compensate fishermen for the duty placed on imported salt. 
Benton confidently concluded that the bounties “can refer their existence to no other source but 
the duty on salt; and they are a drawback of the duty paid on the foreign salt used on that part of 
the fish intended to be exported.”367  
Because this measure was tied directly to the salt duty, Benton reasoned, it would indeed 
prove to be a poor way to train the nation’s sailors. If the bounty’s primary objective was to 
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create competent seamen then why were whalers, who “engage in real war with the mighty 
monsters of the deep,” excluded from the bill’s provisions? Benton claimed this exclusion 
resulted not “because they were less meritorious mariners but because they did not use salt.” 
Furthermore, how could fishermen be expected to become patriotic and able seamen if the 
bounty made no discrimination based on nationality? While Benton aimed to undermine this 
fallacy upon which the bounty stood, he took care not to denigrate the fisheries or fishermen. 
“Far be it from this committee,” Benton cautioned, “to depreciate the value or to underrate the 
importance of the northeastern fisheries.” While the fisheries created generations of hardy 
seamen, the nation now laid claim to other waters to train its sailors. In 1789 “the northeastern 
fisheries were almost the only school in which to learn the art of seamanship,” but by 1840 “the 
northern lakes, the Gulf of Mexico, the bays and the whole maritime coast of the Atlantic border, 
share that prerogative with them.” In Benton’s mind both the bounty and the salt duty to which it 
was tied must be abolished, as these measures served only to advantage the few at the cost of the 
many. And for Benton the many were his constituents in the West.368  
This kind of advantage galled the Jacksonian Benton, and his visceral opposition to the 
bounty stems from his loyalty to the western United States and his belief that “the genius of our 
institutions…forbid the existence of exclusive privileges among us.” In a specific instance 
Benton cited an act of May 2, 1792, whereby the notion of selling salt “by the weighed instead of 
the measured bushel” has led to “the greatest imposition” upon salt sellers of the West. “By 
altering the standard of the bushel,” Benton observed, “the whole western country, has since 
been cheated out of one third of its salt,” thus providing tangible proof that the salt duty and 
fishing bounty inflicted a “permanent injury…upon the western states.” Benton was not alone in 
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understanding the fight over the bounty as one pitting East against West. The Eastern Argus of 
Portland, Maine inveighed that “the scheme of abolishing the Salt Tax and Fishing Bounties is a 
Western Scheme—originated by western men and likely to receive its strongest support among 
the western people.”369 
While Benton was a vigorous defender of the rights of his home section, his opposition to 
the continuation of the federal cod fishing bounty was tied to his partisan affinities as well. As a 
die-hard Jacksonian, Benton and his Democratic ilk were vigilant in opposing the kind of 
privilege that the bounty fostered. Thus in addition to being a symbol of sectional privilege, 
fishermen were, for Benton and his acolytes, a symbol of pork barrel politics. As Benton railed 
against this New England interest he did so not only as a westerner, but as a Democrat, too. His 
failure in securing the repeal of the bounty in 1840 was not solely the result of the nation-wide 
rhetorical power of the fishermen, but part of the Whigs’ defeat of the Democrats in a year that 
saw the first Whig ascend to the presidency.370     
Ultimately, however, 1840 would not see the repeal of the fishing bounty. Writing in 
defense of the bounty Massachusetts Senator John Davis resorted to familiar tactics. Praising 
American fishermen as “the most hardy, patriotic, and efficient seamen on the face of the earth,” 
Davis made the expected equation of fishing and fighting. The federal government must 
encourage the fisheries through a bounty because, Davis concluded, “it makes a great body of 
efficient, able, patriotic native seamen, who, in the emergency of war, have all the qualifications 
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requisite to maintain the honor of the flag, and give protection to the country. The logic of 
national security was a persuasive argument within the American political community.371 
While the bounty weathered the storm of the 1840s, during the 1850s the debate over this 
federal dispensation became part of the larger debate between freedom and slavery. In 1858 the 
Senate witnessed what historian Wayne M. O’Leary would call a “mammoth” debate over the 
proposed repeal of the bounty. The pro-bounty partisans mobilized the very arguments they had 
used for decades. Hannibal Hamlin of Maine came to the defense of the fishermen. Recognizing 
that fishing was a local interest, at least in a commercial sense, just as sugar cultivation was local 
to Louisiana, Hamlin situated fishing and the fishermen as a national resource tied to the defense 
of the nation. Hamlin supported the cod fishing bounty “for a national purpose,” which is to say 
the “training of seamen for the naval service” in the “best school that ever existed.” He even 
went so far as to compare the fisheries to an actual school, claiming that “this nursery of seamen 
ought to be regarded by the Senate and by the American people precisely as we regard the 
military school at West Point, and the naval school at Annapolis.” To counter this familiar line of 
reasoning Clement C. Clay, Jr., of Alabama opted for a novel argument. Instead of attacking the 
bounty as an unfair grant to an ultimately worthy cause, Clay directly questioned the value of 
fishermen to the union. He remarked, “I understand from naval officers that all the advantage a 
cod fisherman has over a mere ‘land-lubber’ is in having learned to ‘rough it,’ to walk the deck, 
and escape sea-sickness; but they say that they would rather take a raw recruit who had learned 
nothing than to take a cod fisherman whom they would have to unlearn before they could teach.” 
The vitriol continued as Clay described how the cod fishing bounty had not created a class of 
hardy, patriotic sailors but instead the bounty only bred “dependence on the Government for 
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support,” that served to depress “national prosperity.” In Clay’s telling the bounty “paralyzes the 
industry, enervates the mind, and enfeebles the will of man.” Fishermen were not men at all 
since such dependence “discourages enterprise, enslaves the spirit, suppresses noble aspirations,” 
to the point where these “sailors” “can never feel or exercise the freedom, independence, and 
self-reliance of mature manhood.” Never before had critics assailed what was, by and large, a 
popularly recognized national symbol by attacking the very reason for the fishermen’s uniform 
federal support.372     
While the federal cod fishing bounty survived intact, serious and substantive changes to 
the political economy of the fishing industry were on the horizon. The 1850s were the highpoint 
of the fisheries in the nation’s political imagination. In 1852 politicians from all sections rallied 
around this resource to protest the most pointed foreign assault on American access to the 
fisheries. In 1858 politicians from at least some of the sections rallied to defeat the most vigorous 
domestic assault on the place of the fisheries in the nation’s political economy. Both of these 
instances represented the culmination of more than a half century of rhetoric that extolled the 
North Atlantic fisheries as a vital part of American statecraft and a symbol of American 
independence and nationalism.  
Looking forward, however, squalls approached. Although the fisheries question became 
part of the larger sectional question that wracked the nation, the Civil War itself did little to 
disturb the industry apart from the normal interruptions and dislocations that came with war. It 
was the postwar period that saw a fundamental change in how the American political community 
understood the fisheries. And yet again this shift was tied to the larger dynamics of Anglo-
American relations. The Civil War era saw huge swings in the nature of the transatlantic 
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relationship as the indignation the United States felt for Britain’s tacit support of the 
Confederacy eventually gave way to a new era of Anglo-American cooperation. Combined with 
a host of other changes that were in part spawned by the war—namely changes in the 
composition and purpose of the United States Navy—this shift in Anglo-American relations was 
intimately connected to a shift in fishery politics that displaced the North Atlantic fisheries from 
its privileged place in American politics.               
  
  
 
240 
CHAPTER 5: FISHERIES AND POLITICS IN THE GILL-DED AGE, 1860–1877 
 
 When the United States and Great Britain signed the Elgin-Marcy Treaty in 1854, it 
seemed to be a boon for the fishing industry. Although the treaty’s stipulations opened the 
American market to most Canadian goods, including lumber, coal, and, principally, fish, the 
treaty also opened all North Atlantic waters to American fishermen. Finally, it seemed, the 
American fishing industry could exploit the inshore fisheries that had for decades remained 
beyond the American fishermen’s statutory grasp, without fear of capture or reprisals from 
British or colonial cruisers. With this diplomatic guarantee and a lionized national icon in the 
patriotic and enterprising fisherman, the American fishing industry was poised to strengthen its 
claim as a nationally important industry. 
 The next two decades, however, would fundamentally change the place of the fisheries 
in American statecraft. The Civil War was not the cataclysm for the fishing industry that it was 
for the nation at large. While men and resources were directed away from fishing, and some 
fishing schooners were even scuttled at the hands of Confederate ships, it was the postwar period 
that saw an assault on the fishing industry. Since the nation’s inception the federal government 
had uniformly protected the fishing industry from domestic opposition, inhospitable international 
markets, and foreign aggressors under the assumption that the North Atlantic fisheries were an 
important national resource with historical ties to the independence of the nation. But after the 
war this logic began to falter. The economic and cultural changes of postbellum America frayed 
the once taut rope that bound the federal government to the fisheries. This shift had political 
ramifications as the fisheries issue in Anglo-American relations was sidelined as an emerging 
rapprochement and a placid transatlantic relationship took precedent over an increasingly 
isolated industry.   
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 Britain’s tacit support of the Confederacy during the Civil War, as manifested in the 
number of ships built, outfitted, or manned by British citizens, cast a pall on Anglo-American 
relations. The sense of betrayal harbored by Americans after the war threatened, at times, the 
stability of Atlantic diplomacy. But the Treaty of Washington (1871) ultimately addressed the 
series of grievances that occasioned fiery American rhetoric at real or perceived British insults. 
Most famously this agreement settled the Alabama Claims stemming from the assault on 
American shipping by British-built Confederate ships. But also included in the negotiation was 
an attempt to remedy the ongoing fisheries issue. Once again an important shift in Anglo-
American relations was directly tied to the fisheries. However unlike the revolutionary 
settlement of 1783, the Convention of 1818, or the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854, the Treaty of 
Washington was not a full-throated defense of the fisheries. Instead the treaty revealed the 
degree to which the fisheries issue had slid down the list of American priorities. American 
policymakers would no longer allow the fisheries issue to dictate foreign policy or compromise 
other, more important diplomatic goals.     
 
THE FISHERMEN’S FALL IN AMERICAN POLITICS 
 
By midcentury the North Atlantic was in flux. The adoption of North American free trade 
altered the calculus of Anglo-American-Canadian relations. American fishermen shifted where, 
how, and for what they fished in response to the accidental collusion of industry and nature. And 
American politics would forever change how the nation would understand those maritime 
laborers. Since the 1790s federal policy had almost uniformly defended the rights and privileges 
of American fishermen from foes both foreign and domestic under the assumption that this class 
of workers was a vitally important element of the American polity. During the 1860s and 1870s 
the formerly unassailable bond between American fishermen and the federal government would 
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shift as the relationship between individuals, industry, and government was exposed to 
fundamental rethinking. Like the nation as a whole, the fisherman of 1860 was far different from 
that of 1880.       
 The first sacrifice was the cod fishing bounty. As the late-antebellum period witnessed 
the deepening of the sectional crisis, antibounty forces had started speaking with a more 
distinctly southern drawl.373 Clement C. Clay challenged the efficacy of the federal bounty in 
1858 and again the antibounty cause failed. Clay would, however, continue the crusade, and 
continue to rail against not just the bounty, but the fishermen too. In an 1860 report to the 
Committee on Commerce the Alabamian again turned his ire on cod fishermen claiming that “if 
the codfishermen rendered the country great and gallant services in her wars,” which he disputed, 
“they may justly claim her praise” but never a bounty, which he likened to “tribute money,” that 
would be “exacted from other patriotic fishermen, mariners, and soldiers.” Not only were cod 
fishermen undeserving, the bounty simply no longer made sense. In an astute reading of 
ecological and industrial change, Clay went on to assail the bounty as unreflective of current 
realities as mackerel fishing had surpassed the cod fishery in importance. Thus the bounty served 
to remove valuable tonnage and labor from the more remunerative mackerel fishery, while 
motivating others to commit perjury in order to collect the bounty. Clay would again fail in his 
efforts, but soon the fishing bounty would be of little consequence to the newly minted 
Confederate senator. Strangely enough, the effort to repeal the bounty, and thus to bring about a 
fundamental reorientation of the relationship between the fishing industry and American politics, 
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would come to fruition only when Clay and his southern colleagues remained out of Congress, 
unrepentant and unreconstructed.374   
 This assault upon the bounty and the political power of cod fishermen came from their 
own backyards. In a session devoid of southern members, Congress repealed the cod-fishing 
bounty with little comment during the summer of 1866. Part of a larger revenue bill, the section 
on the cod-fishing bounty seemed to catch some congressmen by surprise, as if cod fishing no 
longer even merited the attention of the nation’s lawmakers. With an air of exasperation, Senator 
Zachariah Chandler of Michigan dismissed the issue as of little consequence, hoping that the 
bounty question “is ended, and ended forever, and that we shall never have another vote in this 
body for codfish.” While the senator admitted that he had “voted for nine years to retain the 
bounty…now, for the first time, I am going to vote to get rid of it, and get rid of it forever.” Even 
the delegations from Massachusetts and Maine, the heart of the cod kingdom, remained almost 
entirely silent on the question. Only the junior Senator from Maine, Lott M. Morrill, offered an 
uninspired comment on fishermen as a national resource for their service in the navy and 
merchant marine. What the fishermen’s opponents had hoped to do for decades was done with 
little fanfare as inaction won the day. The hearty, patriotic cod fisherman of the North Atlantic 
seemed, at one point in the not-too-distant pass, to command the loyalty of Congress. In 1866, he 
was met with only an indifferent shrug.375    
 This indifference, however, was part of the politics of fishing emanating from wharves 
along the Massachusetts coast. The fishing revolution of midcentury centralized the industry 
among a smaller number of large, highly capitalized firms extending north along the littoral from 
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Boston and in the process squeezed out a number of smaller operations. Fishing capitalists had 
taken over the industry. These capitalized firms did not rely on the federal handout to turn a 
profit or make ends meet during lean years. Thus their representatives in Congress were left with 
little incentive to agitate for the bounty’s survival. Furthermore, the repeal of the measure served 
to liberate fishermen from the bounty’s onerous requirements. No longer did fishermen have to 
prove they pursued cod exclusively for so many months of the year in order to claim the bounty, 
but could instead fill their fares with more profitable fish like mackerel and, increasingly, 
halibut. The repeal of the cod-fishing bounty did little to hurt the industry. It may have, in fact, 
been proof of strength and resiliency. The image of the bold, enterprising, patriotic cod 
fishermen did, however, suffer. Losing the support of the federal government and becoming a 
relic within the industry, the cod fisherman-as-symbol was losing the potency it once had.376 
 The changing circumstances of postbellum American fishery politics reflected changes in 
the sea itself. The middle decades of the nineteenth century witnessed a series of ecological and 
industrial changes that dethroned King Cod from his formerly vaunted place within the wider 
American fishing industry. Overfishing, changes in climate and ocean chemistry, and shifting 
modes of production and consumption, rendered cod, by the 1850s and 1860s, a comparatively 
less valuable fish during the era of Prince Mackerel’s ascendency. 377 As the economic clout of 
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codfish waned, so too did the political clout of cod fishermen. The repeal of the bounty in 1866 
represented an effort on behalf of Congress to align political, economic, and ecological realities 
as the bounty had become an outdated measure, more fit to the circumstances of the 1840s, or 
even, 1790s. But the repeal was also part of a larger, national reorientation away from the 
maritime world.       
 Fishermen of any stripe seemed to embody the ideology of the newly founded 
Republican Party. With its origins in the fractious debates of the 1850s over the place of slavery 
in the union, the Republican Party coalesced around the idea of free labor. The fishing industry 
obviously fit this bill. But the challenges of governing amidst warfare would blind the party of 
Lincoln to the maritime world of the Atlantic—at least the commercial activity beyond the 
purview of the war-time blockade. During the course of the 1860s, as the party’s ideological 
orientation and legislative agenda shifted to face wartime exigencies, Republican economic 
policy largely overlooked maritime matters. Agriculture, land policy, and railroad construction 
were all terrestrial endeavors that came to dominate the Republican Party’s economic program. 
The party did, however, enact limited tariff reform that directly affected the fisheries by revoking 
the Reciprocity Treaty in 1865, thus reinstating the tariff barrier with Britain’s North American 
Colonies.378 Even within the fishing industry this proved to be a controversial decision, since it 
limited the inflow of Canadian fish to the American market but further restricted American 
access to foreign waters. As will be seen this action did not necessarily reflect a genuine interest 
in the fisheries as much as serve to illustrate the contentious state of postbellum Anglo-American 
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relations. Although Secretary of State William Henry Seward attempted to garner support for his 
scheme to purchase Greenland and Iceland in 1867 by describing the wonders of the island’s 
maritime resources, the Republican-controlled government of the 1860s, while not openly 
antagonistic to the fishing industry, was largely indifferent.379 The failure to purchase Greenland, 
the construction of the transcontinental railroad, and measures like the Morrill Land-Grant Act 
all hint at a government and nation no longer obsessed with the sea.380  
 This turn away from the sea was not confined to specific Republican policies, but it 
reached a level of ubiquity, leaving one naval historian to describe the period as a maritime “dark 
age.” While the Civil War witnessed the explosive growth of the United States Navy to meet the 
needs of an extraordinary blockade, this fleet was left to rot soon after the conflict ended. At the 
same time sailing skills were increasingly downplayed in the navy as the American fleet 
transformed from sail to steam. The future of the nation’s naval forces would rely on engineers 
and technicians. As historian Wayne M. O’Leary observes, “the kind of training provided by the 
fisheries ‘school’ might have been helpful in preparing men for the old wooden sailing navy, 
where the premium was on seamanship. In the new age of steam, however, it was irrelevant.” 
Furthermore, the middle decades of the nineteenth century witnessed the professionalizing of the 
navy. These transformations were perhaps most critical in relegating American fishermen to the 
sidelines of politics. For decades the connection between fishing and fighting was pivotal in 
guaranteeing widespread support for fishermen since the logic of national security was quite 
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persuasive. But given the structural changes in the navy, the nation simply no longer needed the 
fisheries to serve as a training ground for sailors.381 The navy proved to be yet another realm of 
federal policy in which the changes of the 1860s and 1870s forced a renegotiation of the 
relationship between fishermen and national, if not international, politics. And yet again the 
political clout of the fisherman and his image was curtailed. 
 Another important aspect of the changing role of fishermen in the political order was the 
increasing professionalization and bureaucratization of fisheries science. For much of the 
nineteenth century fishermen spoke with authority on ichthyological matters, brandishing 
knowledge earned from firsthand experience upon the ocean. This knowledge did not, of course, 
go uncontested. Across the first half of the nineteenth century the growth of scientific thinking in 
the form of published, canonical texts vied with the experiences of ordinary fishermen for 
authority in understanding the opaque world of the ocean. While for much of this period neither 
the men of science nor fisherfolk were able to dominate this discourse, by the second half of the 
century the authority and expertise of institutionalized ichthyology began to win out. The 
experience of fishermen indicated a changing ocean that demanded a change in human actions 
while self-anointed experts hubristically extolled the powers of science and technology to both 
understand and remedy any problem that may beset the fishing industry. Obviously this 
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confident story of technological innovation resonated better than a pessimistic tale of 
environmental degradation. The reification of formal science served to undercut the authority of 
fishermen and further alienate this group of laborers from the politics of the industry.382                    
This process crested in 1871 with the creation of the United States Fisheries Commission 
(USFC). Headed by a now-vaunted man of science, Spencer Fullerton Baird, the United States 
Fisheries Commission had its origins in settling a series of disputes in southern New England 
between line fishermen—those employing older methods for catching fish—who blamed their 
technologically sophisticated competitors using traps and weirs for the marked decline in fish 
stocks along the coasts of Massachusetts and Rhode Island. Cod and mackerel fishermen largely 
aligned themselves with the wealthier weir fishermen as the series of nets and seines that marked 
the New England coast were responsible for catching the alewives that supplied bait for theses 
more lucrative fisheries. Baird initially sought to merely study the question and suggest ways in 
which a scientific approach would remedy the problems of declining catches, yet through skillful 
gamesmanship in Washington he emerged as the head of a new federal agency charged with 
investigating scientific fixes for the nation’s fisheries more generally.383        
Much of the early work of the Commission focused on marine biology; the systematic 
cataloging of commercially valuable fish; and, ultimately, implementing fish culture to 
artificially propagate fish populations in order to overcome the overfishing that threatened 
valuable species. Baird actively sought to address questions to nature itself to circumvent the 
subjectivity of the fishermen who previously spoke on these issues with authority. This shifts 
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represented a process that historian Matthew McKenize describes as “abstraction,” in which the 
region’s fishermen “were relegated to mere inputs in a larger industry, inputs whose individual 
natures had no place in influencing the decisions that affected them.” Furthermore fish became 
“mere numbers in a larger balance sheet of marine environmental production.” This process—
supported by the collusion of industrial, scientific, and governmental interests—further removed 
fishermen from politics in favor of the fishing capitalists, and now fishery scientists, that came to 
control the industry.384 
 The abstraction of fishermen and fish into mere numbers was part of a larger process of 
professionalization and bureaucratization that swept the federal government during the middle 
decades of the nineteenth century. Along with agencies such as the Coast Survey, the Naval 
Observatory, the Smithsonian Institution, and the Census Bureau, the United States Fisheries 
Commission sought to use professional expertise to simplify the complexities of the human and 
nonhuman worlds with the goal of understanding, if not controlling, them. Also inherent in the 
activities of the USFC was expanding the purview of the federal government. Before the 
Commission’s advent, fishery policy was the domain of the states, but in an era that witnessed 
the expansion of federal power, an issue that was seemingly far removed from questions of 
federalism that defined the period attracted federal interest. The United States Fisheries 
Commission, stretching back to the growth of federal power during the Civil War and forward to 
the Progressive era’s ascendency of expertise, was indicative of significant trends in the extent 
and aim of the federal government’s power during the second half of the nineteenth century.385      
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The adoption of the scientific management of fisheries was not, however, confined to the 
United States, but was part of an international trend that privileged the knowledge of elites, while 
assuming the ability of humans to perfectly control the nonhuman world.386 French 
aquaculturists led the way in the artificial propagation of fish, having sustained a government-
funded hatchery in Alsace since the 1850s. By the 1860s the international growth of fish culture 
inspired a series of international expositions to explore and promote this new fishery science. 
The first of these expositions was to be held in the French city of Arcachon in 1866. In a missive 
from the United States Minister to France, John Bigelow, to Secretary of State William Henry 
Seward, the American minister beseeched the secretary of state to send a delegation to France 
owing to the fact that “the people of the United States are more extensively engaged in the cod, 
whale, and oyster fishery than the people of any other nation,” and that the United States was a 
leader in “the science of water culture” given America’s “fluvial system adapted to the indefinite 
culture and distribution of fish.” Victor Coste, the French aquaculturist and leading scientist in 
the field, sought to convene the meeting with the goal of unleashing the same “intelligence” and 
“boldness” to develop “the resources of the domain of the water,” that humanity has long used to 
cultivate the land. The future of marine resources laid in the careful propagation of fish species 
through the collaboration of science and labor. Although Coste declared that “the plain 
communications forwarded by the working people or by the fishermen themselves, form an 
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essential part of an exhibition of fishery,” the application of technology, “appropriate 
administration,” and “the solicitude of government” for “more regular, more intelligent, and 
more complete development” of marine resources, suggested that any input of ordinary laborers 
would of course be guided and mediated by the now more authoritative men of science. The 
international exhibition in Arcachon would prove to be the first such event in a series that would 
stretch across Europe during the closing decades of the nineteenth century. 387 But in the United 
States, at least, the gradual subversion of the fishermen’s political standing served to recast 
American fishermen not as a forward-looking national symbol but as a conservative relic of a 
bygone era.388               
The immediate postbellum years saw a significant shift in how American fishermen 
factored into the political calculus of the fisheries issue, if not American politics generally. 
Formerly fishermen had commanded deference on political questions; their assumed value to the 
republic went unassailed or, in certain instances, was vigorously defended. But numerous 
changes from both within and outside of the fishing industry converged after the Civil War to 
fundamentally alter the relationship between the American political community and the sea 
fishermen of the North Atlantic. The repeal of the federal cod-fishing bounty, the 
transformations of the United States Navy, and the ascendency of science-based fisheries 
management all served to undercut the political capital of fishermen in favor of the scientists, 
bureaucrats, and capitalists whose authority now outstripped that of these maritime laborers. The 
fall of the fishermen in American politics did not, however, mean that the fishing industry 
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generally was forsaken by the political establishment. In fact, the postbellum years would see the 
fisheries issue once again emerge in Anglo-American relations and continue, albeit amid 
differing circumstances, to cut to the heart of transatlantic ties.            
 
ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE POSTWAR WORLD 
As the United States descended into fratricidal war in 1861, Anglo-American relations 
were, in most regards, rosier than ever. Financial and commercial bonds grew stronger as the 
United States acquiesced to Britain’s international free trade order. Agreements like the Clayton-
Bulwer Treaty of 1850 suggested a higher degree of international cooperation. The settlement of 
the U.S.-Canadian border, along with the agreement on the North Atlantic fisheries removed the 
most likely element of discord in Anglo-American relations. Of course rosy relations at 
midcentury were relative as the degree of Anglophobia in popular American politics remained 
high, but these trends all suggested, at the very least, a transatlantic détente. This transatlantic 
spirit of amity would, however, be short lived. Recent historiographical trends have exposed the 
international ramifications of the Civil War and the conflict’s impact on Anglo-American 
relations has been a productive field of inquiry.389 The discord engendered within the United 
States by British policy was not confined to the war years, instead souring transatlantic relations 
for years to come. The fisheries issues would become embroiled in a series of disputes stemming 
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from the war to not only Anglo-American relations to a near breaking point, but also to call into 
question any facile interpretation of a linear trajectory for transatlantic relations across the 
nineteenth century.   
 The tension that defined Anglo-American relations during the early postbellum years 
stemmed from the diplomatic goals of the Confederacy. This newfound state had a relatively 
simple foreign policy agenda: secure international recognition. The carrot and stick approach of 
the South’s cotton diplomacy has received much historiographic attention and has generally been 
dismissed for its failure to achieve the recognition of the European powers.390 Yet the diplomacy 
of the Confederate States may have, in fact, achieved at least limited success by the war through 
Britain’s surreptitious aid. Officially the British government never recognized the Confederacy, 
but it did recognize the South’s belligerency, opening the door for British firms to outfit 
Confederate ships. While the ground war continued apace without the direct intervention or 
assistance of European arms and armies, the war upon the waves depended on British ships and 
men to sustain the Confederate navy. Ships such as the CSS Florida, Shenandoah, and most 
importantly, the Alabama, harassed the Union navy, circumvented the blockade, and preyed 
upon northern shipping, in the process driving up insurance rates leading to an unprecedented 
decline in the American merchant marine. Combined with the Trent affair, the depredations of 
British built sloops assured that the maritime memories of the Civil War would mar postbellum 
relations.391         
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 In summer 1862 the Confederate steamer Alabama embarked upon a two year cruise of 
terrorizing northern merchant ships and evading federal authority. Constructed by the Laird 
Brothers of Birkenhead, the Alabama would become one of the most successful raiders in the 
southern fleet by taking dozens of Union prizes. Ultimately sunk off the coast of Cherbourg by 
the USS Kearsarge in 1864, the British-built Alabama became a sticking point in Anglo-
American relations as it seemed to represent an obvious transgression of Britain’s proclaimed 
neutrality.392 While the Alabama was the most successful and thus (in)famous of the British-built 
warships in the Confederate’s employ, it was not alone. The CSS Tallahassee cruised the waters 
of the North Atlantic, preying on Yankee ships including fishing schooners. Despite a growing 
American naval force in the region, the presence of the Confederate raider dissuaded New 
England fishermen from pursuing their fares resulting in a drop by half in the American tonnage 
employed on the fishing grounds during the war years.393  
As the civil conflict ended, the United States turned its attention to Great Britain with the 
aim of extracting a monetary penalty for the losses to Union shipping and an admission of 
culpability on the part of the British government. Americans not only sought indemnification for 
the direct losses to northern shipping at the hands of British-built vessels, but some even went so 
far as to blame Great Britain for prolonging the war and its insatiable appetite for blood and 
treasure. Hoping to smooth transatlantic discord, the Andrew Johnson administration appointed 
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Reverdy Johnson (no relation) to serve as the American minister to Great Britain after Charles 
Francis Adams’s retirement and to negotiate a satisfactory solution to the Alabama claims. The 
treaty that emerged from Johnson’s negotiations with British Foreign Secretary Lord Clarendon 
assured that the American diplomat’s career would be short lived. Vague, evasive, lacking any 
clear enforcement mechanism, and completely devoid of any British admission of guilt, the 
Johnson-Clarendon Treaty failed in its purpose to assuage transatlantic discord. The treaty would 
come before the Senate where Charles Sumner passionately denounced the treaty while 
articulating the disgust Americans felt given Britain’s actions during the recent war.394      
 Discharging his duty as the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Sumner 
addressed Congress in April 1869, with the committee’s unanimous decision to reject the hastily 
negotiated Johnson-Clarendon Treaty. For Sumner, the convention was wholly inadequate since 
it failed to address British culpability and accounted for a pittance of the losses sustained at the 
hands of British built ships of war. Irksome for the Massachusetts Senator was the fact that Great 
Britain bestowed the status of “ocean belligerent” early upon the Confederacy when the rebellion 
remained “without ships on the ocean, without prize court or other tribunals for the 
administration of justice on the ocean, [and] without any of those conditions which are essential 
prerequisites to such a concession.” This illegitimate recognition of belligerency, a “shameful 
and impossible pretension” with no root in reality, allowed the South “equal rights with the 
National Government in [British] ship-yards, foundries, and manufactories, and equal rights on 
the ocean.” Through granting the status of belligerency upon the Confederacy; allowing ships to 
be built, armed, and equipped in Britain; and refusing to admit those ships to British ports across 
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the world, the depredations of Confederate ships set “the ocean ablaze” and such destruction 
“proceeded from England, which…lighted the torch.”395     
 Americans, Sumner declared, seethed with indignation. Coming at a time of “profound 
peace” between the transatlantic nations, the British decision to recognize the unproven 
belligerency of a sham state was “in no just sense a commercial transaction,” but in fact, “an act 
of war.” Most galling for the Radical Republican was that the nation that had for so long stood 
on the vanguard of world-wide abolition “gave her name, her influence, her material resources to 
the wicked cause, and flung a sword into the scale with Slavery.” American aggravation was to 
be found in Britain’s “flagrant, unnatural departure from the anti-slavery rule, which by manifold 
declarations, legislative, political, and diplomatic, was the avowed creed of England.” Just as the 
United States was joining Great Britain as Atlantic nations allied against bondage, the British 
seemed to cast their lot with a nation of slaveholders gripped “in the very madness of 
barbarism.” Sumner was not alone in this feeling of betrayal.396     
 Sumner’s speech before the Senate conveyed the discord that existed between the United 
States and Great Britain during this postbellum period. But the speech was also a stratagem on 
the senator’s part to reassert his control of U.S. foreign policy. Hoping to assert his dominance 
over the new Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish, Sumner instructed the soon-to-be American 
Minister to Great Britain, John Lothrop Motley, to pen a “Memoir” that Sumner hoped would 
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become the official stance of the State Department.397 The “Memoir” would mirror Sumner’s 
speech in both substance and style. Motley reinforced the feeling of betrayal that pervaded 
Sumner’s speech. “A deep sense of national wrong at the hands of Great Britain,” Motely 
declared, “over and above large pecuniary losses sustained by individuals pervades the American 
people.” Like Sumner, Motley focused on Britain’s grant of belligerency to the Confederacy as 
the genesis of the discord. Giving the Confederate States any claim to legitimacy not only 
endangered Britain’s relationship with the United States, but was not based in the material 
conditions of the southern war effort. The independence and sovereignty of the southern 
government were mere “figments” and any claim to naval belligerence a “shadow of a shade.” 
And like the Senator’s speech, Motley highlighted the hypocrisy of British policy. While the 
abolition of the African slave trade, war against the Christian slavery of the Barbary States, and 
the ultimate emancipation of the enslaved peoples of the West Indies, did much to efface “the 
sins of Elizabeth’s reign,” Britain ceded any claim to the moral high ground by aiding the 
southern cause.398 Motley described the “amazement” and the “revulsion of feeling” when “anti-
slavery England had suddenly and swiftly proclaimed a virtual recognition of the new slavery 
engendered confederacy.” As this revulsion festered for years, a mere repayment for the 
individual losses caused by British built ships would prove entirely inadequate. Americans 
demanded that Britain make amends for affronting the national honor.399      
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 While the Johnson-Clarendon Treaty would make arrangements for settling the claims of 
individuals directly affected by the marauding of the southern navy, Sumner took a more 
expansive view of the costs to the entire nation. In addition to the losses of individuals, Sumner 
calculated a bill that took into account the costs borne by the United States merchant marine as 
American ships either refused to subject themselves to the risk of Confederate raiders or were 
simply unable to contend with skyrocketing insurance rates. But most costly was Sumner’s 
contention that British support extended the duration of the war by more than two years. The cost 
in men and materiel was staggering as Sumner suggested Great Britain owed the United States 
billions of dollars in damages. Historians and contemporaries have suggested that this inflated 
number was Sumner’s gambit to force Britain to cede Canada as equal payment.400 But even 
such a princely sum was worthless without Great Britain acknowledging its wrongdoing. Sumner 
concluded by observation that “a generous expression” of guilt was the necessary “beginning of 
a just settlement, and the best assurance of that harmony between two great and kindred nations 
which all must desire.”401      
 Sumner’s speech roused Americans at home and ruffled Britons abroad. In Congress and 
in the press Americans praised Sumner for taking such a hard line on the outstanding grievances 
that bedeviled Anglo-American relations. Clearly he was able to convince his peers as the Senate 
rejected the Johnson-Clarendon Treaty with near unanimity, fifty-four to one. Sumner seemed to 
give voice to the sense of disgust and betrayal that defined the American political community’s 
outlook on its transatlantic peer. Meanwhile, Sumner’s speech was received in Britain as the 
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ravings of a dangerous man, set on destroying the possibility of future transatlantic 
cooperation.402   
 In 1869, as spring turned to summer. Anglo-American relations were at an impasse. The 
Alabama claims remained unsettled and thus a major roadblock to any transatlantic détente. 
While John Lathrop Motley was dispatched to London with explicit instructions to bring the 
British to the bargaining table, Anglo-American relations headed toward divergence in response 
to the postbellum pall that descended upon transatlantic ties. Fully four years before Sumner 
addressed the Senate and gave voice to ideas that had been festering for years, the United States 
ended its reciprocal trading relationship with Canada that had been in effect since 1854. While 
much less dramatic than Sumner’s and Motley’s fiery rhetoric, the end of North American 
reciprocity was symbolic of the stress Anglo-American relations endured. Only a decade before, 
Great Britain used the stick of fisheries access to coerce the United States into an emerging 
international regime of free trade. Now, a spiteful America sought even further separation from 
the same.       
 At midcentury British boosters spoke of free trade in rhapsodic terms, believing an open, 
international economic order was an enlightened path that could go so far as to end all wars. But 
after a decade of North American free trade, the United States was all too ready to extricate itself 
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from that arrangement and, pursuant to the terms of the treaty, repealed the agreement in 1866. 
The justification for doing so was explained, at least in part, by the simple economic rationale 
that the United States, unlike the Canadian provinces, was disadvantaged by the relationship. But 
observers at the time noted that repeal was a response to the acerbic tenor of Anglo-American 
relations, and also tied up with the larger geopolitical questions of annexation and confederation 
that had for decades challenged the North American relationship. 
 In the aftermath of repeal, a report addressed to Secretary of State Seward made clear that 
it was not the content of the Reciprocity Treaty that occasioned its repeal. Instead it was 
American indignation at Britain’s tacit support of the Confederacy that severed the first North 
American trade union.403 The report’s author, E. H. Derby, recognized that “the treaty itself had 
serious defects,” chief among them was the fact that the treaty’s terms were more beneficial to 
the under-industrialized economy of the Canadian Provinces; but repeal was accelerated by 
American bitterness. “The notice for repeal,” Derby remarked, “was given at a time when our 
country was deeply offended with Great Britain,” since during “our great struggle for existence 
she had given her sympathy to our foes,” and thus exposed Britain’s hypocritical claims to 
opposing servitude. Given the geographical unity of North America, Derby suggested the only 
logical solution to the problem of trade was through “the union of all parts of our continent in 
one harmonious whole.” Of course, any such arrangement was best administered from the 
federal capitol in Washington. But the American doubted the British would ever accede to 
relinquishing the Canadian Provinces. Derby sardonically queried whether “Asia, Africa, and 
Australia” were alone “sufficient for Great Britain?”404  
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 A later report, compiled at the behest of the Treasury Department on the eve of the Treaty 
of Washington negotiations, described the condition surrounding the repeal of reciprocity in far 
more straightforward, economic terms. While acknowledging free trade as the kind of 
arrangement that should define commercial relations between “these quasi-foreign neighbors and 
ourselves,” the terms of the Reciprocity Treaty had exposed itself as “a badly one-sided bargain.” 
In the view of the Treasury Department, the North American Provinces had not honored the 
reciprocal nature of the agreement and thus while the American market was opened for Canadian 
produce, the inverse remained unfulfilled. This situation was, however, not unexpected. The 
report’s author, J. N. Larned, characterized the 1854 Reciprocity Treaty as a “sharply-forced 
bargain on the fisheries question.” The events of the early 1850s showed that the fisheries issue, 
and the attendant question of trade reciprocity, had the potential to devolve into violence. While 
the treaty obviated this threat, ten years of not-so-reciprocal trade had obviously disadvantaged 
the United States, leading to the treaty’s repeal—but repeal also included the repeal of the United 
States’ statutory claim to the inshore fisheries. With American fishermen once again barred from 
the inshore fishing grounds, those fishermen were once again subject to the “unfriendly laws and 
harassing officials” that threatened the rise of “dangerous national controversies.”405 By the early 
1870s, the situation on the fisheries, and Anglo-American relations more generally, demanded a 
longer lasting agreement, one that addressed the Alabama Claims and fisheries issue alike. 
 Once again the fisheries issue would be implicated in what would become a fundamental 
pivot in Anglo-American relations. Long-standing questions about the fisheries were made all 
the more urgent on account of the threat of violence posed by intemperate fishermen who had 
little regard for the arbitrary boundaries drawn by diplomats, as they pursued their catch. The 
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negotiations and treaty that would follow, however, did not serve to reify the political position of 
the real or imagined American fisherman. Instead the resulting transatlantic agreement would 
confirm that the fisherman was increasingly irrelevant and overlooked in the politics and 
diplomacy of a changing world.       
 
WASHINGTON, 1877 
By 1871 the fisheries issue needed a diplomatic fix. The situation was, in fact, not all that 
different from the early 1850s when fishing rights and reciprocity were traded in an effort to 
forestall a breakdown in Anglo-American relations. When Congress repealed the Reciprocity 
Treaty in 1866, the United States also renounced expanded fishing privileges in inshore waters 
that American mackerel fishermen had enjoyed for the previous decade. Without that statutory 
guarantee, American fishermen would once again be subject to seizure by British and provincial 
cruisers for fishing within one league of the shore. The possibility of maritime clashes and the 
loss of American property filled diplomats and fishermen alike with dread. As was true two 
decades earlier, only a shift in transatlantic diplomacy could head off such a confrontation. The 
situation was all the more dire as, unlike during the 1850s, postbellum Anglo-American relations 
had soured significantly and were strained nearly to the breaking point.       
 State Department officials were immediately aware of the maritime implications of the 
repeal of the Reciprocity Treaty. Richard D. Cutts of the Office of Coast Survey informed 
Secretary Seward that without the protections afforded the American inshore fishing fleet by the 
recently repealed treaty “certain laws of Nova Scotia and other Provinces enacted rather to harass 
American fishermen than to protect their own rights….will seriously affect the welfare, if not the 
very existence of our fisheries.” American fishermen were to be on notice that they “must fall 
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back upon their rights, as they exited previous to 1854…[and] that they have, now, no more right 
to fish within three marine miles of the Provincial coasts.” Fearing that Provincial authorities 
may use even the slightest infraction of the three mile limit and the consequent seizure of 
American ships and crews to push for a renewal of the reciprocity treaty, Cutts did not mince 
words, instructing that fishermen “should always have in mind that they are hovering on the 
coasts as if were of an enemy who will avail himself to the slightest suspicion to do him an 
injury.” The situation on the fisheries certainly resembled that of the early 1850s, but this time 
around American officials were far more cognizant of the role played by their North American 
neighbors.406 It seemed as though American policymakers were keen to see nefarious designs in 
Britain’s schemes, whether they emanating from London or power centers much closer to 
home.407  
 Rather than run the risk of future seizures and collisions, or submit to British or Canadian 
demands, Cutts suggested a plan to settle the outstanding differences between the Anglophone 
powers. The plan, Cutts assured Seward, “if assured and judiciously executed…cannot fail to 
place the rights, claimed by the United States, on a footing of greater security and less liable to 
Provincial interference or aggression, and, therefore, acceptable to our fishermen and freed from 
the necessity of aid by extraneous legislation.” Taking cues from an Anglo-French convention 
signed in 1839 to regulate oyster fisheries, Cutts suggested the creation of a commission to 
clearly define the rights of each party, as well as an international tribunal that would adjudicate 
any future disputes. The central job of the proposed commission would be twofold: first, “to 
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agree upon and define…the limits which shall separate the exclusive from the common right of 
fishery, on the coasts, and in the seas adjacent, of the British North American Colonies…to be 
regularly numbered, duly described, and…clearly marked on charts.” Second, once the United 
States and Great Britain had agreed on how to divvy up the fishing grounds, they should, in 
Cutts’s estimation, conclude an enforcement mechanism “to agree and recommend the penalties 
to be adjudged and such proceedings and jurisdiction as may be necessary to secure a speedy 
trail and judgment…for the transgression of the limits and restrictions which may be hereby 
adopted.”408   
 This vision of an international commission to address and adjust fishery relations would 
come to fruition—in time. The acerbic tone of transatlantic relations, however, stymied progress, 
even as the situation on the fisheries demanded attention. While often disregarded by the 
emerging formal scientific consensus, the question of the fisheries’ plenitude contributed to the 
urgency of diplomatic proceedings. The likelihood of impudent fishermen creating trouble—a 
situation diplomats on all sides wished to avoid—was exacerbated by the fact, or even 
perception, of dwindling catches. Although Cutts gave voice to the commonly held, if overly 
optimistic notion that “like farming lands,” fishing grounds required “judicious treatment to 
increase the annual harvest,” he did recognize that it was “a mistake to suppose that the supply of 
food afforded by the sea is inexhaustible.” Cutts expressed to Seward that reports from the 
fisheries indicated that the prodigious Grand Bank fishery was “beginning to fail.” The 
increasingly precarious nature of the fisheries could degenerate to the point of creating political 
tension. But political cooperation, supported by the promises of scientific encouragement, was, at 
least in the eyes of Cutts and his superiors at the State Department, necessary to fix this 
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ecological problem.409 When American diplomats set themselves the task of easing Anglo-
American tension in 1871, they had a sense of the environmental elements of that diplomacy. 
But such considerations, often based on dubious scientific assumptions, took a back seat to the 
dictates of political horse-trading.             
 As postbellum American diplomats once again approached the ongoing problem of the 
North Atlantic fisheries, other maritime resources were likewise included in the calculus of 
American foreign relations. While fundamentally incorrect to think of the postbellum United 
States as more outward looking than its antebellum iteration, the field of American fishery 
diplomacy had expanded greatly by the 1860s and 1870s. While analysis of this period should be 
weary of the teleology that assumes the American republic of 1870 was destined to become a 
colonial master in 1898 and a world hegemon in 1945, the growing reach of American fishery 
diplomacy suggests that the United States was finally emerging from the vassalage of 
postindependence insecurity to becoming a global power. From the Canary Islands to the North 
Pacific, American fishery diplomacy was no long confined to cod and mackerel in the Northwest 
Atlantic. As different as these places seem, their diplomatic workings created the larger, 
integrated context for the treaty negotiations that shifted the trajectories of Anglo-American 
relations and the ubiquitous North Atlantic fisheries question. 
 From his station in Madrid as the American minister to Spain, Daniel Sickles, the 
crippled Union general and self-styled hero of Gettysburg, connected American strategic interest 
and fishery concerns. In an ultimately unsuccessful bid to purchase the island of Tenerife from 
the Spanish to establish a naval depot and dock yard to support an expanded American presence, 
Sickles commented on how the island’s fisheries “really [are] worth attention…on their own 
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merits.” As the American and British delegations were meeting in Washington to finally hammer 
out their differences, Sickles, perhaps undeservedly, boasted “that my fishery negotiation goes on 
swimmingly,” as he continued to push the question of the Canary Island fisheries under the 
assumption that “they are of great value and utility to us….[and] will afford occupation to our 
fishermen during the considerable part of the year when the inclement season makes fishing 
impossible on our Eastern Coast.”410  
 Former Secretary of State William Henry Seward would make an even more direct 
comparison between the North Atlantic fisheries question and expanding American interests. 
Seward counseled Fish that the United States could foil “European and Monarchial jealousy and 
rivalry in the North West” through a fisheries reciprocity treaty with Russia along the coasts of 
the North Pacific Ocean. But more importantly such an agreement could work as a lever upon 
transatlantic relations. “Negotiating such a treaty with Russia,” Seward remarked, “would I think 
have no inconsiderable influence in aiding our negotiations with Great Britain, for the revision of 
the question of the fisheries.” The specter of a Russo-American alliance would galvanize the 
British, as “every new advance of mutual friendship between the United States and Russia adds 
immensely to the prestige of the United States, and to the desire of the British nation to 
accommodate the difficulties existing between that country and the United States.”411  
 While Seward’s suggestion to use fishery issues to achieve larger geopolitical aims was 
motivated by the kind of clear-eyed realism that marked much of American foreign relations 
during the nineteenth century, other officials suggested the United States could use worldwide 
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fisheries issues as a softer kind of suasion. Amid the fantastic growth and growing legitimacy of 
ichthyological science during the middle decades of the century a number of international 
fisheries exhibitions, modeled on London’s Great Exhibition of 1851, were held in France, 
Norway, and the Netherlands. Department of State operative Richard D. Cutts advocated a 
similar exhibition to be hosted in the United States—an event befitting the nation’s claim to 
world power status. On account of “the prominent position occupied by the United States in 
prosecution of the fisheries,” the United States was a logical choice for an exhibition “to 
embrace…the sea-fisheries, salmon culture, oyster farming, and pisciculture.” While justified on 
the grounds of bringing together experts from across the Atlantic and fostering the growth of the 
practical elements of ichthyology, the proposed exhibition would demonstrate American fishery 
leadership and place the nation alongside traditional powers like Great Britain and France in the 
international pecking order. The exhibition would, in Cutts’s words, “issue greatly to the 
benefit…of the country at large.”412 The prospect of European fishery delegations converging on 
Boston in supplication to American leadership would no doubt confirm American pretentions to 
the status of global power, and once again confirm the link between the ever present fisheries 
question and the fundamental workings of American foreign relations during the nineteenth 
century.    
 Postbellum American foreign relations are most often understood as continuous with the 
forces and events that led to intervention in Spanish affairs in Cuba and left the United States 
with its first, formal colonial possessions. Walter LaFeber, the noted historian of American 
foreign policy, describes William Henry Seward’s and Hamilton Fish’s time at the helm of the 
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State Department as “years of preparation.”413 But this period was also marked by continuity 
with the past. Foreign policy under Seward and Fish, just as under its antebellum administrators, 
cast covetous eyes on those parts of North America and the Caribbean still beyond the eagle’s 
talons. While Alaska was successfully added to the national manse under Seward’s watch, 
schemes for acquiring new territory were more often frustrated. The Ulysses S. Grant 
administration’s attempt to purchase the Dominican Republic ultimately came to naught, running 
up against an obstinate Congress weary of adding the island’s colored population to the national 
domain.414 American territorial ambition was implicated in the fisheries question in the run up to 
the Treaty of Washington negotiations as questions of reciprocity in matters of trade and fishing 
made Americans on both sides of the national divide question why North America foolishly 
remained bifurcated.    
 For citizens of the United States during the nineteenth century the eventual acquisition of 
Canada seemed like an assured eventuality. During both the Revolutionary War and the War of 
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1812, Yankees resorted to arms in the hope of joining the continent under one national system. 
At midcentury trade reciprocity suggested that such a union could be achieved peacefully as 
economic integration would naturally lead to a political union. Although the forces of economy 
and manifest destiny seemed poised to align in the 1850s to bring about a North American union, 
in the 1860s the question still lingered even as Canada opted for dominion and, eventually, self-
rule. In 1867 E. H. Derby filed a report with Secretary Seward about his travels to the Provinces. 
Even though that year would witness Canadian Dominion, Derby was leery that Great Britain 
could expend its military presence so close to American borders. “The great majority of 
Americans,” Derby concluded, “would rather see this continent occupied by one republic,” to 
finally rid North America of the British presence.415 Derby also predicted the end of reciprocity 
would bring about the North American union as “the provinces will range themselves under our 
banner and seek admission into the Union,” in order to continue enjoying the commercial 
benefits engendered in the now-repealed treaty. But the union would likewise benefit the United 
States as American fishermen would finally have an unassailable claim to the inshore mackerel 
fisheries.416  
 As the 1860s neared their close and Anglo-American relations remained toxic, 
annexation seemed destined. In a message Horace Greeley forwarded to Secretary of State 
Hamilton Fish in the spring of 1869, a correspondent with the newspaper editor claimed that 
“there perhaps never was as much  genuine annexation feeling in Canada as there exists at 
present,” making annexation “certain.”417 Even an authority the likes of the former American 
                                                
415 Senate Documents, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess., “Message of the President on Reciprocal Relations with British 
Provinces, and Condition of Fisheries,” (Serial 1277, Washington, D.C., 1867), 19. 
 
416 Ibid., 28, 54. 
 
417 M. W. Brown to Horace Greeley, April 30, 1869, Folder: January–March, 1869, Box: 308, John Bassett Moore 
File, Hamilton Fish Papers, Library of Congress. 
  
 
270 
minister to Great Britain, George Bancroft, remarked to Fish that “there is no resisting destiny,” 
as America was poised to subsume lands north and south through the annexation of Cuba, 
Mexico, and, of course, Canada.418 Perhaps American political observers were completely 
ignorant of the forces working north of the border that were laying the foundation of an 
independent Canadian nation, making speculation of a North American union mere bluster. Or 
perhaps this rhetoric was indicative of a propensity among Americans to read foreign relations 
through the Anglo-American relationship. North American union was wishful thinking for a 
nation eager, perhaps now more than ever, to twist the lion’s tail. 
 As the United States and Great Britain staggered to what would become the Treaty of 
Washington, Canadian annexation was among the many questions that would color the 
proceedings. The ubiquitous fisheries issue and the Alabama claims dominated the discord that 
marked Anglo-American relations. In an established pattern the fisheries question was intimately 
tied to what would be a significant shift in transatlantic relations. But in Washington a power 
struggle over control of the nation’s foreign policy resulted in Hamilton Fish’s ascendency to 
became President Ulysses S. Grant’s most trusted advisor and the primary American player in 
British-American treaty making.419    
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 In the spring of 1869 Charles Sumner was in a position of strength. He was one of the 
most senior members of his party, the powerful chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
and fresh off his resoundingly successful jeremiad against the hastily negotiated Johnson-
Clarendon Treaty. Having the president’s ear, Sumner engineered John Lothrop Motley’s 
assignment to London as the American minister and point person on future Anglo-American 
negotiations. Grant elected to follow Sumner’s advice over Fish’s. Motley, however, disobeyed 
the administration’s orders shortly after his arrival and was promptly removed. Sumner’s support 
of Motley, and his opposition to Grant’s Dominican Republic scheme, ensured the senator would 
be sidelined for the remainder of his public service, not to mention stripped of his prestigious 
position as the chair of the Senator Foreign Relations Committee, while facilitating Fish’s 
ascendency.420 Fish had few positive words for the man who attempted to undercut his authority. 
The secretary of state called Sumner “malicious” and a “monomaniac,” whose “vanity and 
conceit have overturned his judgment, which never was the best.”421 Fully capturing Fish’s 
disdain for Sumner and his machinations, he confided to the American minister to France that 
Sumner was “bitterly vindictive and hostile…[to] every thing that the President proposes or 
wishes or does.” Fish was “convinced” that Sumner was “crazy” and his “vanity, conceit, [and] 
ambition have disturbed the equilibrium of his mind,” going so far as to claim that Sumner’s 
behavior resulted from Preston Brooks’ assault on him in the 1850s. Referring to Sumner, Fish 
remarked that “he was suffering from the same malaise that he experienced after Brooks’ assault 
upon him,” while recommending that “his friends should subject him to ‘treatment’ that, I think, 
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is the term they use in connection with the insane.”422 With Sumner sidelined and Fish in control, 
Anglo-American diplomats who had long recognized the tension in transatlantic relations finally 
recognized the need for amelioration. 
 The future of transatlantic relations, it seems, rode on the impending Anglo-American 
negotiation; the consequences of another failed treaty were dire. Even as Motley’s “Memoir” 
aped Sumner’s fiery, Anglophobic rhetoric it recognized the need for placid transatlantic 
relations, if not the obvious kinship of the two nations. Referring to transatlantic ties, Motley 
proclaimed that “relations of peace and sincere friendship should exist between two great and 
kindred nations,” even though “never before was America so little understood by Great 
Britain.”423 Elsewhere Hamilton Fish recognized the delicacy in the current state of Anglo-
American relations as he wished “that discreet men on either side remain discreet and calm men 
retain their thoughtfulness.”424 Fish likewise shared the sentiment that the two nations should be 
on friendly terms as the forces of culture and history, not to mention of commerce and finance, 
made comity normative. “The two English speaking, progressive, liberal government of the 
world,” Fish proclaimed, “should not, must not, be divided.”425 While this kind of rhetoric was a 
far cry from the effusive pronouncements of Anglo-Saxonism that would emanate from either 
side of the Atlantic in coming decades, Washington, at least, recognized what was on the line if 
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the tenor of Anglo-American relations remained fraught. 426 For the British and American 
ministers that would meet in Washington in the spring of 1871 expectations were high. 
 While Anglo-American friendship was a goal for the American contingent, it was 
obviously undergirded by the demands of national interest. Americans would not be brought to 
the bargaining table without the assurance their grievances would be addressed. Topping that list 
was of course the Alabama claims that had generated so much vitriol. But the fisheries proved to 
be a more immediate concern as intemperate American fishermen, or overzealous Canadian 
cruisers, had the potential to turn a minor incident into a major confrontation. The American 
delegation would make the fisheries issue a substantial talking point and demonstrate how once 
again an epochal shift in Anglo-American relations turned on the fishery question.    
 As had long been the case, the inshore mackerel fisheries seemed to be the keystone of 
international tension. However, by the 1870s it was not access to these fisheries per se that 
American fishermen so deeply desired. Instead the liberal fishing rights afforded under 
reciprocity were so welcomed by American fishermen because of the “relief from unfriendly 
laws and harassing officials which the American fishermen enjoyed under it [reciprocity], and 
the welcome quietus that it gave to quarrels and questions which were constantly giving rise to 
dangerous national controversies.” It was only in hindsight that American fishermen saw the 
nonpecuniary benefits of reciprocal trade. But as American and British officials met in the spring 
of 1871 to hammer out their many disagreements, American diplomats understood the fishermen 
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as wanting to avoid the “recurrence of those same annoyances, and their consequence of ill 
blood,” even if that meant the “loss of the ‘inshore fisheries.’”427 Perhaps ironically Americans 
were willing to part with access to the inshore fisheries—the fisheries that had been at the center 
of American fishing and diplomacy for decades—if transatlantic relations could be put on more 
stable grounds. The trade of security for access confirmed the changing place of the fishery 
question in American statecraft. 
 This sentiment was reflected in the case the American delegation presented to their 
British counterparts. Postbellum foreign policy makers showed a willingness to buy their way 
out of problems. The Grant administration met mixed success in attempting to simply purchase 
Caribbean islands to add to the nation’s growing empire.428 At the Washington negotiations 
Hamilton Fish brought the same mentality to the fisheries question, hoping to ascertain the value 
of the fisheries and have the United State purchase that right in order to avoid future clashes. In 
what was perhaps a bit of political gamesmanship Fish claimed the fisheries were of little 
economic value. Fish, it seemed, wanted the British to name their price, but cautioned that the 
inshore fisheries were often overvalued. The inshore fisheries, the secretary noted, “were desired 
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more on political grounds, in order to avoid the danger of collisions, than for their commercial 
value,” offering one million dollars to simply purchase this right.429  
 Throughout the negotiations Fish and the American delegation insisted on expediency, 
understanding the contentious fishing grounds more as political tools to calm transatlantic 
relations than commercial, or even ecological, entities. The Americans harped on the 
geopolitical, not economic, dimensions of the inshore fisheries. A memorandum communicated 
by the State Department to the American delegation observed that “the acquisition of the right to 
American fishermen to fish on the in-shore fisheries…is more important as removing danger of 
collision than as of great intrinsic value.”430 During the actual negotiations the U.S. 
commissioners expressed their desire to secure American access to the inshore fisheries, 
alongside British and Canadian fishermen, “not for their commercial or intrinsic value, but for 
the purpose of removing a source of irritation.”431 The longer the question remained open the 
greater a chance for violent confrontations. Fish “dwelt upon the importance of a settlement, as 
removing a dangerous question that might at any time, through the rashness of the fishermen, 
bring about a collision between the two countries.”432   
 The British delegation, which included the first Prime Minister of Canada, Sir John A. 
MacDonald, found the American scheme objectionable. Authorized by Whitehall to negotiate on 
the basis of reciprocity, the leader of the British delegation, Lord de Grey, remarked that the 
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“most satisfactory arrangement” would involve “a reciprocal tariff…and reciprocity in the 
coasting trade,” in exchange for American access to the inshore fisheries.433 The British 
insistence on reciprocity reflected Britain’s own imperial politics as Canadian interests seemed to 
set the terms of the debate. Reciprocity in trade was, for the Canadians at least, necessary. 
MacDonald noted “that the entire market of the mackerel fisheries was in the United States, and 
the surrender of the inshore fisheries without getting the United States market would ruin the 
Canadian fisheries.”434 Reciprocity was, unsurprisingly, a nonstarter for the Americans. Only 
five years earlier Congress had repealed the reciprocity treaty both under the assumption that the 
trading arrangement did little for American interests and to spit in the face of the free trade 
loving British. Fish made no pretense in expressing that anything approximating a return to the 
Reciprocity Treaty was politically untenable in the United States. Any agreement, Fish declared, 
must “avoid the appearance of the re-enactment of the Reciprocity Treaty, [which]…was 
understood not to be acceptable to Congress.”435  
 The negotiation, it seemed, had come to an impasse. While both sides recognized the 
need to once again address the fisheries issue they disagreed on how to go about it. The crucial 
difference was how each side valued the resource. British diplomats balked at Fish’s suggestion 
that the right of American access could be bought for a mere one million dollars. Instead, at 
Canadian insistence, the British delegation favored a trading agreement that would allow 
Canadian and British merchants to freely sell fish, along with lumber, coal, and salt, to the 
United States in a move that would net foreign merchants millions annually. The Canadian 
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representative, John MacDonald, along with the sole New Englander on the American side, Bay 
State native Ebenezer R. Hoar, attempted to reconcile the disparate valuations by resorting to 
statistical evidence. But the two statesmen could not agree on the interpretation of the data.436 
Unable to bridge such a chasm, the peace commission essentially kicked the can down the 
diplomatic road by agreeing to authorize “an impartial Commission” to determine the value of 
the fisheries.437 For the time being, until the fisheries commission could meet, the conditions of 
the Reciprocity Treaty were essentially reinstated. The inshore fisheries would be opened to 
American fishermen as the American market was to Canadian salt, lumber, coal, and fish. 
American fishermen would be on a level playing field with their Canadian counterparts both on 
the fisheries and in the market, but now without the palliative support of the federal fishing 
bounty. While the resulting treaty would authorize a similar commission to adjudicate the 
Alabama claims, the fisheries commission would not meet for another six years, and it remained 
unclear how the commission would rule.438  
 The Treaty of Washington was an important pivot in the history of Anglo-American 
relations. Although the final text seemed to punt on the fisheries issue, it was, in fact, a 
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powerfully suggestive comment on the place of the fisheries in the larger dynamics of 
transatlantic relations. Through the creation of this “impartial commission” Anglo-American 
diplomats hoped to sequester the fisheries questions from the now more important matters of 
reconciliation. While for nearly a century the North Atlantic fisheries were closely tied to key 
elements of Atlantic diplomacy—including international borders and commerce, if not the very 
notion of independence—the Treaty of Washington indicated that Anglo-American diplomats 
were not content to let their nations come to blows, or even to allow relations to sour, for mere 
fish. The fisheries issue did not go away in 1871, or even 1877 when the commission finally met. 
It would in fact remain part of Atlantic diplomacy until the case was finally brought before The 
Hague in 1910. But the calculus of fishery diplomacy was fundamentally altered as it was 
relegated to the backseat, finally made distinct from the mainstream of Anglo-American 
relations.439        
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 Although the fisheries questions remained unsettled, the treaty was tremendously 
successful in accomplishing its aim of lifting the pall from transatlantic relations. Hamilton Fish 
was heartily congratulated for orchestrating the détente. Well-wishers mused that this was a 
“most important achievement” that would “promote the highest interests of the Anglo Saxon 
race, for all time.” The theme of Anglo-Saxon unity would emerge as others paid tribute to Fish 
for laying the foundation “for a lasting bond of friendship between two countries, which are 
already so nearly allies to each other by a common ancestry and language.” Fish himself even 
reflected on this accomplishment by noting that “the people of both Countries will appreciate the 
benefits of an assured peace, and good understanding between the two branches of the English 
Speaking, Liberty loving, common law governed populations of the globe.”440 The response 
from Boston, however, was not so rosy. Upon his return to his home state Ebenezer Hoar 
remarked that “the general Massachusetts sentiment about the Treaty seems to be satisfaction, 
except as to the fisheries.” Fish would respond by noting that “neither Massachusetts or Canada, 
is satisfied with the Fisheries,” which, in his estimation, proves the “the arrangement is a fair 
one.”441  
 Industry boosters were more likely to recognize the epochal shift the Treaty of 
Washington occasioned in the fisheries. A group of concerned Bostonians petitioned Congress to 
express their displeasure with the recent treaty. These fishing insiders noted that the terms of the 
treaty and the prospect of turning the fate of the industry over to an international tribunal made 
clear that “for the first time in our history the fostering hand of Government is to be withdrawn 
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from our fisheries.” Even if the two nations were to exchange greater American access for 
reciprocal trade—essentially returning to the status quo of 1854–1866—“the price paid for the 
privilege of fishing in British waters, and of retreating unmolested to British ports and harbors, is 
nothing more nor less than the existence of the very industry,” that would now be exposed to 
“destructive foreign competition.”442 The Treaty of Washington proved to be the crest of a wave 
of federal indifference as a fundamental change in the nation’s political economy now allowed 
the fisheries to be sacrificed for other political goals.  
 While dwelling on the implications for the future of the industry, these petitioners, too, 
had an appreciation for the historical importance of the fisheries to the United States. For them, 
the Treaty of Washington was a significant break with the past. While once the fisheries had 
“received the kindest care of the government,” now the citizens of Boston lamented that such 
was no longer the case. Although this new state of affairs obviously struck at the pecuniary 
interests of this group, they made this appeal to the federal government by noting the place of 
this resource in the political and diplomatic history of the nation. The memorial astutely 
observed that the fisheries had “been the turning-point of some of the most intricate and difficult 
negotiations known in the annals of diplomacy.” The connection between the North Atlantic 
fisheries and the history of American statecraft and nation building was deep, and for nearly a 
century industry boosters used this connection to bolster their arguments about the centrality of 
the industry to the nation’s political economy. But, it seemed, this well had run dry. Although the 
Bostonians were correct to identify the fisheries as the pivot upon which so much of the nation’s 
diplomacy turned, the federal government now seemed content to forget that history in favor of 
its future—one to be marked by closer Anglo-American ties. This future, so the citizens of 
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Boston concluded, came at the expense of the government’s fostering hand supporting the 
fishing industry.443   
 The sliding prestige of the fisheries in the American political consciousness would be 
confirmed six years later as the international tribunal stipulated by the Washington Treaty would 
meet in Halifax to settle the balance sheet. By the 1870s the political, economic, and ecological 
contexts in which the North Atlantic fisheries existed had fundamentally changed. For all intents 
and purposes the fisheries issue that had been a central part of American diplomacy for nearly a 
century was now a relic of the past. Fishing continued apace in the North Atlantic for the 
remainder of the nineteenth century, and into the next, as fishing merchants continued to reap 
profits from the ever-growing amount of biomass that fishermen pulled from the oceans with 
increasingly sophisticated technologies. But despite the economic and commercial vitality of the 
industry the political and cultural contexts that made the cod fisheries such an important part of 
American statecraft were no more. King Cod, it seemed, had died and the Halifax Fisheries 
Commission would be its funeral. 
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EPILOGUE 
HALIFAX, 1877 
 
 In the years between the Washington Treaty and the eventual convening of the 
international tribunal that would address the question, the situation reverted to the conditions that 
reigned in the aftermath of the Reciprocity Treaty. Once again North America was united in free 
trade as North Atlantic waters were open without restrictions to American fishermen. As the 
diplomatic and statutory fate of the fisheries remained unsettled, Americans continued to do what 
they had always done: fish. The late nineteenth century would witness more and more biomass 
taken from the seas as an increasingly consolidated and capitalized industry targeted new 
species, straining and already strained ecosystem. From mackerel, to halibut, to lobster, to 
dozens of other species, the postbellum years witnessed booms and busts as new sea creatures 
found their ways to the mouths of hungry consumers across the nation and the world. The 
closing decades of the century seemed to be but an extension of a familiar story; in many 
respects it was. Ecological, industrial, and technological changes encouraged fishermen to 
exploit different species at different times. Catches and profits initially rose in response to 
targeting other organisms, only to be followed by significant declines when ecosystems could not 
sustain such pressure. Yet despite the continuation of this similar pattern, the political context in 
which North Atlantic fishermen worked had changed.     
 These changes were in sharpest relief in 1877 as British and American ministers finally 
convened before an international tribunal in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of 
Washington. Meeting over several months in Halifax—given the topic of consideration, an 
altogether appropriate venue along the North Atlantic’s littoral—the fisheries commission 
considered nearly a century of Anglo-American fishery politics. The central question upon which 
the negotiations turned concerned the value of British North America’s inshore waters and, 
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repeatedly, how much the United States owed for exploiting those waters for decades. The 
commission’s proceedings consisted of discussions of the fishermen and environments that had 
always been fodder for this kind of diplomacy. But the tone of those discussions was 
significantly different.  
 The claims brought before the commission by Great Britain against American fishermen 
were largely straightforward. Essentially the English ministers claimed that the federal 
government owed Great Britain for American fishermen enjoying fishing privileges beyond 
treaty stipulations in British waters. The task then was to determine how much that compensation 
should be, or in other terms, how much value American fishermen derived from the British 
fisheries. The claim was substantial, with the British remarking, “The admission of American 
fishermen to concurrent rights…is…in every respect highly advantageous to the United States’ 
citizens.” In all, Her Majesty’s Government claimed $14.8 million dollars as “a just estimation of 
the intrinsic worth of the concurrent fishing privileges accorded to United States’ citizens,” and 
thus the amount Great Britain demanded of the federal government.444 This sum nearly equaled 
the $15.5 million Britain had, just five year earlier, been ordered after an international arbitration 
to pay the United States to finally settle the Alabama claims.  
 Great Britain justified the amount by cataloging the advantages Americans derived from 
the British fisheries. The British commissioners identified four areas where American fishermen 
benefitted at the expense of British and Canadian fishermen under the terms of the Treaty of 
Washington. First, and most importantly, American fishermen were greatly advantaged by 
unrestricted access to the inshore waters of the Canadian Dominion. British ministers at Halifax 
described this as “a very valuable concession to United States’ citizens,” going on to remark that 
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“the common use of extensive and productive fishing grounds, which are readily accessible to 
American fishermen, and are advantageously situated as regards their home market.”445 Second, 
the British commissioner noted that American retained “[t]he liberty to land for the purpose of 
drying nets and curing fish,” which was “a privilege essential to the successful prosecution of 
fishing operations.” When combined with the third area British diplomats identified—“access to 
the shores for purposes of bait [and] supply”—the right of American fishermen to exploit shore-
side resources gave Americans the ability to complete multiple excursions into British waters 
each season, thus allowing American fishermen to double their profits.446 Finally, American 
fishermen benefited from the efforts of the Fisheries Protection Service of Canada (the 
counterpart to the United States Fish Commission) which encouraged the propagation of forage 
fishes in Canadian rivers, estuaries, and seas that were necessary for the prosecution of the sea 
fisheries. 
 British policymakers doubled down on their argument by claiming that the state of the 
fisheries not only unfairly advantaged American fishermen, but actively worked to the detriment 
of their own. As British ministers observed and urged the tribunal to consider when making their 
decision, the under-capitalized Canadian fishing industry found it difficult for their smaller 
schooners to access the distant open sea fisheries and those fisheries in American waters opened 
by treaty stipulations. But perhaps most troubling, “[t]he inshores are occupied to the fullest 
possible extent, and the supply especially in the matter of bait, is rapidly becoming 
exhausted.”447 The justifications the British ministers mobilized in support of their claim exposed 
                                                
445 Ibid. 
 
446 Ibid., 70. 
 
447 Ibid., 73. 
 
  
 
285 
two central, if interrelated, aspects of fisheries issue that would color much of the discussion in 
1877—those of course being the role of maritime laborers and the environment in this political 
calculus. Moving forward the negotiations would deeply involve fishermen and the fish 
themselves. The American response to the British position would demonstrate the degree to 
which American consideration of the fisheries and its fishermen had changed.   
 In calculating the $14.8 million that the British government demanded of the United 
States for the advantages American fishermen enjoyed, British diplomats resorted to data and 
testimonies collected at the source, which is to say the fishermen themselves. By all accounts the 
British had access to far more sophisticated data than their American counterparts, with the 
leading American ichthyologist Spencer Fullerton Baird even admitting as much.448 To counter 
the British argument American representatives in Halifax resorted to attacking the evidence the 
British case was built on. In the process of doing so, however, American policymakers made 
clear that fishermen, a class of citizens long lionized for their patriotism and enterprise, no longer 
enjoyed such a reputation among the American political community.  
 Much of the American case in response to the British claim rested on proving that 
American fishermen did not have access to privileges beyond what was likewise given to 
Canadian and British fishermen. Essentially the American delegation hoped to prove that the 
inshore waters of the United States were as valuable to foreign fishermen as Canadian inshore 
waters were valuable to Americans. Such a position was difficult to uphold given the American’s 
comparatively shoddy data. But in making this argument the American representatives clearly 
favored the “objectivity” of science over the hard-won vernacular knowledge of fishermen.  
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 The most acerbic words for American fishermen came from American counsel William 
H. Trescott. To support the evidence that the American commissioners marshalled in the service 
of their argument, Trescott directly challenged the intellectual authority of fishermen. While this 
rhetorical move resonated during an era when professional ichthyology was winning adherents in 
governments across Europe and North America, Trescott’s diatribe demonstrated just how little 
esteem American diplomats had for the fishermen who once factored in so prominently to the 
nation’s foreign relations. In Trescott’s mind the difference between British and American 
evidence mapped on to the divide between canonical science and experience, between capital 
and labor. “Ours,” Trescott declared, “is the estimate of the capitalist, theirs the estimate of the 
labourer.” The perspective of ordinary laborers was insufficient in considering such a large 
question, Trescott continued, as “there is no great industry, the cost and profits of which can be 
ascertained by such partial, individual inquiry.” The expanse of the ocean and its resources could 
not be ascertained from the perspective of any individual. Trescott bluntly put the question to his 
audience, “If you wished to invest in mackerel, would you trust the rambling stories of the most 
honest of skippers, or the most industrious of boat-fishers, against the experience and the books 
of men like Procter, Sylvanus Smith, Hall, Myrick, and Pew?”449 By openly questioning the 
intellectual authority of fishermen to speak on behalf of their industry, Trescott’s rhetoric 
widened the gap between ordinary fishermen and the politics of the industry. The individualistic, 
enterprising, and patriotic fishermen did not have a place in the American case at Halifax.               
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 Even American counsel Richard Henry Dana Jr. affirmed the efficacy of the testimony of 
the vaunted men of science over knowledge derived from the everyday experiences of labor. 
Dana was perhaps, more than any other American in Halifax, most familiar with shipboard life. 
Despite his well-heeled Cambridge upbringing, Dana spent part of his formative years aboard 
ships, laboring shoulder-to-shoulder with a class of men whose knowledge of the environment 
came in the form of quotidian observations. This experience formed the basis of his wildly-
popular Two Years Before the Mast and instilled in him a consideration for the trying 
circumstances of maritime laborers.450 But at Halifax even Dana described the “evidence to be 
relied upon,” as “the evidence of men who keep books, whose interest it was to keep books, men 
who had statistics to make up upon authority and responsibility, men whose capital and interest 
and everything were invested in the trade.”451 Yet again the American case was built upon the 
evidence derived from capitalists, corporations, and scientists, not laborers and fishermen.  
 The disavowal of the intellectual authority of fishermen had implications for how 
commissioners at Halifax understood the environment. The case for caution and the need to tread 
lightly upon these maritime resources most often came from fishermen. With those perspectives 
muted, the proceedings at Halifax seemed to be undergirded by the scientific assumptions of the 
day that mere humans could in no way degrade a system as large as the ocean and the associated 
belief that humans had within their power to ability to rectify any degradation. These 
assumptions fit well with the American case since a supposedly inexhaustible resource like the 
fisheries could sustain the exploitation of Americans and Canadians alike, thus resonating with 
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the claim that American fishermen received no benefit beyond what Canadians could likewise 
claim.  
 The statements made by American counsels at Halifax were informed by the assumption, 
common across much of the nineteenth century, that the sea was beyond history—that is to say, 
unchangeable by the intervention of man. The vastness of the world’s ocean was beyond the 
comprehension of any individual, and so, the American case made obvious, was the ability of 
humans as a whole to influence it. Dana bolstered his argument that the United States owed 
nothing to Great Britain by remarking on the nature of the cod fishery, stating “there is no fear of 
diminution—certainly none of its extermination.” Quoting evidence provided by Baird that a 
single cod could produce 3,000,000 to 7,000,000 eggs with 100,000 growing to maturity, Dana 
continued, “Although that is not a large percentage of the amount of ova…[this annual increase] 
shows that there is no danger of the diminution, certainly none of the extermination of that class 
of fish.” Not even the forces of all humanity could diminish the number of fish in the sea, since 
this resources was “something which the whole world combining to exterminate could hardly 
make any impression upon.”452          
 While this line of reasoning resonated with a strain of elite scientific thought, it had 
powerful political implications in this instance. Dana refuted the British claim to a large 
monetary settlement, arguing that the United States should not be forced to pay for degrading a 
resourced that could never be degraded. The Massachusetts native stated that “when the 
argument is made here that we ought to pay more for the right to fish because we are in danger of 
exterminating what cod-fish we have—if that argument is made—it amounts to nothing,” for the 
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fishery was and would always be “as large and extensive and as prosperous as ever.”453 Changes 
in the sea were already afoot, and had been for decades if not centuries, as Dana articulated his 
point at Halifax. Yet the environmental understanding preferred by the American counsels 
obfuscated those changes.  
 Although the American delegation at Halifax broke with nearly a century of precedent as 
they alienated ordinary fishermen from the diplomatic proceedings, the political use of the 
environment was wholly consistent. Given the mobilization of “authoritative” science to support 
American contentions, American diplomats used that particular understanding of the 
environment in the way that they always had. In a remarkable continuity with the past, the 
American arguments made at Halifax presented an environment that seemed to reinforce a 
politically advantageous position. During the Revolutionary era John Adams argued for 
American access to the fisheries on the basis that geographic proximity gave Americans that 
right. During the middle decades of the nineteenth century Daniel Webster and other diplomats 
made novel arguments to justify the American exploitation of inshore waters as mackerel 
became a commercial valuable fish. Now at Halifax, Dana and his colleagues described the 
inexhaustibility of ocean fisheries as proof that the United States was not degrading a commons 
resource and therefore was not liable for the damages Great Britain claimed.  
 This line of argumentation, however, did not prove convincing. In a two-to-one decision 
by the tribunal at Halifax the federal government was ordered to pay for the privileges American 
fishermen enjoyed in foreign waters. While a far cry from the nearly $15 million the British 
government wanted, the final total of $5.5 million the United States paid out, was still, in the 
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words of historian Brian J. Payne, an “enormous sum.”454 For Canada this indemnity had a long-
term influence on the fishing industry of the Maritime Provinces. During the era of dominion, as 
Canada went through the process of national integration, the new national government at Ottawa 
opted to invest the American money back into fishing. Starting in 1878, Canada’s federal 
government invested $150,000 each year in a bounty system for Canadian fishermen, not unlike 
the programs that had been instituted by the United States, Great Britain, and France. The 
Canada bounty system operated until the 1940s.455 The American response to the Halifax 
decision, however, was not nearly as constructive.  
 The reaction in the United States to the Halifax tribunal’s decision that the federal 
government owed $5.5 million for the use of foreign waters was marked by outrage. Fishermen 
voiced their opposition to this decision, but given the changes in the political economy of fishing 
over the previous decades those voices were muted in Washington. Although some congressmen, 
including Senator Hannibal Hamlin of Maine, considered refusing to pay the award, political 
elites in Washington ultimately chose placid relations with Great Britain over the demands of the 
fishermen. Peace, American congressmen made clear, was worth the fisheries. While previously 
the federal government had almost uniformly defended the rights of American fishermen, at 
times allowing this class of ordinary laborers to direct, if not dictate, American policy, it was 
clear at Halifax and after that such was no longer the case. Nearly a decade later, in 1885, the 
federal government failed to renew the fisheries clause of the Treaty of Washington which gave 
American fishermen access to all Canadian waters in return for allowing Canadian fish into the 
American market. This effort was not one that originated among the few remaining small scale 
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fishermen in the region. Instead it was a campaign waged by the American Fishery Union, a 
newly found consortium of fishing merchants and capitalists who, while in part motivated by the 
sting still felt by the Halifax decision, decided to sacrifice greater access for American fishermen 
in order to keep Canadian fish out of the American market.456 There was simply no longer room 
for maritime labor in the international politics of the fisheries issue.  
 The Anglo-American fisheries question came to a resolution by a decision made at The 
Hague in 1910. During this era of Anglo-American rapprochement, the court at The Hague 
decided that the only way to finally settle the question was through opening the contested waters 
to all nations while creating an international joint commission to hear and adjudicate problems in 
the future. No longer would the fisheries question of the North Atlantic be subject to static 
international agreements like the Convention of 1818 that failed to accommodate changing 
ecosystems and changing industries. Instead a regime was put into place that while flexible to 
changing contexts was overwhelmingly committed to unfettered extraction. The resolution to the 
fisheries issue was in part found in the myriad forces that fostered closer Anglo-American 
relations around the turn of the twentieth century. But prominent among those forces was a joint 
commitment to the continued and ruthless exploitation of this maritime resource.           
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